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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation approaches Lucretius' poem as an attempt to communicate 
persuasively across the border between science, Literature and religion. Acknowledging 
the challenge that Lucretius was issuing to his Roman audience, I offer a reading of De 
Rerum Natura as a piece of philosophical evangelism directed toward individuals in a 
society that was generally apathetic toward philosophy and particularly hostile toward 
Epicureanism. Many of Lucretius' contemporaries perceived the Epicurean doctrines of 
divine passivity as a threat to the sanctity of traditional morality and an attempt to 
dismantle the very framework on which their society was built. In this hostile intellectual 
climate, Lucretius employed literary convention and rhetorical innovation in order to 
make his rejection of the supernatural acceptable and appealing to an audience steeped in 
a culture of myths and gods. 
To this end, Lucretius presented his audience with a philosophical treatise that, in 
v 
part, resembled an epic poem. Lucretius himself likened his poetry to the honey rimming 
the medicine cup to disguise the bitter taste of the philosophy within (1.925ff.). This 
dissertation identifies new "honeyed cups" beyond Lucretius ' use of verse. I begin by 
defending the poem' s disputed didactic intent as genuine (ch. 1), and outline the 
challenges that Lucretius faced in presenting his philosophy to his Roman audience ( ch. 
2). I then characterize the subtle didacticism that Lucretius employed to overcome those 
challenges ( ch. 3), bringing together the contributions of previous Lucretian scholarship 
to form a complex picture that reveals Lucretius ' use of wordplay, literary allusion, and 
progressive naturalization of myth as elements of a unified pedagogical strategy (ch. 4). I 
then proceed to describe the psychagogic quality of "latent myths," illuminating 
previously underappreciated passages in which Lucretius subtly references popular 
mythology within descriptions of natural phenomena, creating implicit mythological 
allegories that serve both to naturalize myth, and also to encourage subliminally the 
impulse to see nature's truth within supernatural fictions (ch. 5). 
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Introduction 
Imagine there's no heaven 
It's easy ifyou try 
No hell below us 
Above us only sky 
Imagine all the people living for today 
-John Lennon, from the song "Imagine" 
This dissertation approaches Lucretius ' poem as an attempt to communicate 
persuasively across the borders between science, religion, and literature. Lucretius 
likened his poetry to the honey rimming the medicine cup to disguise the bitter taste of 
the Epicurean philosophy within (1.925ff.). This dissertation identifies new "honeyed 
cups" beyond Lucretius' use of verse-moments in which he employs subtle 
mythological allusion to serve the didactic purpose of acclimating his reader to the 
unfamiliar world of atomism and the theology and ethics that this science provides-and 
explores the motivation behind these subtle and complex passages and their powerful 
didactic impact. 
I begin by quoting Lennon's famous lyrics, not only because they provide an 
elegant encapsulation of Epicurean-like theology and ethics, but because the rhetorical 
fashioning of Lennon's philosophical appeal shares its essence with Lucretius' didactic 
approach. Lucretius embedded his message within a framework of vivid imagery and 
emotional poeticism that captivates the senses. He asks, sometimes compels his reader 
2 
to picture in his mind an unfamiliar world of cascading atoms, in which the gods ignore 
mankind, and each individual, without the hope or fear of divine interference in this life 
or after it, lives only for the true pleasures that a full and happy life has to offer. The 
reader ' s gateway into this new world is his understanding of the invisible nature of a 
microscopic reality which Lucretius will set before his mind in vivid colors. This 
dissertation explores the further reaches of Lucretius' poetic didacticism, with which he 
initiates his reader and prospective student by a kind of didactic psychagogia that turns 
the reader's own imagination into the theater of philosophical instruction. 
I begin in chapter 1 by defending the poem's disputed missionary intent as 
genuine. Although scholars acknowledge the poem's greatness as a piece of moving 
literature, most are still reluctant to attribute its poignancy to an intent to change the 
minds of its audience. I compare De Rerum Natura to some other works within the 
didactic genre in order to correct the scholarly misconception that Lucretius wrote his 
poem purely as a piece of literature. The chapter concludes by offering a wider vision of 
Lucretius' potential readership and suggesting that it was this broader, imagined 
audience, rather than the limited (though not insignificant) audience of the Late 
Republic, that motivated Lucretius' philosophical mission. Chapter 2 outlines the 
challenges that Lucretius faced in presenting his philosophy to his Roman audience, in 
whom the competing voices of traditional religion and other philosophical schools 
instilled a fundamental prejudice against the Epicurean philosophical system and the 
ethics of its adherents. In chapter 3, I characterize the subtle rhetoric of personal 
alliance through which Lucretius positions himself and his reader together amid the 
3 
complex interrelationships that the poem presents between narrator, reader, addressee 
and outside other. Unlike the scholars who view Lucretius' relationship to his reader as 
forcibly coercive and paternalistic, I illustrate the way in which Lucretius employs these 
constructed relationships as an attempt to overcome his reader's prejudices and to 
redirect his antagonistic misgivings about Epicureanism, turning him instead into a 
philosophical ally. 
In chapter four, I examine the relationship of Lucretius' hymn to Venus to the 
rest of his poem, bringing together the contributions of previous Lucretian scholarship to 
form a holistic picture of the poem's polyvalent didacticism. Examination of Lucretius' 
use of word play, literary allusion, and progressive naturalization of myth from the 
proem on into the poem's later books helps to provide a unified view of Lucretius' 
pedagogical strategy. I conclude by applying the concept of polyvalency to the lines on 
the gods' absence from our world (1.44-49), which other scholars have judged to be 
problematic within the context of the proem. I provide a reading that both adheres to 
Epicurean theology and is also consistent with the tone and purpose ofthe proem's 
mythical context. In chapter 5, I identify two passages whose striking imagery has often 
piqued the interest of critiques but which have yet to be fully examined or understood. I 
bring out the relevance ofthese previously misunderstood passages to Lucretius' 
didactic program by illuminating the "latent myths" that lie beneath their surface. In 
these passages, Lucretius subtly references popular mythology within descriptions of 
natural phenomena, creating implicit mythological allegories. These implicit allegories 
create a sub-surface polemic in which Lucretius tacitly criticizes the mythological and 
4 
poetic tradition in the course of presenting Epicurean doctrine. I proceed to describe the 
psychagogic qualities of these examples of "latent didacticism," which serve to 
naturalize myth and to instill in the reader the impulse to see nature ' s truth within 
supernatural fictions. 
These arguments take their direction from several scholarly works. Any modem 
study ofLucretius owes its interpretative freedom to the scholarship of the later 
twentieth century which has exploded the picture of Lucretius as the melancholic 
madman 1 who wrote poetry despite his Epicureanism and who practiced Epicureanism 
despite his inner longing for divine spirituality.2 The work of several authors has 
combined to put together a much more generous, less cartoonish image of the author. 
W. R. Johnson (2000) gives the best survey of this previous, unenlightened scholarship, 
and his delving into the cultural motives behind it helps to undo the erroneous 
conclusions under which Lucretian scholarship suffered in those previous centuries. 
Clay (1983) has given us a clearer sense of Lucretius' relationship to his philosophical 
master and ofhis independence as an Epicurean thinker, poet, and teacher. Waszink 
(1954), Gale (1994), and Asmis (1995) have helped to reconcile Lucretius' use of poetry 
with Epicurus' distaste for it, and, together with Clay (1983), Boyance (1963), Amory 
(1968), and Cox (1969), have shown the unity ofLucretius' poetry with his philosophy, 
whose ultimate end is set to the singular goal of persuading his audience. 
1 The picture first appears in Jerome, Chronicle at the year 95 BC (Helm [1923] 149), 
who also adapts Lucretius' image of the honeyed cup; see Ronnick (200 I). 
2 This idea, which dates back to Polignac ( 17 4 7), was popularized in the 19th century in 
part by Tennyson's poem, "Lucretius," and codified in scholarship by Patin (1868), 
whose opinions would pervade well into the 20th century as well. 
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Kenney (1970) has allowed us to see Lucretius in dialogue with contemporary 
neoteric poetry, while Fowler ( 1989) has set him apart from contemporary politics as a 
philosopher concerned with the universality of individual experience rather than with the 
topicality ofthe historical moment. Volk (2002) has placed Lucretius securely within 
his genre as the author of a genuine didactic poem whose aim is to instruct, and 
Schijvers (1970), Clay (1983) again, and Segal (1990) have given us a deeper 
understanding of the form that Lucretius gives to his psychagogic pedagogy, as he leads 
his students toward Epicureanism by reaching into their minds and souls. Donahue 
(1993) and Mitsis (1993), have helped us to distinguish between the rhetorical device of 
Lucretius' literary addressee and the actual reader that he hoped his message would 
reach, and Parker (2009) gives us a broader view of whom we may imagine that reader 
to be. 
Classen (1968), Asmis (1983), and Schiesaro (1987) have shown us a Lucretius 
whose pedagogical goals make him both poet and rhetorician, 3 and Friedlander ( 1941 ), 
Snyder (1980), and Ahl (1985) have given us a sense of the earnestness and instructive 
capacity ofhis playfulness with words. Finally, Monica Gale (1994) has explicated the 
affinities that Lucretius ' poem shares with epic, showing how Lucretius exploits and 
attacks the genre as a vehicle of myth by placing his own poem within the epic tradition. 
Gale (1994) also introduces Lucretius' critics to the importance of "intentional 
3 Markovic (2008) deserves some credit here too for showing how Lucretius' "rhetoric 
of explanation" strives to "facilitate the internalization of these explanatory accounts." 
But his main thesis-which claims that Lucretius is always consistent with the 
rhetorical theories and practices of Epicurus, placing both in a tradition of epideictic 
rhetoric--overlooks too much to secure its conclusions. See Solomon's review, The 
Classical Review 59 (2009), 454-55 . 
6 
polyvalency," through which Lucretius is able to imbue single passages with layers of 
meaning.4 Most importantly for this dissertation, she illustrates some examples of 
"latent myth," and descrbes the didacticism behind his tacit allusions, a concept on 
which this dissertation will substantially expand. 
There has also been great interest recently in Lucretius' role in shaping the 
thought of the Renaissance Humanists who, in turn, helped to shape the modern world. 
Brown (2010), Greenblatt (2011), and Passannante (2011) remind us that Lucretius is an 
author whose influence extends into our own time, and, although this dissertation does 
not attempt to carry its conclusion beyond the ancient world, as a work that explores the 
rhetorical and didactic strategies of an author whose principle aim was to combat 
ignorance at large, this dissertation has a certain relevance in any age in which ignorance 
prospers. 
In my arguments I often approach the dangerous question of authorial intention, 
an area of inquiry that much modern literary criticism has abandoned as an 
epistemological dead end. 5 In order to overcome this difficulty, I try to conceive the 
aims of the text's author as a reconstruction from manifest reader reaction, with the 
assumption that the responses that result from the text are likely to reflect, at least in 
part, the intention of the text's originator.6 However, because this complex 
4 Cf. Johnson (1976) on the polysemous quality ofVergil's Aeneid. 
5 E.g. Wimsatt and Beardsley (1946), Barthes (1989). 
6 I derive this more nuanced conception of authorial intent from Hinds (1998), who 
follows Conte (1986) and (1994), and Eco (1990) and (1992). Hinds tempers the 
hardline rejection of intentionalism with the caution that important areas of intertextual 
insight are lost along with this rejection of the author: "The axiom that meaning is 
constructed at the point of reception becomes a better tool for dealing with the kinds of 
7 
reconstruction of authorial intent requires complex language, and these complexities 
tend to stifle clear thinking and to encumber lucid articulation, I often revert to simpler 
language that may seem to bespeak a naivete concerning the complexities of the subject. 
Where this is the case, it is simply for the sake of convenience and for ease of 
articulating and communicating already complex ideas. 
Again, privileging the convenience of language, I often refer to Lucretius' 
reader, both ancient and modem, as "he." It is one of my first goals in this dissertation 
to expand our conception of Lucretius' readership, and, since even in ancient Rome this 
readership may have included women, it is with reluctance that I choose to use the 
masculine pronoun in preference to the cumbersome "he or she" construction. It should 
be understood here as a generalized pronoun meant to indicate a reader of any gender. I 
admire W. R. Johnson (2000), who habitually refers to Lucretius' reader as "she," but 
since I have found his unconventional adoption of the feminine pronoun difficult to 
incorporate into other prose that does not venture to take the same leap, I have not 
chosen to follow him in this. 
case which interest students of philological allusion if it embraces the fact (i.e. rather 
than occluding it) that one of the most persistent ways in which both Roman and 
modem readers construct the meaning of a poetic text is by attempting to construct 
from (and for) it an intention-bearing authorial voice, a construction which they 
generally hope or believe (in a belief which must always be partly misguided) to be a 
reconstruction; and the author thus (re )constructed is one who writes towards an 
implied reader who will attempt such a (re )construction" ( 49). 
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Ch. 1 Reception: Lucretius' Readership 
This dissertation is in large part about the role that De Rerum Natura played in 
the society of the Late Republic and how the social concerns of the time affected the 
reading and the writing of his poem. As such, it will ask questions about the author's 
intended audience and their attitude toward the poem and the Epicurean philosophy that 
it presented. These are preliminary questions that need to be addressed in order to begin 
to search out the central question of this research, how did Lucretius accommodate the 
presentation of his philosophy in anticipation of his audience's attitude in receiving it? 
In exploring this question, this study aims to help us better understand how Lucretius 
constructed his poem, both as a work of didacticism in poetic form and as a poem 
imbued with a special kind of rhetoric. 
I Implications of genre 
This central question relies on the answers to some preliminary questions. In 
order to fathom the character of Lucretius' rhetoric we must first form a clear idea of his 
rhetorical goals. This leads us to wonder for whom the poem was written. Whom did 
Lucretius envision as the audience of his work? This question, in tum, depends heavily 
on how one conceives of the poem's purpose, which involves its relationship to its 
genre. Simply acknowledging De Rerum Natura as a "didactic" poem does not in itself 
reveal its intended purpose, given that various examples within this genre differ in their 
9 
intent. Empedocles, whose poetry Lucretius greatly admired (DRN 1.716-33)/ did not 
necessarily have the same didactic-poetic goals as later didactic poets, such as Aratus, 
Nicander, Vergil, or Manilius. As a didactic poet, Empedocles is characterized by his 
apparently sincere desire to impart the lessons of his philosophical system to his readers. 
He is recognized first and foremost as a philosopher, and his aims in writing his poetry 
are those of a teacher of that philosophy. 8 The character of those later poets is more 
complex and varied. 9 In reading these poets we tend to understand their didactic goals-
their desire to impart knowledge of their subject-as secondary to their literary goals. 
We tend to read through their subject-matter (be it farming, remedies for snake bites, or 
the motions of cosmic bodies) and to focus on the virtuosity of their poetic skill or the 
subtexts of their exposition rather than their communication of the surface content. 
Ancient audiences as well probably did not read Aratus or Manilius as students of 
7 Volk (2002) 105-6, Gale (1994) and (200 1) 168-172. 
8 See Conte ( 1994 ), who distinguishes Lucretius's poem from its Hellenistic and neoteric 
antecedents by its restoration of the genuine didactic intent and prophetic voice of 
Empedocles: "Lucretius' restoration of the didactic, missionary function goes hand in 
hand with his promotion of Empedocles to a symbolic person to whom the founding 
gesture ofthe De rerum naura can be entrusted" (11-12); see also Gale (1994) 50-75 
and Volk (2002) 51-8. 
9 Bernd Effe (1977) classifies three types of didactic poetry based on the intention of the 
author as determined by the relationship between the poem's subject-matter and its 
(not necessarily identical) theme. The categories are "the ideal," characterized by the 
sincere intention to teach, for which DRN is the principle example ( 66-79), "the 
formal," characterized by the use of subject-matter as a pretext for poetic virtuosity, for 
which Nicander serves as the best example, and "the transparent," which pretends to 
teach one thing but in actuality wishes to convey another. In this category Effe lists 
Aratus and Vergil (26-39). But these categories have been found to be unsatisfactory 
and insufficient to describe accurately the function and purpose of these poems. Effe 
does not take into account the intentional fallacy and relies on interpretation to 
"reconstruct" "hidden agendas" and therefore fails to add to the understanding of the 
genre; see Volk (2002) 4 and Dalzell (1996) 32. 
10 
astronomy. It has been humorously noted by Nicander's modem editor that "the victim 
of snake-bite or poison who turned to Nicander for first-aid would be in a sorry 
plight;" 10 likewise, the farmer who looked to the Georgics for vocational instruction 
would find himself steeped in the appreciation of industrious bees and of the noble race 
horse but sadly ill-prepared for the mundane tasks of actual Roman agriculture and 
husbandry, which had much more to do with the plow and the pig than they did with 
these more romantic subjects. 11 
Given this variety of purpose, one must ask whether Lucretius' motive in writing 
his poem was true missionary zeal or poetic aspiration. Did Lucretius simply intend to 
write a piece of virtuoso poetry, whose subject happened to be the philosophy of 
Epicurus, and whose resemblance to a piece of actual philosophical didacticism is 
merely a coincidence of its literary genre? Or did Lucretius nurture the sincere desire to 
impart the lessons of Epicureanism in the hopes of effecting the salvation of his reader 
and perhaps of the world? The question is a fruitful one, from which we gain a clarity of 
perspective that will avail us as we proceed. Securing the answer to the question of 
Lucretius' didactic intent in tum reveals the answers to questions of the poem's 
readership and of the attitude with which the poem's author courts his readers, his 
prospective students. 
The two most recent works on the genre of didactic poetry take opposing views 
of Lucretius' didactic intent. In The Poetics of Latin Didactic (2002), Katharina Yolk 
adopts the opinion that Lucretius was a serious teacher dedicated to converting his 
10 Gow and Scholfield (1953) 18. 
11 Thomas (1988) 3-4 and 10-11. 
11 
student-reader to Epicureanism, yet, at the same time, she asserts that he was a serious 
poet as well. This is the prevailing view of modem scholarship on Lucretius, which 
agrees in the central conceit that the function of the poetry as Lucretius describes it in 
the metaphor of the honeyed cup-what Yolk dubs "the poetics of pleasure"-implies 
that Lucretius ' poetry is secondary to his philosophical subject. The primary intention 
of the poem is the communication of a philosophical system, and, because this 
communication aims to convert, or at least to convince, the reluctant reader, it employs 
poetry as an allurement and an analgesic. Therefore, as Yolk puts it, "the poetry plays a 
subordinate role vis-a-vis the teaching ofphilosophy," 12 yet, at the same time, "it is not 
possible to distinguish his teaching from his poetry."13 These two statements are not 
contradictory. The latter reflects the opinion that Lucretius' poetry is not simply an 
afterthought, nor a covering lying inertly over the top of his otherwise dry philosophical 
argument. The poetry is an integral part of the communication of his philosophy, and it 
is this philosophical teacher's best teaching technique: 14 it is the gateway that links the 
intellect with the imagination. 
The primacy of the philosophic content over the poetic form is suggested in the 
poem itself. When Lucretius describes his motives for undertaking the work of 
12 Yolk (2002) 96. For other iterations ofthis opinion see Boyance (1947), Wasznick 
(1954 ), Giancotti (1959), Classen (1968), Schijvers (1970), Glei ( 1992), and Gale 
(1994). 
13 Yolk (2002) 83. See also Gale ( 1994) and Johnson (2000). 
14 This idea is not a new one. The view of Lucretius as a serious missionary who 
employs the techniques of the classroom (though at the time a minority view) can be 
found even in the early 20th century. See Knapp (1922), Merril ( 1907) 21 and 25-6; 
and see also Wiltshire (1974). 
12 
composing his poem on the doctrines of Epicurus-the hope of praise and a love of the 
muses (1.923-24)-, he orders his goals in that manner: 
primum quod magnis doceo de rebus et artis 
religionum animum nodis exsolvere pergo, 
deinde quod obscura de re tam Iucida pango 
carmina, musaeo contingens cuncta Iepore (1.931-34). 
Firstly because I am teaching a great subject and strive to loosen the tight knots 
of religion, secondly because I am setting forth such splendid songs on an 
obscure topic, steeping the whole of it with musical charm. 15 
Lucretius himself places his desire to teach his subject and to combat religion in the 
primary position (primum) and subordinates his poetic aspirations to this principle goal 
(deinde). 16 But his language also implies the integrity of the mixture: 
[ . .. ]sed acri 
percussit thyrso laudis spes magna meum cor 
et simul incussit suavem mi in pectus amorem 
musarum (1.922-25). 
[ ... ] but the great hope of praise struck through my heart with a sharp thyrsus and 
simultaneously struck into my chest a sweet love of the muses. 
The metaphors ofthe following lines on the pleasure of picking new flowers and of 
walking untrodden paths (1.925-30) imply that the praise for which Lucretius hopes is 
the praise for being the first to render the doctrines of Epicurus in Latin verse. This 
15 The emphases here are mine, as are the translations throughout. 
16 See Wiseman (1992) 45 . 
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hope and his love of the muses' song strike the poet simultaneously (simu[) and in a 
similar manner (percussif ... incussit; meum cor ... mi in pectus). They are not disparate 
components added in layers to a separable admixture each as they occurred to the poet; 
they are the simultaneous ingredients of a unified theory of composition. 17 
Like Yolk, G. B. Conte recognizes that the poem's form and content comprise an 
inseparable unity. He also sees the sincerity ofthe poet's didactic mission-which its 
didactic form is employed to serve-as the integrating component of this unity. Conte 
finds his missionary sincerity to be the fundamental difference between the genuine 
didacticism of Empedocles, whose poetry envisions both "a wise teacher and a public to 
be taught" 18 and that of Aratus, for example, whose "sophisticated artistic game" 19 
conflates cosmic religiosity with philosophical doctrine in order to serve "the function of 
displaying the poet's skill, almost against the text's real content."20 In contrast to 
Aratus' artistic playfulness with his technical subject, Lucretius adopted the didactic 
genre of Empedocles by reuniting cosmology with ethico-social concerns, 21 and his text 
shows clearly that the composition of his poem relies completely on its subject-matter. 
Conte is agreeably emphatic on the matter, going to so far as to say that Lucretius 
17 See Waszink (1954), and cf. Wiltshire (1974) 34. 
18 Conte (1994) 3. 
19 Conte (1994) 7. 
2° Conte (1994) 8. 
21 Conte (1994) 4 and 7 on Vergil's recognition ofthis fact. 
14 
"entrust[s] his poetic existence to his didactic mission,"22 which is in turn "a discursive 
project that involves and drags off as many disciples as possible."23 
In contrast to this emphatic picture of Lucretius as missionary philosopher, 
Alexander Dalzell-Yolk's predecessor in examining Lucretius through the medium of 
its genre and author of The Criticism of Didactic Poetry (1996) and of the entry on 
Lucretius in the Cambridge History ofClassical Literature (1982)-disagrees with this 
conception of Lucretius as a genuine teacher of philosophy. Dalzell reasons that, 
because De Rerum Natura shows its influence solely in literary works and, as he claims, 
not at all in philosophical works, it "was not regarded as a primary philosophical text."24 
One might be willing to concede that De Rerum Natura may not have been regarded as 
serious philosophy by some readers (by connoisseurs of poetry or by its philosophical 
opponents), but Dalzell takes his point further and claims that Lucretius himself must 
have regarded his own poem in this same way and that he never intended it to be read as 
a serious work of philosophy. He concedes that Lucretius intended his poem to give 
22 Conte (1994) 8. 
23 Conte (1994) 6. 
24 Dalzell (1996) 45. In this chapter I focus on Dalzell's statements about the generic 
status and intellectual significance of Lucretius' poem as a conspicuous example of an 
often-repeated misreading of the poem's intent. Dalzell offers the opportunity to 
address several important misconceptions that lead to this kind of misreading. Another 
conspicuous, although older, example can be found in Rawson (1985), whose 355-page 
volume, Intellectual Life in the Late Roman Republic, contains exactly one paragraph 
devoted to Lucretius' contribution, "while it was admired and influential as literature, 
it cannot be shown that it was authoritative as philosophy; Lucretius is not mentioned 
in later philosophic writings, and as we have seen was perhaps not closely in touch 
with Epicurean or other philosophic circles in his own time" (285). This despite her 
own report that Vitruvius (ld. 9 praef 17) singled out Lucretius' De Rerum Natura as 
the greatest work of his time that he felt would carry on to posterity the best of Roman 
accomplishments in philosophy (117). 
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pleasure by virtue of "the compelling nature of its argument,"25 but he holds that the 
nature of this pleasure was meant to be purely aesthetic rather than actually enlightening. 
He writes: 
Lucretius can hardly have expected his poem to be read by the kind of person 
who stood most in need of freedom from religious terror. There has been too 
much emphasis on Lucretius' missionary role. I do not doubt the poet's 
sincerity, but to see him as a preacher who happened to be a poet is to reverse the 
natural order of things. 26 
and later: 
The loss ofthe greater part ofEpicurus' writings has given the De rerum natura 
a prominence in the history of ancient philosophy which it was never designed to 
have. [ . .. ] The didacticism of the poem, therefore, must come from its literary 
tradition rather than from any intention on Lucretius' part to fill a gap in the 
education of his fellow citizens?7 
In addition to the evidence of the lack of references to Lucretius in other philosophical 
works, Dalzell bases these claims on the idea that the poem 's learned sophistication 
would have reduced its readership to those educated classes that would have been 
immune to the superstitious fears that the poem intends to dispel. 28 This reasoning 
hearkens back to an old trope in Lucretian criticism that seeks to devalue the 
contemporary relevance of Lucretius ' philosophical message. The reasoning behind this 
25 Dalzell (1996) 39. 
26 Dalzell (1996) 50-1. 
27 Dalzell (1996) 70-71 . 
28 Dalzell (1996) 49-50. 
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trope-that Lucretius' only possible audience would have had no use for the poem's 
philosophical message-attempts to force the conclusion either that Lucretius was sorely 
out of touch with his readership (and probably with reality),29 or, if we exonerate him of 
this fault (as Dalzell does), that we must instead alter our view of the poem's intent. In 
short, if De Rerum Natura was useless as a work of philosophical evangelism, it was 
still, at least, a pleasing piece of poetry, and so this must be all that Lucretius ever meant 
it to be. 
Consideration of the above argument requires some description of the 
"sophistication" that supposedly puts the poem into the hands of the elite and out of the 
reach of the average reader. In part, Dalzell sees the poem's sophistication in its 
abundance of Greek references and near exclusion of Roman ones. Despite what he 
calls the many "ancillary" Roman settings, he does not find in the poem any "special 
effort to trick out Greek philosophy in Roman dress" and concludes that Lucretius' aim 
was simply to describe Epicureanism, not to adapt it for his Roman audience.30 As a 
result, the poem must have required a reader familiar with Greek culture and philosophy, 
which necessarily limited its readership to the elite classes. 
29 The supposition that Lucretius was out of touch was employed by earlier scholars who 
eventually concluded that Lucretius' zealous and emotionally charged philosophical 
presentation was the result of madness or of his desire to convince himself of a 
philosophy that he did not truly believe; see for example Regenbogen (1932) 49-51. 
Other examples include Bailey (1932) 218-21 and Leonard and Smith (1942) 72-73. 
The erroneous conceit that Lucretius was needlessly attacking forgotten superstition 
has been dismantled by scholars who view Lucretius' attacks within the context of 
their historical and rhetorical relevance; see Kenney (1971) 4-5 and Gale (1994) 85-98. 
30 Dalzell (1996) 48-49. 
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Dalzell assumes the corollary claim on which his larger conclusion depends-
that the elite classes were immune to the kind of superstition that Lucretius rails against. 
He does not (as other proponents of this argument often have) trot out Cicero's comment 
that Epicureans were seeking inanely to free the world from superstitions so foolish that 
not even boys or na!ve old women actually believed them (Tusc. Disp. 1.48),31 but his 
conclusion implies the same reasoning. What these other arguments and Dalzell's share 
in common is the assumption that De Rerum Natura was intended to be read solely by 
an educated elite for whom the question of religious superstition was irrelevant. 32 This 
is a notion that this and the upcoming chapters aim to refute on the large scale, but for 
now we can challenge it in the case of Dalzell by showing that his preliminary claim-
that Lucretius' poem shows no special effort devoted to Romanizing his subject-stands 
on weak ground. 
One of the unique qualities of Lucretius' version of Epicurean philosophy is 
precisely the "special effort" it makes to adapt Epicurus' philosophy to a Roman 
audience. In his seminal work, Lucretius and Epicurus, Diskin Clay begins his 
comparison of the student and his master by noting the "sea changes" evident in the 
comparison of Lucretius ' version of Epicureanism to that found in the writings of 
Epicurus. The general motivating factor behind these changes, Clay posits, was that 
Epicurus was writing for an Athenian audience that was familiar with and accepting of 
31 Cicero ' s comment has been used in the past as the main piece of evidence for many 
iterations ofthe argument that Lucretius' struggle against superstition was 
unwarranted. Cf. again Sellar (1863) 370-71 and Regenbogen (1932) 28. 
32 Cf. Boyance (194 7) and Nichols (1972). 
18 
philosophical discourse, whereas Lucretius was writing for a Roman audience that was 
less accustomed to such discourses and more likely to resist them.33 
Dalzell also makes the surprising assertion that Lucretius' religious polemics 
focused on Greek religion and did not attempt to address specifically Roman practices. 34 
The works of Kirk Summers (1995 and 1996) speak strongly against this claim. For 
example, the programmatic passage in which Lucretius criticizes traditional forms of 
piety (5.1198-1203) contains multiple references to specifically Roman forms of 
religious cultus.35 In Lucretius' redefining of religious piety in book 5, for instance, 
Summers sees two distinctly Roman references. Lucretius does not call it piety "to be 
seen with covered head turning toward the stone and approaching every altar," nee 
pietas ullast velatum saepe videri I veriter ad lapidem atque omnis accedere ad aras 
(5 .1198-99). Summers points out the Romanness of these references, one to the Jupiter 
stone, a fixture of Roman legal practice whose religious connotations made it a powerful 
symbol by which legal oaths were sworn, 36 and the other to the Roman ritual of 
supplicatio in which the images of several deities were made available for worship all at 
once. 37 Similarly, at the end of this passage Lucretius' mention of "the beautiful rods 
and fierce axes," pulchros fascis saevasque secures (5.1234), places his discourse firmly 
33 Clay (1983) 13-53, esp. 16-21; see also Grimal (1963) 95-6, Minyard (1985) 33-69, 
Fowler (1989), esp. 412-420, and Schiessaro (2007). 
34 Dalzell ( 1996) 48-9. 
35 Summers (1995) 33-45. 
36 Summers (1995) 39-40; cf. Cic. , Ad Fam. 7.12, Polybius 3.25, Livy 1.24.7-9, Varro, 
Re Rust. 2.4.9, 
37 Summers (1995) 40-41 ; cf. Caes. , BG 7.90.8, Cic. Pis. 6 and Phil. 2.13., Livy, 26.9.7. 
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within a Roman context. 38 Likewise, Lucretius' description of the Magna Mater 
procession (2.600-43) reflects the Roman instantiation of these cultic rites, which were 
performed in her streets during the annual celebration of the Megalensia.39 The 
allusions to Roman religion seen above-built upon subtleties of vocabulary and 
imagery that reflect conspicuous contemporary practices-are typical of Lucretius' 
didactic style. Lucretius reserves such topical references for the undercurrents of his 
poeticism, subordinating these polemics to the more universalizing tone of his 
philosophical and scientific arguments. 40 
Dalzell habitually looks for signs of Romanization that Lucretius is not willing to 
offer. In examining whether or not Lucretius contributes to the construction of a Latin 
philosophical vocabulary, Dalzell looks for him to adopt and transliterate Greek 
technical terms. 41 His search is disappointed-Lucretius does not show an abundance of 
38 Summers (1995) 44. 
39 Summers (1996) and (1995) 52. This argument will be of special importance in 
chapter 5, see below, pp. 179-184. 
40 There are many other examples of such implicit Romanizations within Lucretius' 
poem that are external to his religious polemic. Some well discussed examples include 
the likeness ofEpicurus in the proem (1.62-79) to a conquering general returning in 
triumph: Davies ( 1931) 280-83 and Buchheit (2007), and cf. West (1969) 5 8-60 and 
Gale (1994) 195; the likeness of Sisyphus (3.995-1 002) to the stereotypical Roman 
politician: Minyard (1985) 63 and Fowler (1989) 420; and the abundance of so-called 
"social metaphor," which describes the congress of atoms with metaphors derived from 
Roman politics and law: Davies ( 1931) 284-85 and Cabisius (1985), cf. Fowler (1989) 
417-19. 
41 Dalzell (1996) 72-103: "In spite ofLucretius' protestations about the lack of 
philosophical vocabulary in Latin, he chose, by and large, not to take over Greek words 
to fill the linguistic gap" (85). Dalzell compares Lucretius' contribution to the creation 
of a Latin philosophical vocabulary to Cicero's, and finds the former's to be far less 
significant and even less significant than commonly thought: "Lucretius' claim at the 
outset of his poem that his theme needed new words is, to say the least, misleading. 
20 
Grecisms-and he attributes Lucretius' lack of transliteration to a lack of effort to 
Romanize his philosophy. But as Sedley (1999) has shown, Lucretius' preference for 
images and metaphors expressed with common Latin poetic vocabulary is a nod toward 
Romanitas, which aims "to make Epicureanism thoroughly at home in a Roman cultural 
context."42 It was an important choice for any author of this age to include Greek words 
within a Latin text. The addition of Grecisms held a powerful cultural significance 
given the stylistic controversy in the first century over the waning purity of the Latin 
language.43 The invention of neologisms would most likely have seemed less Roman to 
a first century audience than putting existing Latin vocabulary to good use. Likewise, 
Lucretius' vivid poetic style simply prefers fuller metaphorical descriptions over less 
descriptive technical terms, a preference which is actually a hallmark of Latin poetic 
style.44 
One final and signal example explodes the notion that Lucretius makes no effort 
to adapt his Epicurean poem to his Roman audience. When Lucretius chose to begin his 
poem on Epicurean philosophy with an invocation to Venus, a conspicuously Roman 
deity, referring to her as the mother of the Aeneadae, the founders of Rome and the 
[ ... ]the contribution which Lucretius made to a Latin philosophical vocabulary turns 
out to be modest indeed" (88). 
42 Sedley (1999) 227. 
43 Kaimio (1979) 295-315, Uden (20 11 ). 
44 Coleman ( 1999), "the creation of imagery, often as an essential feature of a poetic 
argument, and the tropes of semantic transfer-metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche-
were frequently deployed through common words. In fact no words were too prosaic 
to appear in even the highest poetic contexts, always assuming their metricality" (21). 
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professed ancestral race of the Julian gens, what other purpose could he have had in 
mind than to invest his philosophical poem in a strikingly Roman context?45 
This evidence of Lucretius' Romanization of Epicurean philosophy is enough to 
weaken Dalzell's case for the poem's elitist concentration on Greek settings. The second 
of his arguments also illuminates a common error that serves to obfuscate Lucretius' true 
didactic intent. While Dalzell rises above the conclusion of prior scholars and does not 
accuse the author of this supposedly impotent work of insanity, the position he adopts 
springs from the same roots. Dalzell gives grudging acquiescence to the sincerity of the 
poet's feeling with prefatory phrases like: "I do not doubt the poet's sincerity, but 
[ ... ],"46 or: "For all his devotion to Epicurus and his ardent belief in his message, 
[ ... ],"47 all of which lead to more forcefully expressed adversative clauses that deny the 
sincerity of Lucretius' philosophical mission and assert instead the primacy of his poetic 
goals. But these reluctant admissions of Lucretius' personal conviction are impossible 
to reconcile with their author's real conclusion. In effect, Dalzell wants to pay lip 
service to the scholarly common-place that Lucretius was a true philosophical devotee 
and a fervent believer, but he is nevertheless unwilling to acknowledge that the sincerity 
of Lucretius' belief extended to his serious sponsorship of this same philosophical 
system when he described it in his poem. It is difficult if not impossible to imagine the 
45 Cf. Clay (1983) 82-4, Strauss (1968) 76. 
46 Dalzell (1996) 50. 
47 Dalzell ( 1996) 102. 
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opposing characteristics of fervent belief and missionary apathy (within a didactic 
poem!) existing together within an integrated personality. 
This contradiction seems to be born out of the scholarly attitude toward De 
Rerum Natura that began to appear at the beginning of the 20th century. In Lucretius 
and The Modern World, W. R. Johnson traces the history ofLucretian criticism from the 
1 ih to the beginning of the 20th century and finds in it the adoption of a "prudent 
compartmentalisation" which strategically separates the acceptable aspects of the poem, 
its poetic beauty and its author's noble earnestness, from the threatening ideas of its 
irreligious materialism.48 In earlier centuries, Jerome's comments on the poet' s 
insanity~ " made it easy for Christian readers to dismiss Lucretius ' ideas as the incoherent 
ravings of a melancholic madman, so that they could continue to appreciate his poetry 
safe from the threat of its philosophical influence. As Lucretian scholarship progressed 
into the 20th century, scholars began to pay less heed to Jerome ' s report, but the impulse 
to compartmentalize and to separate the powerful poet from the impotent philosopher 
still remained. 5° I think it not unlikely that Dalzell ' s uncomfortable admixture of 
Lucretius, the fervent philosophical believer, and Lucretius, the pure poet whose theme 
meant less to him than his poetry, results from this same pitfall. 
We might add to these objections a more obvious criticism that applies to the 
principle half of Dalzell's argument. Dalzell ' s first argument is that, because clear 
references to Lucretius are found strictly in poetry and not in philosophical works, his 
48 Johnson (2000) 79-156. 
49 See above. n. 1. 
50 Johnson (2000) 79-80 and 131-2. 
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intention must have been to write poetry and not philosophy . This conclusion, however, 
is hard to accept for the simple reason that the later reception of an author's work is not 
secure grounds from which to determine that author's original intent. To illustrate the 
point with an extreme example, the emperor Constantine cites Vergil's Eclogue 4, with 
its message of the virgin birth of a god-like child, as an influence in his conversion to 
Christianity.51 Gibbon, reporting Constantine's statement in The Decline and Fall of the 
Roman Empire, comments ironically that this event suggests, "Virgil may deserve to be 
ranked among the most successful missionaries of the gospel. "52 But, of course, Gibbon 
is being facetious. No reasonable scholar would seriously claim that Vergil was writing 
his fourth Eclogue as a Christian missionary nor that he envisioned it as a prophetic 
foreshadowing of the conversion of his nation to Christianity. Even if contemplation of 
his poem had this effect on Constantine, we do not therefore assume that this effect was 
Vergil's intended purpose. Nor should we assume that it was Lucretius' intention to 
write his poem solely for the appreciation of its poetry, even if poets are the only 
witnesses whose appreciation of the poem the historical record clearly shows. 
One expects that other poets would naturally reflect on the poetical aspects of 
Lucretius ' poem, simply because poetry was their stock and trade. Nor is it always the 
case that these later poets separated Lucretius' philosophy from his poetic influence. 
Consider V ergil' s conspicuous pairing in the Georgics of the happiness that stems from 
knowledge of nature with that of those who know the gods-an alternative that is better 
51 Constantine delivered this interpretation in his "Assembly of Saints" which is 
appended to Eusebius' Life a/Constantine. 
52 Gibbon (1946) I. 574. 
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suited to the reverential attitude that his poem avows to the divinities of agriculture and 
to Augustus: 
felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas 
atque metus omnis et inexorabile fatum 
subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari; 
fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis 
Panaque Siluanumque senem Nymphasque sorores (2.490-94). 
Happy is he who can understand the causes of things and can cast underfoot 
every fear and inexorable fate and the rumbling of a greedy underworld; and 
happy is he who knows the rustic gods and Pan and old Silvanus and their sister 
nymphs. 
V ergil' s juxtaposition of these sources of happiness, the one through knowledge of 
physics (rerum causas), the other through knowledge of the divine, clearly shows his 
awareness and acknowledgement of Lucretius' Epicurean ethics, which rear their head 
even in this otherwise conspicuously religious poem. 53 
To further the point, one cannot derive secure conclusions from negative 
evidence alone. It is not possible to ascertain the philosophical value of Lucretius' poem 
solely by the lack of clear reference to it by his philosophical opponents. It is odd that 
Cicero does not mention Lucretius by name, other than to comment briefly and 
cryptically on his poetic talent, seemingly at his brother's insistence, "Lucretius' poem is 
as you write: a work of genius with many points of light, and [or, perhaps, but] of much 
53 Cf. Conte (1994) 6-7. 
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art; but when you come-," Lucreti poemata, ut scribis, ita sunt: muftis luminibus 
ingeni, multae tamen artis; sed cum veneris- . 54 But one need not postulate a 
conspiracy in order to account for Cicero's silence. 55 It may simply not have suited 
Cicero's rhetorical style or the genre of his dialogues to name and to deal directly with 
contemporary philosophical opponents outside of his personal company. 
Despite Jerome's report that Cicero edited De Rerum Natura after Lucretius' 
death, 56 the animosity between their competing philosophical viewpoints makes it highly 
improbable that Cicero would have become familiar with his poem as its final editor. 
On this point, Cicero's comment at Tusc. 2.7 is also worth consideration.57 In it Cicero 
insists that he does not read----cannot be bothered to read-those Epicurean popularizers 
who write in Latin on the grounds that their style and argument are beneath his contempt 
and utterly unworthy of his attention. It is assumed from his earlier comment at 4.6 that 
he means Amafinius and those like him, but there is little reason to believe that he would 
have excluded Lucretius from this group. In light of this claim, I find the vagueness 
with which Cicero describes his opinion of Lucretius' poem to his brother, with its 
acquiescent tone and trite acknowledgement of the nebulous qualities of ars and 
ingenium, suggestive of unfamiliarity. It seems to me that this is the kind of comment 
that one casually makes in passing on a subject with which one is not intimately familiar 
54 Ad Quint., Feb. 54. 
55 Some have done so. See e.g. Martha (1896) 22-23, Bergson (1884) ii, and Farrington 
(1939), who were in turn challenged by Traina (1986). 
56 See above, n. I . 
57 Tusc. Disp. 2.7: Est enim quoddam genus eorum, qui philosophos apellari volunt, 
quorum dicuntur esse Latini sane multi libri, quos non contemno equidem, quippe quos 
numquam legerim. 
26 
and which one wishes quickly to dismiss . Perhaps we cannot press this observation too 
strongly, but we can remain satisfied that there are better ways in which to discover 
Lucretius' intent than to let the negative evidence of other philosophical sources stand 
alone. 
II Literary Sophistication 
Lucretius' missionary intent is as apparent as his desire to imbue his poem with 
pleasing rhetoric, and he makes this desire plain in his choice to write honey-sweet 
poetry. The above discussion has served to bring to light and to refute the scholarly 
prejudice that causes Dalzell to deny Lucretius' intention to write a philosophically 
potent didactic poem. But the hesitation on the part of scholars to accept Lucretius' 
didactic mission as genuine is more pervasive. Dalzell represents a hardline position 
that would unsettle more liberal scholars, but the idea of the poem's esoteric 
sophistication pervades the works of even mainstream critics, who hesitate to accept that 
such a "sophisticated" poem would rest comfortably with a wide and potentially 
unsophisticated audience. 
Like Dalzell, Conte is not confident that the poem was intended to reach a 
popular audience, despite the fact that his insightful reading of the poem generally 
regards its genuine missionary character as its defining feature-a feature which, he 
claims, reinvigorated the original didactic nature of the genre and which identifies the 
poem's teachings with "the doctrine for the salvation of humankind."5R Conte 
58 Conte (1994) 8 (emphasis added); cf. below p. 3S-l9 on humana vita (1.62). 
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acknowledges that this genuine didacticism determines the readership that the poet 
envisions: "Investing oneself with a missionary function," he writes, "enlarges the 
audience." This acknowledgement stands as evidence against the assumption that the 
poem was intended solely for the enjoyment of the literary-minded classes of the 
educated elite, and Conte makes special note ofthis fact: "Lucretius' word, by contrast 
with his Hellenistic predecessors', can no longer be directed to a strictly delimited group 
of persons moved only by literary interests."59 But by this Conte does not mean to 
suggest that Lucretius' poem could have reached a "popular" audience in the strict 
sense. Conte quietly checks this notion in a footnote asserting that "the work's formal 
and structural complexity" would surely have excluded the possibility that Lucretius was 
an evangelist preaching to a wide, public audience.6° For Conte too, the sophistication 
of the poem's composition is reason enough to limit its intended audience to "cultured 
elites." His wariness comes in stark contrast to his earlier claim that the poem "involves 
and drags off as many disciples as possible."6 1 Conte means to qualify his superlative 
with the understood restriction of social class. 
This qualification does not come out of nowhere. From the start, Conte 
implicitly qualifies what kind of reader the poem might actually reach; "the didactic 
message is addressed 'to all' but not 'to just anyone,"' he writes, and he describes 
Lucretius' actual reader as a "new Chosen Friend" who is made ready "to admire and 
59 Conte (1994) 10. 
6° Conte (1994) 148, n. 25. 
61 Conte (1994) 6; see above p. 14. 
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receive the description [of the philosophical doctrines] as a privileged revelation. "62 It is 
true, as we will see,63 that Lucretius attempts to align his reader with him as a "Chosen 
Friend" and to present his teachings as a "privilege" to be gained only by the worthy. 
But it must be kept in mind that this impression of selectivity is part of the rhetorical 
design of the poem with which Lucretius aims to win the reader's alliance; the real 
qualification for selection is mere open-mindedness. Lucretius does not intend this 
rhetorical positioning to exclude any willing participant from the philosophical 
instruction that the poem offers. Conte acknowledges something like this when he 
describes the kind of reader that his own theory of Lucretius ' style envisions, "a ' docile,' 
teachable, reader, one willing to collaborate with the text's intentions to the point of 
letting them remodel him."64 If Lucretius aims to teach, and the intention of the text is 
to remodel its reader, we should not take his rhetorical exhortations to join with the 
privileged group of Epicureans as a real attempt to disqualify and to refuse potential 
pupils. The poem itself says nothing about distinctions based on social class. 
Even though Conte does not accept that Lucretius was targeting a popular 
audience, still he does not deny, as others have, that Lucretius' message is relevant for 
this elite group as well, and this is not an uncommon opinion. In his commentary on 
book 3, E. J. Kenney (1971) concisely debunked the idea that Lucretius ' attacks on 
popular mythology were irrelevant to an elite audience. Lucretius did not refute the 
underworld myths that appear in the last section of this book idly, even if one assumes 
62 Conte (1994) 9-10. 
63 See the discussion in ch. 3. 
64 Conte (1994) 3 1. 
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that these particular myths were beyond the belief of his educated readers. Lucretius 
found something essential within these myths that perpetuated a fundamental 
misperception of reality and cultivated an attitude of superstition that ran contrary to 
Epicureanism and was worth taking the time to contest. Kenney writes, "an intelligent 
reader, trained to draw general conclusions from particular cases, can see all the 
innumerable superstitions ofthe Hellenistic and Greco-Roman worlds imaged in 
Lucretius' great diatribe."65 Traditional myths, even those beyond the credulity of the 
educated, offered Lucretius inroads by which to challenge the embedded intangibles of 
an ingrained culture of myth-based etiology .66 
In Myth and Poetry in Lucretius (1994), Monica Gale expanded the idea that 
Lucretius' use of myth had relevance for his contemporaries, but she also limited his 
audience to the elite classes. Gale generally views Lucretius' mythological polemics in 
the literary context of epic poetry, and so envisions an audience familiar with the 
literature that was the vehicle of these myths.1' 7 She also cites examples in which 
Lucretius' polemics address myths that he acknowledged to be beyond belief. 
Regardless of this fact, he addresses these unbelievable myths in an effort to critique the 
contemporary allegorizing trend of other philosophical schools that were attempting to 
salvage them. 11 ·' In these cases it is not the veracity of the myths that Lucretius puts up 
65 Kenney (1971) 5. 
66 See also Segal (1990), who shows the relevance ofLucretius' philosophy in 
combatting the fear of death that must have existed even among the elite classes, 
"including the free-floating anxiety about pain and death" (19). 
67 Gale (1994) 88-94; see also Kenney (1970) 366-92. On literacy and its effects on 
Lucretius' intended audience, see below pp. ~ l-39. 
68 For a specific discussion of this topic, sec belov/. ch. 5. pp. 154-1 57. 
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for debate-for example, he and his reader are both quite sure that there never have been 
such creatures as centaurs and other hi-forms (5.878-924); rather, it is the origins of 
these myths and the effort to salvage them that he puts on trial. Gale points out that 
Lucretius brings up these myths most often in discussions of sense-perception and as 
examples of its fallibility. One might easily mistake a vision derived from stray atomic 
particles for something supernatural, but even such incredible visions have a natural 
explanation that lies in an understanding of the nature of the senses.69 In these cases too, 
there is some wisdom to be gained from Lucretius' refutations of myth by members of 
any social class. 
The works of Kenney and Gale make room for the relevance of Lucretius ' 
teachings even among the educated elite, and their arguments provide evidence enough 
to justify our sense of his poem's genuine missionary impulse. Even if we accept that 
Lucretius' audience consisted solely of the educated classes, to the exclusion of other 
less "literate" classes, this should not lead to the conclusion that his philosophical 
doctrines were irrelevant, or that his missionary zeal was unwarranted. Still, when 
struck with the universalizing tone of Lucretius' didactic rhetoric, one feels that 
Lucretius intended his message to reach out beyond all limits, including those of social 
class. 
The danger in denying the poem's ability to reach many and many kinds of 
readers is that this limiting view of its readership causes us also to limit the breadth of 
our own reading and to ignore our sense of the poem's most earnest communications. 
69 See also DRN 5.1161-1240 on the origin of religion and 4.580-94 on other mythical 
phenomena and Gale's (1994) discussion of each at 130-33 and 133-38, respectively. 
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The poem offers a great deal of preparatory rhetoric and incitements to learning, and, 
when its didacticism is understood as a genuine desire to reach out to its audience, this 
kind of rhetorical "sophistication" speaks to the poem's ability to teach a broad rather 
than a selective audience. Seen in this light, the poem's formal or structural 
complexities should not be thought to preclude its intent to reach a wide readership. Its 
sophisticated rhetoric has a more primary purpose than to be appreciated solely as 
literary decoration. It serves to make the poem appealing and convincing and therefore 
all the more able to reach, to teach, to convince, and to convert readers of all kinds. 
III Literacy 
The vague language that discussions of the poem's readership usually adopt 
tends to obfuscate the core issue. Conte, for example, frequently calls Lucretius a 
missionary,70 and his reader a "catechumen,"71 but he argues that it would be wrong to 
regard his mission as "evangelism." Does this distinction really bring us closer to 
determining who was reading the poem or for whom the poet wrote it? Obviously, these 
questions will not best be served by pondering the precise difference between a 
"missionary" and an "evangelist"-any term deriving from the Christian tradition is sure 
to have its own shortcomings when applied to the reception of pagan philosophical 
literature. Dalzell's terms tend also to obscure the issue. In addressing Lucretius' 
statement that his philosophy is often rejected by those many, the vulgus (1.943-5), who 
70 Though sometimes he speaks more cautiously of the "missionary gesture" that he 
adopts in his poem, Conte (1994) 16. 
71 Conte (1994) 16. 
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do not understand it, Dalzell claims that by vulgus Lucretius must not have meant 
"common rabble" but "reading public," on the grounds that the "common rabble" (i.e., 
the lower, less educated classes) are not expected to have been literate.72 But the 
difference between these two interpretations of Lucretius' word actually has little 
consequence for our vision of Lucretius' intended audience. To replace "common 
rabble" with "reading public" is merely to point out that Lucretius' "readers" must have 
been able to read. This is to say nothing more than that Lucretius' audience was 
restricted by the limits of literacy, and this question deserves to be addressed on these 
terms. 
Since the publication of William Harris' Ancient Literacy (1989), it has been a 
scholarly commonplace that literacy levels in ancient Rome were very low by today's 
standards and that reading of any kind was an activity relegated to the elite classes.73 As 
a result, Harris asserts that writers on religious matters, such as Lucretius, could have 
found only a very select audience.74 The important point for this discussion is to bear in 
mind that, although we must accept that low literacy levels surely did have a real impact 
on Lucretius' actual, contemporary readership, this actual readership does not 
correspond definitively to the imagined readership that Lucretius envisioned for his 
poem. And it is this imagined audience more than any other that drove Lucretius' 
didactic impulse and motivated his poem's rhetoric. This distinction reminds us that we 
72 Dalzell (1996) 173-4, n. 24. 
73 Harris (1989), who puts literacy levels between 20-30% (175, 248-53), cf. Johnson 
(2000) 615. 
74 Harris (1989) 219. 
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should not let our scholarly vision of the reality of the times overshadow the poet's 
grander vision and cause us to set undue limits on the intentions of his rhetoric. 
It will also do some good to examine for a moment what this literate class of 
Romans looked like. The term "elite" that we have been using to describe the literate 
population tends to call to mind the most prominent characters of Roman politics and 
literature such as a Memmius, or even a Caesar or a Cicero. It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that in terms of literacy this designation extends also to the relatively 
lower (and much larger) ranks of property owners and legionary soldiers. Literacy was a 
requirement for the everyday business and maintenance of a farm, 75 and was common 
enough among the soldier-classes for the government of the Late Republic to solicit 
them with propaganda in written form. 76 Nor can it be said that these occupations 
required only a specialized type of literacy that did not extend into the literary. Greg 
Wolf argues that, unlike other, more diverse, societies such as that of the Greeks, which 
employed various types of occupational literacy that did not easily correspond to one 
another, the more homogenous society of the Romans developed a much more universal 
form of literacy in which reading functioned as a generally applicable skill that extended 
from business to politics to literature with relative ease.77 These findings help to correct 
the limiting impression of the literate audience to whom Lucretius' poem was available 
75 Harris (1989) 197-206. 
76 Harris (1989) 217 and 253-55. 
77 Woolf (2009). 
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and to extend it beyond the literati to the much larger populations of soldiers and 
businessmen who were also able to pick it up and enjoy it if they wished.78 
With this broader picture ofliteracy, we can more constructively reenter the 
debate over Lucretius ' potential audience. It is clear from Lucretius' chosen word 
vulgus (1.943-5) that he meant to imply that some large, probably non-elite population 
was aware of his philosophy. If we add to this implication Cicero's statement that, 
through the writings of philosophers such as Amafinius,79 Epicureanism "took all Italy 
by storm," Italiam totam occupaverunt (Tusc. Disp. 4.3.6-7), the picture we get is of 
Epicureans (and just because Cicero did not mention him by name is no reason to 
exclude Lucretius) reaching out to the general public80-a group Cicero contemptuously 
called the multitudo, and which, he wrote, consisted also of the uneducated, indocti. 81 
Lucretius' vulgus was perhaps the unreceptive portion of this very same "uneducated 
multitude" that Cicero describes embracing it. It seems on the face ofthings that these 
two pieces of evidence are proof that the poem had come into the hands of a wide, 
popular audience. But scholars still tend to think that this is an unlikely scenario. 
Perhaps Cicero was exaggerating in order to motivate more strongly the need for his 
78 Cf. also Purcell (1995), who studies the adoption of the complex game alea by the 
lower classes as a form of social mobility between the illiterate and the literate classes, 
on which see Habinek (2009) 125 and Woolf (2009) 50-1. 
79 See Rawson (1985) for a brief account of our knowledge of these native Italian 
Epicureans (284). 
8° Cf. Rawson (1985) on the abundance of philosophy in Rome before Cicero that tended 
also to focus on physics rather than ethics (282). 
81 Cf. Cicero, Acad. 1.8, in which he states that Varro's descriptions of the various 
philosophical schools and their doctrines are suited to the minus docti; see Rawson 
(1985) 283. 
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own philosophical writings,82 and perhaps Lucretius' vulgus did mean something closer 
to "the common (yet literate) crowd." Perhaps these considerations are valid, but we 
should consider also the inclusory practices ofEpicurus ' school-in which he included 
women (perhaps some of them prostitutes), slaves and children-as a model for 
Lucretius. 83 
Still, Conte's and Dalzell's complaint that the poem could not have been 
intended for "ordinary citizens," because it is too sophisticated for the uneducated "to 
understand it fully,"84 is one that this dissertation hopes to answer. The thrust of this 
work is to show that Lucretius ' poem does not require "full understanding" in order to 
be an effective teaching tool. Lucretius provides layers of meaning that create inroads 
by which readers of different levels of sophistication can begin to appreciate the beauty 
and the benefits of the Epicurean philosophical system even before they can plumb its 
full depths. But even on its simplest level, the poem itself provides all the education 
(and the enticements to pursue that education) that even an unsophisticated reader 
requires in order to grasp its basic message. It is the sophisticated reader, already versed 
in the opposing rhetoric of competing philosophical systems, that offers the harder mark 
for Lucretius to reach. 
82 Dalzell (1996) 173, n. 24. 
83 Clay (2009) 19-20 and 26-27, and cf. Plutarch Lat. Viv. 1128F-1129A, in which he 
criticizes Epicurus for recruiting new disciples from Asia and Egypt and for soliciting 
the young men and women of Lampsacus. 
84 Dalzell (1996) 46. 
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Some further discussion of the physical act of reading will draw us closer to a 
conclusion regarding Lucretius' intended audience. The very language that I used 
earlier to describe a soldier's ability to "pick up" Lucretius' poem involves a point of 
contention. To "pick up" De Rerum Natura and read it implies that the poem was 
consumed by individuals in written format, but it has been argued that this kind of 
private reading from books was not normal practice. Harris and other modem scholars 
place a much greater emphasis on the oral transmission and consumption of literature; 
"The diffusion of literature remained much more oral than is often realized," Harris 
writes, 85 and he is corroborated by W. A. Johnson, who explores the complex social 
relevancies of "elite reading groups" in the early empire. 86 The conceit that a poet's 
fame comes from recitations of his work (whether public or private) and not from the 
publication of his book,87 further reduces the effective audience of a given work, but this 
claim has also recently been challenged. Thomas Habineck has given us a useful 
reminder that literacy and orality are not mutually exclusive points on a continuum. 88 
Viewing recitation and composition as contemporary and complementary practices-the 
book's fmal publication acting as a sort of commemoration of the work's composition, 
but not as its ultimate telos-renders traditional accounts of this kind of literacy less 
secure.
89 
85 Harris (1989) 224. 
86 Johnson (2000) and (20 1 0). 
87 Harris (1989) 225-6, citing Strabo i.l9-20. 
88 Habinek (2009). 
89 Habinek (2009) 115 and 124 on the commemorative nature of the publication. 
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Holt Parker gets to the heart of the issue by pointing out the contradiction 
between the scholarly view of poetic readership and that which the poets describe for 
themselves. The consensus that literary texts were to be read orally by/for small, elite 
audiences flatly contradicts the poets' own stated intention to reach a "potentially 
unlimited" audience of readers with their work in written form . 90 It is this return to the 
authority of the poet's voice that I wish to advocate in discussions of Lucretius' intended 
audience. It is fallacious to expect that an author would limit the intentions of his 
discourse to those appropriate only for the immediately available audience; rather, we 
must bear in mind that such works envisioned, as Parker puts it, "a readership extending 
through space and time, far beyond the confines of the city of Rome or of the poet's own 
life."91 Even if we are forced by lack of evidence to the contrary to admit that Lucretius' 
poem was only read by the literary elite among his contemporaries, even this stark 
hypothesis would not preclude an intention to seek out a wider audience outside this 
small circle and to expect, or at least to hope, that his poem would bring him widespread 
fame and glory, acri I percussit thyrso laudis spes magna meum cor (1.922-3). '12 
To believe that Lucretius intended to incite a wide readership to enjoy the 
benefits of his philosophical system one need only take him at his word. On the whole, 
the above pages have been aiming simply to sanction this trust in what the poet himself 
expresses about his didactic intent. Numerous critics, beginning with Jerome in the 4th 
century, have posited various reasons why we should not trust Lucretius' word. But the 
90 Parker (2009). 
91 Parker (2009) 188. 
92 See above, p. 12, and cf. Segal (1989). 
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hypothesis that his opinions are nothing more than the ravings of a confused madman 
has been justly discredited. More subtle modern critiques, based on the status of his 
poem within its genre or of its potential contemporary readership, seem at first to 
deserve greater credence, but when examined these too seem unjustly to diminish or to 
demonize Lucretius' stated missionary goal and incorrectly to reduce the audience that it 
envisions. 
Unlike Epicurus who said that he "never strove to please the many," ouo£non; 
cbp£x811v toic; noA.A.oic; 6.p£crK£tv,93 Lucretius held a different view. Clay has shown the 
numerous ways in which De Rerum Natura departs from the writings of Epicurus, and 
he calls this missionary tone "one of the massive differences that distinguish the two 
men."94 Lucretius' own description of Epicurus' achievement reflects this difference as 
well. Far from the image of the philosopher secluded among his devotees that Epicurus' 
own statement suggests, the version ofEpicurus that we see in Lucretius' poem 
resembles something closer to a missionary prophet bringing the news of his glad 
discoveries to a world much in need of them (1.62-79).'!-' For Lucretius, Epicurus' 
greatness lay in his ability to bring to light the physical system that would conquer the 
religious fears that oppressed the life of all mankind, humana vita (1.62), and his styling 
of the Master as mankind's savior gives us good reason to believe that Lucretius viewed 
his personal mission in this same light. Lucretius intended his reason and scientific 
93 Usener (1887) 157, frag. 187. 
94 Clay (1983) 112. 
95 These lines also convey another image, that of Epicurus as a conquering general; sec 
above, n . 40 . 
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observations to shine in upon the shadowy world like shafts of sunlight that would 
vanquish terror just as day conquers night: 
Hunc igitur terrorem animi tenebrasque necessest 
non radii solis neque Iucida tela diei 
discutiant, sed naturae species ratioque ( 1.146-8). 
Therefore this terror and the shadows of the mind must be scattered not by the 
rays of the sun nor the bright shafts of day, but by the observation of nature and 
by reason. 
The scope of influence that Lucretius expected his work to obtain is revealed here in this 
image ofthe Master making reason to shine in on mankind's ignorance more brightly 
than the light of day. 
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Ch. 2 Reception: Epicureanism in Late Republican Rome 
The previous chapter highlighted the distinction between Lucretius' 
contemporary audience and the larger audience of his poetic vision in an effort to realize 
the sincerity and the breadth of Lucretius' didactic goals as a philosophical missionary 
on a large scale. In this chapter, we will turn back to the smaller scale reality of Rome in 
the Late Republic, in order to explore the way in which the poem's contemporary 
context affected Lucretius' rhetorical choices. The tenor of his exhortations suggests 
that Lucretius expected his poem to find a recalcitrant or even hostile audience, and this 
chapter will examine the causes of these negative feelings toward Epicureanism and how 
they motivated Lucretius ' attempts to overcome them. 
In writing De Rerum Natura, Lucretius was issuing a profound challenge to his 
non-Epicurean readers. He was asking them to replace divinity with the random swirl of 
unfeeling atoms. He was also asking them to cast aside the fundamental principles of 
ethics and religious worship which imbued their society. Lucretius was aware that his 
fight against religion and his desire to trample it underfoot, religio pedibus subiecta 
vicissim I obteritur (1.78-79), would seem impious to the uninitiated, and he took great 
care to accommodate the anxieties of his trepidatious readers and to allay their fears . It 
was his ultimate goal to redefine piety and impiety and to replace traditional religious 
ethics with a sounder system based on observable truths, rather than on the false 
superstitions upheld by traditional religion. He begins this redefinition early on in the 
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poem by exemplifying religion's immorality in the sacrifice oflphianassa (1.84-101). 
This infamous act of impiety, enacted at the behest of chosen leaders and under the 
guidance of religious prophecy, serves to show the wrongs to which adherence to empty 
superstition can lead, "such great wickedness could religion persuade," tantum religio 
potuit suadere malorum (1.1 01). Eventually, Lucretius will describe a new type of 
"piety" which does not rely on the thoughtless acceptance of oracles and adherence to 
empty ceremony, but on an inner state of peace and a devotion to reason ( 5 .1198-1203). 
Yet this final redefinition is still a long way off in the design of his poem. The 
reader must first be willing to open his mind to new ideas and to acquire a great deal of 
technical knowledge in order to accept this new form of piety and to acknowledge its 
benefits. Since this understanding requires from the reader some degree of effort and of 
trust-because this new piety will take him away from accepted forms of traditional 
piety-, Lucretius must first negotiate for the opportunity to make his case. He must 
first contend with his readers' impulse to reject his teachings before their benefits can be 
extolled: 
quod superset, vacuas auris <animumque sagacem> 
semotum a curis adhibe veram ad rationem, 
ne mea dona tibi studio dispostafideli, 
intellecta prius quam sint, contempta relinquas (1 .50-53).96 
96 I follow the strong evidence given by Bailey ( 194 7) (loc. cit.) for restoring 
<animumque sagacem> as the ending of 1. 50. 
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For what remains, offer to true reason empty ears and a keen mind removed from 
cares, lest you should reject in contempt the gifts I have arranged for you with 
faithful eagerness before they are understood. 
The way Lucretius frames this request for attention is itself revealing. He does not 
simply invite his reader to listen; he warns him to dismiss the obstructing forces that 
threaten his ability to listen. He seeks his reader's attention in terms of the removal of 
obstacles. He asks him to empty his ears and to remove from his mind the worries that 
muddle his thoughts. In doing so, Lucretius acknowledges that his poem will not fall on 
ears empty of competing voices nor minds unaware of the challenges to orthodoxy that 
Epicureanism posed. He understands that his teachings are competing for a place among 
the teachings of others and among his reader's preexisting beliefs. As a result, Lucretius 
asks that his reader take his poem on its own terms and allow him the chance to reveal 
its gifts. 
Lucretius was also aware that in relation to traditional beliefs his materialist 
philosophy might be frightening and that his poem might seem to many like a gateway 
into evils: 
Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forte rear is 
impia te rationis inire elementa viamque 
indugredi sceleris (1 .80-82). 
In these matters I fear one thing: that perhaps you may suppose you are taking up 
principles of impious reasoning and starting upon the path of sin. 
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He is aware that asking his reader to doubt divine providence calls into question the 
fundaments oftraditional ethics. To the unenlightened reader, as yet unaware of the new 
ethical standards with which Lucretius will replace these traditional ones, how could the 
request to abandon providence seem otherwise? Lucretius perceived these premature 
objections to Epicureanism as a serious obstacle to his ability to be heard. In order for 
his message to gain purchase in his reader's mind, he knew that he would have to 
circumvent these obstacles and to contend with the belief that piety lay under the 
authority of religion. For this reason, Lucretius begins immediately to attack this 
authority by turning to the sacrifice of Iphianassa as an infamous example of religious 
impiety. 
In these early appeals Lucretius shows his apprehension about his reader's ability 
to receive his words with an open mind free from competing voices. But he does not 
clearly outline what these competing voices are, nor does he reveal the circumstances 
that so piqued his fear of failure. He complains of the difficulty of relating "the obscure 
findings of the Greeks," Graiorum obscura reperta, in his native tongue due to "the 
poverty of the language and the novelty ofthe subject matter," propter egestatem 
linguae et rerum novitatem ( 1.136-9), but the above passages express a concern derived 
from something greater than anxiety over his own poetic inadequacy. He is anxious that 
his reader will be driven away by a fear stemming from some external source. It is clear 
that Lucretius presents his teachings with passion and immediacy and with great concern 
for the well-being of his readers. Lucretius states that he was motivated to spend serene 
nights in composing his poem for the sake of Memmius ' friendship ( 1.140-5), but there 
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is some suggestion that he was further motivated by the circumstances of the times to 
disseminate the teachings of Epicurus to the public. 
There are small indications that he felt some threat to Rome's security that may 
have prevented him from composing his poem "with an even mind," aequo animo 
(1.42), and that may have distracted Memmius' attention (1.43). The phrases, "in this 
uneven time for our country," hoc patriai tempore iniquo (1.41), and "in such times" 
talibus in rebus (1.43), seem to refer to turbulent political circumstances that threatened 
to drown out his message of ataraxia, but the details and even the reality of these 
circumstances comprise a point of debate. The incredible picture of Lucretius as a 
fevered madman struggling against fits of insanity has colored a surprising amount of 
the scholarship on the issue.97 As a result, comment on these references to political 
turmoil has tended to dismiss them as unfounded in reality, focusing instead on their 
inconsistency with the apolitical attitude of Epicurus. Though many modern scholars 
rebel against this notion,98 there is still work to be done in showing the contemporary 
relevance of the passion and urgency with which Lucretius presents his poem and his 
fear of losing his reader to competing forces . 99 The current chapter will explore the 
sources of these competing forces that lay in the religious, socio-political, and 
philosophical spheres of society in the Late Republic. 
97 For refutation of this picture of Lucretius, deriving from Jerome, and a history of the 
misguided scholarship that followed into the 20th century, see Johnson (2000) 79-102. 
98 See Fowler (1989) 399-400 and Schiesaro (2007) 42. 
99 This was that goal expressed by Farrington (1939) 172-206, but his ideas did not gain 
wide acceptance. 
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This exploration will call attention to the multiplicity of reactions to religious 
and philosophical discourse that are to be expected in a large and varied society such as 
that of Rome in the Late Republic. To clarify the point, we may tum to Edward Gibbon 
as an astute observer of Roman culture and as a writer of great clarity and economy. His 
acknowledgement of the varied reactions to religious forces in the time of the empire are 
easily applicable to the society of the Late Republic as well: 
The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all 
considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and 
by the magistrate as equally useful. 100 
In this statement, Gibbon describes a governing class eager to take advantage of any 
religious conviction that proved expedient to governance, a variety of philosophical 
schools that, taken together, rebelled against every religious doctrine, and a populace 
that reacted with relative ambivalence to the efforts of either group. These social 
elements describe with a sufficient degree of accuracy the conditions under which 
Lucretius composed his poem. Acknowledging this variety within the audience that his 
poem would meet gives us a clearer picture of the difficulties that Lucretius appears to 
have faced in issuing his own challenge to his readers and to prevailing religious 
orthodoxy. We can see resistance on three fronts: the political, the philosophical, and 
the popular. 
100 Gibbon (1946) vol. I, 22. On this last point cf. vol. I, 24-5. 
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I The political 
Even into the mid-twentieth century the idea that Lucretius' mental imbalance 
caused in him an inner struggle that manifests itself in his poem crept in and 
overshadowed objective historicizing. "Something of the murky tumult of the times 
clouded his brooding spirit and shadowed his verses," wrote W. E. Leonard in the 
introduction to his edition of Lucretius' poem. 101 Although here he admits that the times 
were tumultuous, Leonard focuses his greater attention on the poet's "brooding spirit." 
And this momentary acknowledgment of the political circumstances under which 
Lucretius was writing soon gives way to the old notion that he was primarily motivated 
by inner conflict: 
And what was the social and historical background in his revolt against religion? 
Such data as we have tend to support our informal psychoanalysis of its 
vehemence as originating in personal experience rather than in shock at a 
cringing race. Mankind was as yet in no such panic. 102 
His participation in the old caricature causes Leonard to overlook two very real and very 
important factors. First, it is important to recognize that for Lucretius political tumult is 
the result of the poor principles on which religion is based and of the anxieties which it 
produces. 103 Secondly, Lucretius' anxiety over the state of political society goes far 
beyond an impression derived merely from his personal feeling. It is a worry well 
justified by the common experience of the times and which we can see borne out in 
101 Leonard and Smith (1942) 7. 
102 Leonard and Smith (1942) 72-73 
103 Sanguine civili rem conjlant divitiasque I conduplicant avidi, caedem caede 
accumulantes (DRN3.70-71); cf. Schiesaro (2007) 53-4 and Dalzell (1982) 209-10. 
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contemporary history. 
Other scholars are more generous in searching out real sources of inspiration for 
Lucretius' philosophical project within his own time, but these investigations aim 
largely to determine Lucretius ' personal political outlook104 and to reconcile the 
scholarly conceit that Lucretius' poem seems to be politically driven with Epicurus' 
doctrine of political abstinence. 105 Don Fowler concludes that the poem probably does 
not present a specific political stance, but that its political language is rather employed 
surreptitiously to suggest the dangers of political ambition. 106 In particular, he finds 
veiled references to the Catilinarian conspiracy of 63 BC and emphasizes that this threat 
to the Roman Republic would still be fresh in the Roman consciousness in the year De 
Rerum Natura was published.107 
The Catilinarian conspiracy and the fear it engendered constitute one likely 
source of Lucretius' concerns for the society of Rome in the very recent past, and one 
need look only to the near future and the coming civil war to see that there was good 
reason to look ahead with a troubled spirit. 108 In the year prior to the publication of De 
104 Nichols (1976) and Minyard (1985) independently attempted to reveal the political 
motivations of DRN, but their works have met with no scholarly consensus. 
105 Fowler (1989) 120-150 presents the best reading; see also Schiesaro (2007) 41-58, 
and cf. Yolk (2002) 94-96. 
106 Fowler (1989) 412-426. 
107 Fowler (1989) 417-19. This is also yet another instance of Lucretius subtly 
incorporating his philosophical principles into a Roman context. 
108 Some awareness of the contemporary political situation is suggested also in his 
reference to the anguimanus elephanti oflndia (2.536-40). See Wiseman (1992) who 
discovers in this passage an argument that combines vivid poetic imagery (probably 
derived from Ennius) with reference to "a topical subject ofpopular discussion" (51), 
i.e . Crassus' questionable ambitions to conquer all of Asia. 
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Rerum Natura, 109 Cicero too seems to have perceived the impending civil war. In his 
letter to Quintus on 12 Feb. of 56 BC, Cicero alerts his brother to the riots between the 
supporters of Pompey and Clodius that have been taking place in the senate, during 
which Cicero himself was forced to flee in fear for his safety(§ 2). He also relates 
Pompey's fears of an imminent attempt on his life(§ 3). In his edition of Cicero's 
letters, David Stockton recognizes in Cicero's letter a breathless account of a time when 
"Roman politics seemed to be teetering on the brink of a totally new alignment". 110 It is 
not unreasonable to recognize in Lucretius' poem, published only a year before Cicero's 
letter, a similar presentiment of political unrest. Given the abundance of political 
upheaval in Rome, following closely upon civil war in 63 BC and looking ahead to the 
coming of new civil discord between Pompey and his enemies in 56 BC, it is easy to 
imagine the source of Lucretius' sense of immediacy in the reality of the times without 
resorting to misleading analyses of Lucretius' mental state. 
II The philosophical 
Although the ambient threat of political unrest was indeed one likely source of 
potential distraction for readers of De Rerum Natura, there was also a more direct source 
of opposition at work in the socio-political atmosphere, whose source lay in the fact that 
Epicurean doctrines threatened the foundations of political power. Epicureanism's 
denial of providence invalidated the divine sanctions, conspicuously received through 
public religious rites, whereby political leaders gained their authority. The political 
109 Most scholars make 55 BC the likeliest date for the poem's publication. 
110 Stockton (1969) 21. 
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philosophers of the time did not receive this threat passively; they mounted a defense 
which constituted a major source of competition for part of Lucretius' audience. 
In 1939, Benjamin Farrington, in his controversial work, Science and Politics in 
the Ancient World, painted in bold strokes the picture of Lucretius' contentious 
relationship with political thinkers who wished to uphold religious orthodoxy as a means 
to maintain and to facilitate the political control of the aristocracy. 111 Focusing on 
Plato's prescription of the "noble" or "governmental lie" in the Republic and Laws, 112 
Farrington described the tendency of the governing classes to view religion as a political 
expedient for maintaining control over the under-classes and as a tools for suppressing 
popular revolt. Farrington went so far as to say that these elite classes conspired to 
prescribe religious doctrines for the masses which they themselves knew to be false , 
because these false doctrines enabled them to uphold their superior position in an 
unbalanced social hierarchy. Farrington traced this tendency from its beginnings in 
Plato to its final perfection in Rome. He upheld Epicurus and Lucretius as the saviors of 
rational science and as heroes of the people against the oppressive governmental 
instruments of ignorance and superstition. Farrington placed Lucretius' poem in direct 
conflict with contemporary works that proposed the application of religion as a political 
instrument: 
The essential thing about Lucretius is that in an age when the most learned 
author and the most eloquent statesman were agreed that it is expedient that the 
111 Farrington (1939). 
112 Farrington (1939) 87-106. 
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people be deceived in the matter of religion he summoned all the resources of his 
learning and eloquence to maintain the opposite view. 113 
By "the most learned author" he refers to V arro, specifically as the author of 
Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum. Although this work is now mostly lost, 114 St. Augustine 
describes in it V arro' s support for the public suppression of any philosophical inquiry 
that threatened the status quo. 115 Farrington describes De Rerum Natura and Varro' s 
work as "the culmination oftwo long rival traditions,"116 one that supported the 
dishonest use of religion as a means of political control and one that resisted it. By "the 
most eloquent statesman" he refers to Cicero, whose works of political philosophy, De 
Republica and De Legibus, he claims were directly influenced by Varro and Lucretius. 
In these works, Cicero condones the prescription of traditional religion as an expedient 
to politics following the Platonic model but updated to conform to Stoic doctrines! 17 
Farrington positions De Rerum Natura in relationship to these other works as a timely 
and vital appeal to reason and scientific enlightenment as a means to resist 
governmentally-imposed religion. He goes so far as to describe Lucretius' poem as a 
defensive weapon for the masses against mental slavery-"the last great cry of Greek 
science" and "a protest against the dissemination of superstition by authority and an 
attempt to resist it." 118 
Farrington's work met with much unfavorable criticism (as we will see shortly) 
113 Farrington (1939) 218. 
114 The fragments have been edited by Burkhart Carduans (1976). 
115 Augustine, Civitas Dei 4.31, and cf. 3.4 and 3.9, and Farrington (1939) 205. 
116 Farrington (1939) 204. 
117 Farrington (1939) 206. 
118 Farrington (1939) 231. 
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and to the judgment of the modem reader as well he seems frequently to have stated his 
case too strongly. It is important to note, however, that Farrington was reacting against 
the prevailing scholarly view that Lucretius' philosophical program was vain and 
unwarranted. 1 1 11 These scholars, like Leonard above, assumed that the source of 
Lucretius' poor judgment of his audience and of his times was to be found in his 
unbalanced mind. Against this scholarly commonplace, Farrington emphasized the 
opposite view: 
The opinion I wish to maintain is that the polemic of Lucretius was not directed 
exclusively, or even mainly, against popular superstition, but that the object of 
his attack was the state cult as the mainstay and propagator of superstition, and 
that he had special reason in the circumstances of his own day for the acerbity of 
his attack. 120 
Farrington made it his aim to show that Lucretius' passion was fully justified by the 
relationship of its message to the socio-political climate of his day. In this aim, if not 
entirely in his conclusions, Farrington is on solid ground among modem scholars and for 
our purposes his work provides a fruitful foundation for discussing both the passion and 
apprehension that Lucretius' poem conveys. With some necessary qualifications, 
derived from more modem views on the topic, Farrington' s bold portrayal of Lucretius 
as an enemy of government-sponsored religion will serve as the starting point of the 
current investigation into Lucretius ' motives for his unique presentation of his 
philosophy, for which, as Farrington aptly writes, "he summoned all the resources of his 
119 Farrington(1939)183-8. Seeabove ch. l. pp. 17-lg andn . . 11. 
12° Farrington (1939) 174. 
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1 . d 1 ,121 earnmg an e oquence. 
Among his contemporaries, Farrington's arguments elicited both admiration and 
annoyance. 122 His reviewers complained that his evidence against Plato was one-sided 
and his characterization of his political philosophy unfair. It is also fairly clear that 
Farrington's conclusions were colored by his own Socialist political sympathies, yet the 
accuracy with which he depicts the political role of religion, particularly in Rome, was 
too compelling to dismiss. Although Farrington may have been too ready to condemn 
Plato as an enemy of scientific progress, his characterization of the manipulative use of 
religion in Rome, through the vehicle of state cult, seemed all too accurate. 
Cicero, for example, did not just present a positive attitude toward traditional 
religion; he was also an outspoken critic of Epicurean theology. He went so far as to 
accuse the Epicureans of spreading a philosophy that threatened the fabric of society. In 
De Natura Deorum, Cicero railed against the Epicurean doctrine of divine passivity and 
described the dissemination of this doctrine as a mortal threat to the whole of 
civilization. He condemned those who professed the doctrine of divine passivity as 
proponents of impiety: "If their opinion is true, what power can piety have, what 
sanctity, what religion?" Quorum si vera sententia est, quae potest esse pietas, quae 
121 Farrington (1939) 218. The significance ofthis acutely appropriate phrase will 
become clear in chapter 3 section IV, which discusses Lucretius' adoption of varied 
rhetorical devises from the several genres at his disposal. 
122 Cf. for example, W. C. Greene's statement in his review: "There is enough of truth in 
Professor Farrington's main contention to cause one to wish that his book had been 
more fairly conceived," CP 36 (1941), 201-202, at 201. Cf. also the reviews similar in 
tone of G. E. Kirk, JHS 59 (1939), 298-299, W. K. C. Guthrie, CR 54 (1940), 34-35, 
and H. M. Hubbell, CJ38 (1943), 481-482. 
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sanctitas, quae religio? (1.3 ). 123 Cicero emphasizes the power (potest) of providence (or, 
at least, of the belief in providence) as a restrictive force, in whose absence the pillars of 
morality are lost. To deny that the gods' presence, either in benefaction or in 
punishment, is to take away religion's power. What force then remains to ensure piety, 
when, for Cicero, piety means adherence to tradition? 
Cicero is unwilling to accept any definition of piety that does not include the 
sanctions of the gods, and he expects that the loss of these sanctioning powers, whether 
to entice men to do good or to prevent them from doing wrong, would render religion 
morally and socially impotent. The loss of this restrictive force, he concludes, would 
soon lead to the end of human society and all its virtues: 
... at que haud scio, an pietate adversus deos sub lata fides etiam et societas 
generis humani et una excellentissima virtus iustitia tollatur (1.4) . 
. . . and I do not doubt that taking away piety towards the gods would take with it 
faith and the society of the human race and together with justice the most 
excellent virtue. 
The respect and fear of the gods ' power, founded in religion, is like the fear of 
punishment under the law which is the basis of civilized society; each relies on the 
principles of piety: iustitia, the knowledge that good behavior will be rewarded and that 
wrongdoing will be punished, and fides , a deeply held belief in the efficacy of these 
institutions. The Epicurean doctrine of divine passivity denied all of these established 
123 Note also that in In Cat. 4 Cicero states that illi antiqui created the idea of life after 
death to enforce moral behavior. 
' 
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principles, and therefore Cicero perceived it as a threat to society. 124 
In this same work, Cotta, Cicero ' s representative of the Academic school, states 
his objections more emphatically, insisting that the Epicureans were really closet 
Atheists who only admitted to the existence of the gods in order to avoid offence and 
persecution. Cotta' s speech begins by expressing the same misgivings that Cicero stated 
earlier, emphasizing the catastrophic effect on society that acceptance of the gods' 
indifference toward men would have: "For what power can sanctity have if the gods do 
not care for men; what furthermore could nature have, living yet caring for nothing?" 
Quae enim potest esse sanctitas si dei humana non curant, quae autem animans natura 
nihil curans? (!.123). Again, it is the loss of divine sanctions that is Cotta's main 
concern. But he perceives an even deeper threat. 
In addition to threatening the fabric of society, Cotta sees the loss of these 
sanctioning deities as a threat to nature itself. Cotta cannot believe that Epicurus could 
have genuinely held such a preposterous belief and sides with Posidonius in accusing the 
philosophy's founder of hiding his true atheist beliefs "for the sake of deterring ill-will," 
invidiae detestandae gratia. Certainly, he reasons, ifthere were gods, one must admit 
that they would be the provident sort. Even Epicurus, Cotta claims, must have known 
this to be so, since he would not have been so foolish as to think otherwise: 
neque enim tam desipiens fuisset, ut homunculi similem deum fingeret, [ . . . ] nihil 
cuiquam tribuentem, nihil gratificantem, omnino nihil curantem, nihil agentem 
(!.123). 
124 This observation comprises the brunt ofNichols' (1972) argument, see for example 
149. 
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for neither would he have been so silly as to imagine a god similar to a mere 
mortal,[ ... ] giving nothing to anyone, favoring nothing, caring for nothing at all, 
d . h. ,125 omg not mg. 
The accusation of atheism made the threat that the Epicureans posed to the sanctity of 
religion all the more poignant, but it also carried with it the negative connotations 
associated with this undefined yet notorious sect of god-denying bogeymen, in whose 
hands all piety was forsaken and all morality and all the bonds of society counted for 
nothing. 
It is also likely that these perceived threats did not pique the fears of Cotta and 
Cicero alone. Rather, such accusations of immorality and impiety represent a tradition 
of attacks on Epicurean ethics that took advantage of these same fears in the public 
imagination. In his study of the invective of In Pisonem, Philip De Lacy has 
demonstrated that in leveling charges of impiety and debauchery against Pi so, Cicero 
took advantage of the popular prejudices against Epicureans in general. 126 De Lacy 
finds that Cicero does not cite specific grievances for which Piso can be proved 
responsible, 127 but instead calls upon a long-standing tradition of attacks on the 
Epicurean school 128-the same tradition from which Plutarch most likely drew his own 
invectives against the Epicureans of the Empire. 129 In short, in order for Cicero to raise 
125 cf. Nat.D. III.3 
126 De Lacy (1941). 
127 De Lacy ( 1941) claims that the absence of specific charges suggests the inaccuracy of 
Cicero's account ofPiso's conduct (56-58). 
128 Cotta's accusation of atheism at De Natura Deorm 1.123 also mention a tradition that 
goes back to Posidonius. 
129 De Lacy (1941) 52 and 55, and see Plutarch, Mor. 1124D-1127E. 
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the negative reputation of Epicureans in general as effective proof ofPiso's guilt, this 
reputation must have existed not only in the mind ofPiso's accuser, but in the minds of 
the audience hearing the trial Gudges and bystanders alike). Lucretius shows his 
awareness of this prejudice when he expresses his fear of losing his reader to the 
prevalent misconception of Epicureanism as a via sceleris and of its proponents as 
teachers of impia elementa. 
In his attack on Piso, Cicero mocks the idea of inactive gods, intimating that Piso 
himself, in his wretchedness, stands as an example of divine disfavor. 130 But in his 
political works, his objections are made in earnest. In De Legibus, he proposes the 
enforcement of state control over private worship as a defense against this threat (II.30-
33), "for, the people's perpetual need ofthe counsel and authority of the aristocracy is 
what holds the state together," continet enim rem publicam consilio et auctoritate 
optimatium semper populum indigere (II.30). In this passage, Cicero condones the use 
of state religion as an expedient for maintaining the political control of the 
aristocracy. 131 His proposed law would tolerate any iusta religio (II.30), but it is clear 
from the views expressed in De Natura Deorum that Cicero would not tolerate 
Epicureanism. Here Cicero focuses his discussion of state religion on the rites of 
13° Cicero asserts that Piso could not profess this doctrine in attempting to check the 
ambition of Caesar, his son in law, because his own person affords evidence to 
contradict it, tibi enim et esse etfuisse videbit [Caesar] iratos [deos] (In Pis. 59). Cf. 
De Lacy (1941) 52. . 
131 Cf. Rawson (1985) on religion in the late republic, "there was little mythology, but 
complex ritual on which the welfare ofthe community, even more than of individuals, 
depended. Thus religion and politics were allied, and the same persons responsible for 
both" (298). 
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divination in particular-a practice which Lucretius singles out for ridicule. 132 Cicero 
concentrated on those rites under the control of the augural college to which he 
belonged, because in his estimation the authority of this college wields the greatest 
power to prevent undesirable political change (II.31 ). However, Cicero also admitted 
disbelief in the efficacy of these rites, at least in his own day when, by his estimation, 
true knowledge of the art had surely faded from memory. 133 Cicero's desire to maintain 
these empty rituals purely as a politicallever134 puts his recommendation of their use as 
a political expedient on par with Plato' s "noble lie." This recommendation seems also 
to corroborate Farrington's assessment of the oppressive character of Roman religion 
and in tum his picture of Lucretius as a fighter against oppression. 135 But perhaps there 
is still some call to temper this extreme view. 
More recent research has also sought to bring Lucretius' socio-political 
awareness into sharper focus by placing his poem in conversation with proponents of the 
use of state religion as a means to preserve aristocratic control. P. A. Brunt ( 1989) reads 
Cicero's De Natura Deorum as an attempt to reassemble a cogent version of the divine 
for the masses after Lucretius' poem threatened to dismantle it. Cicero issued this 
132 Lucretius explicitly attacks foreign modes of divination such as the Etruscan practice 
of reading lightening strikes (DRN 6.5 8-67 and 83-89, cf. Cicero, De Div. 2.18.42 and 
20.45, Pliny, HN2.143 , and cf. also Farrington [1939] 187-88) and the Pythian oracle 
(DRN 5.110-12 = 1.738-39). 
133 Dubium non est quin haec disciplina et ars augurum evanuit iam et vetustate et 
neglegentia (Laws II.33). 
134 See also De Divinatione 11.42 f. , 70, 75 , and cf. Brunt (1989) 181. 
135 For further arguments in this vein that deal with Cicero's attitude toward religion see 
Rawson (1985) 302 and Brunt (1989) 191-4, and cf. Farrington (1939) 201 and 206-7. 
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restoration of traditional theology, Brunt claims, in response to the dissolving influence 
of popular Greek philosophies, Epicureanism in particular. 136 He calls Cicero's 
suggestion in De Legibus-that the empty practice of divination be maintained and 
utilized to political advantage-"an indication of a cleft in religious mentality that had 
opened up between the elite and the masses." 137 Most recently, Alessandro Schiesaro 
(2007) also sets Lucretius' work in opposition to the works of Cicero and other 
contemporary proponents of the political application of state religion. In this context he 
highlights the revolutionary character of the poem, "the overall message ofthe DRN 
strikes at the heart of the expedient connection between religion and politics which 
characterizes Roman practice throughout the Republic and is packaged theoretically by 
Varro's Antiquitates Rerum Divinarum in the very same year." 138 J.D. Minyard (1985) 
also characterizes Lucretius' poem as an "assault on civic categories" 139 that places itself 
in opposition to the traditional values of the mos maio rum. 140 In attempting to redefine 
those values in terms of a materialistic world-view, Minyard finds, Lucretius pits 
Epicurean epistemology against the traditional sources of knowledge advocated by the 
aristocracy. 141 Lucretius attacks religion because it is "the central category of the mos 
maiorum, " 142 calling instead for vera ratio. These modern scholars, who aim to situate 
Lucretius' philosophical program within its contemporary socio-political context, tend 
136 Brunt (1989) 184-91. 
137 Brunt (1989) 193. 
138 Schiesaro (2007) 52. 
139 Minyard (1985) 53. 
140 Minyard (1985) 5-12, on the traditional values of the mos maiorum. 
141 Minyard (1985) 46-53. 
142 Minyard ( 1985) 46. 
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also to acknowledge that it expresses a polemic against the advocates of state-sponsored 
religion. 
These studies tend to return us to the picture that Farrington put forth, but there 
are still some further criticisms of this picture that need to be addressed. Arnaldo 
Momogliano (1941), Farrington's most outspoken critic, complained that Farrington's 
portrayal of Epicureanism as a popular movement in opposition to the Roman 
aristocracy was inaccurate because it overlooked the fact that Epicureans could be found 
within the aristocratic ranks as well. Momigliano preferred to look to the actions of 
politically preeminent Epicureans for more direct evidence of the school's real political 
attitudes. For Mornigliano, the mere fact that Epicureans could be found among the 
political elite was evidence against a popular Epicurean movement in opposition to 
government-controlled religion. As proof of their active involvement in politics, he 
called on the evidence of Cassius' assassination of Caesar, concluding that this 
conspicuous type of political action was condoned by Epicurean dogma. 143 As evidence, 
he adduced Lucretius' description ofthe early development of society (5.1011-1160), in 
which he supposes that Lucretius shows his preference for a Republican government as 
"an advanced stage of this progress." 144 In contrast to the only other Epicurean account 
of early man's political development, 145 Lucretius included a period after the anarchy 
that followed the overthrow of kings in which men, worn out by constant fighting, 
143 Momigliano (1941) 156. 
144 Momigliano (1941) 157. 
145 Hermarchus, in Porphyry, De Abstinentia 1.7-12 (= Hermarchus fr. 24, Krohn). 
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agreed to be ruled by magistrates and laws (5.1141-1150). This addition led 
Momigliano to the general conclusion that: 
Epicureans were sympathetic to a State founded upon consent, as the Roman 
aristocratic Republic was. [ ... ] To Lucretius magistrates and laws, not kings, 
are able to ensure durable peace. 146 
Thus, Momigliano assumed that Cassius and his like could find philosophical 
justification for the removal of a dictator within Epicurean doctrine. This claim, 
however, would prove to be made on shaky ground. 
D.P. Fowler (1989) has, in tum, critiqued Momigliano's characterization ofthis 
passage of De Rerum Natura. 147 He reminds us that, for Lucretius, early man's move 
toward government by magistrates and laws does not signal the end of civil strife nor the 
attainment of an endurable peace, as Momigliano suggested. 148 Fowler refrains from 
such broad conclusions regarding Lucretius' political sympathies, asserting instead that 
"Lucretius is no more a republican by principle than Epicurus was a monarchist." 149 
Likewise, Gordon Campbell (2003) notes that Epicureanism, by its fundamental ethical 
principles, takes an ultimately ambiguous view of political civilization of any kind. 150 
Rule by magistrates and laws is preferable only to living under the violence caused by 
greed and ambition, themselves products of the fear of death, but, even in its suppression 
of this violence, Campbell writes, it is still only "an approximation to justice through 
146 Momigliano (1941) 157. 
147 Fowler (1989) 141-145. 
148 Momigliano (1941) 157. 
149 Fowler (1989) 426. 
15° Campbell (2003) 14. 
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restrictive legislation" 151 and does not represent a real advancement toward the 
"progress" that Momigliano envisioned. 
Momigliano's characterization of Epicureanism among the political elite also 
overlooks the complexities inherent in attributing political action to philosophical 
conviction. Miriam Griffin (1989) has shown clearly the difficulties involved in relating 
Roman politics directly to philosophical doctrine. 152 She illustrates the variety of 
problems one encounters in attempting to find a causal connection between 
philosophical thought and political action: (1) the lack of ancient testimony directly 
linking the two, (2) the philosophical eclecticism of the period, which makes it hard to 
link any particular action to one specific set of doctrines as isolated from another-a 
problem exacerbated by (3) the ambiguity of these philosophical doctrines themselves 
and (4) the flexibility and adaptability of these doctrines, and (5) the compatibility of 
these doctrines with traditional Roman values, all ofwhich further obscure any alleged 
philosophical call to political action. 153 
Griffin also argues that Momigliano wrongly links Cassius' assassination of 
Caesar to his self-identification as an Epicurean. 154 Two major pieces of evidence taken 
from the letters exchanged between Cassius and Cicero argue against a causal 
connection. First is the multitude of other Epicureans who aligned themselves with 
151 Campbell (2003) 14. 
152 Griffin (1989) 1-37. 
153 Griffin (1989) 32-33 . 
154 Griffin (1989) 29-32, although she is more supportive of Momigliano's claim 
regarding the political sympathies expressed in DRN 5.988 ff. than is Fowler. 
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Caesar; 155 and secondly, Cassius expressed his ambivalence toward Caesar's victory, 
preferring to be ruled by Caesar, "an old and merciful master," rather than "a new and 
cruel one" in Pompey's son, in the year 45 BC, 156 well after his conversion to 
Epicureanism in 48 BC. 157 In light of the apathy that Cassius expressed in his letters and 
of the insignificance of his conversion to his opinion of Caesar' s dictatorship, Griffin 
concludes, "we have no reason to think that Cassius put his decision to kill Caesar, even 
to himself, in philosophical terms."158 Contrary to Momigliano's opinion, it seems that 
Epicurean philosophy did not provide the impetus that compelled Cassius to act. 
These more recent findings upset Momigliano's argument. Principally, he seems 
to have mischaracterized Lucretius' account of early society in order to invent a 
precedent for an unrecognized form of"heroic Epicureanism,"159 in which the call to put 
down tyranny trumps the doctrine of political abstinence. In connecting this new brand 
of Epicureanism with the assassination of Caesar, Momigliano found evidence against 
Farrington's characterization of Epicureanism as a popular movement against an 
oppressive aristocratic government. Yet, the investigations of modem scholarship have 
dismantled his argument. In light of these challenges to Momigliano's criticism, and of 
the shifting weight of scholarly opinion on the matter, we might now be better disposed 
to review Farrington's vision of Lucretius as a crusader against governmental oppression 
with renewed forbearance. Even if we admit that his characterization of Plato and of the 
1 -5 
' Cicero, Ad Fam. VII. 12. 
156 Cicero, Ad Fam. XV. 19. 
157 Cicero, Ad Fam. XV.15. 
158 Griffin (1989) 31. 
159 Momigliano (1941) 157. 
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political role of Greek religion is exaggerated and ignores contradictory evidence, we 
can perhaps allow that his portrayal of the aristocratic manipulation of religion in Rome 
is nearer the mark. 
III The Popular 
It is when we tum towards the realm of popular opinion that Farrington's 
portrayal of a Roman populace tom between the competing forces of government-
imposed religion and a growing sect of Epicureans striving to liberate it from aristocratic 
oppression seems most in need of revision. This picture probably overestimates the real 
ability of these two parties to affect the popular consciousness. The difficulty here lies 
in gauging the degree to which philosophical incredulity actually influenced the people 
at large. Because the only surviving voices in the debate between religion and 
philosophical secularism are those of the most adamant advocates of either side, it is 
easy to take for granted that the importance imparted to this debate by its proponents 
was felt as poignantly by the people as well. However, Brunt raises awareness of the 
fact that philosophies like Epicureanism did not have such significant real-world 
effects, 160 and forces us to qualify Farrington's portrayal ofLucretius as a people's 
champion. 
Cicero condemned the proliferation of foreign philosophies fearing that their 
growing popularity threatened to undermine the authority of traditional religion. Brunt's 
goal is to examine whether Cicero's fears were warranted by actual changes in the 
160 Brunt (1989) 194-5 and 198. 
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intellectual climate brought on by the influx of these new ways of thinking. The 
evidence leads him to conclude that Cicero ' s fears were exaggerated, simply because no 
philosophy was as potent a tool in directing the opinion of the masses as Cicero 
anxiously anticipated. Brunt arrives at this conclusion from the lack of public venues in 
Rome for philosophy or for skeptical criticism of religion. Rather, philosophical 
discussion tended to take place behind the closed doors ofthe individual schools. 161 The 
genuine didactic aims of De Rerum Natura make it an exception to this generalization, 
but of course the poem also encountered the limitations of literacy. Brunt also notes that 
educational boundaries presented a serious hindrance to the persuasiveness and 
proliferation of such dissenting philosophical opinions among the masses. 162 His 
acknowledgement of these limitations leads Brunt to conclude that the unorthodox 
doctrines even of adamant religious opponents ultimately did not theaten the security of 
traditional religious institutions. Brunt also takes care to note that it was these 
institutions that were the real focus of Cicero's traditionalism. In contrast to Plato, 
whose goal in proliferating the noble lie among the masses seems to have been to 
influence their personal religious convictions, Cicero was intent not so much upon 
prescribing personal belief as upon preserving the public authority of the institutions that 
provided political leverage, such as the Augural College.163 
Given these qualifications, we must modify our vision of Lucretius in the Late 
Republic with the knowledge that philosophy was largely ignored by an uninterested 
161 Brunt (1989) 195. 
162 Brunt (1989) 194-97. 
163 Brunt (1989) 198, cf. De Legibus 11.30-33. 
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Roman populace. Here again we come up against the notion that Lucretius' philosophy 
was impotent, this time to affect change among the masses, and this is the conclusion 
that a historical perspective forces us to accept. We should not, however, allow this fact 
to change our opinion of the poet's didactic intent. Even if the limitations of 
contemporary education prevented Lucretius' poem from enlightening the mass of the 
Roman populace, this fact does not preclude Lucretius from entertaining the hope, 
h d d d. . . b 164 owever oome to tsappomtment It may e. 
As a potent and pervasive cultural institution, orthodox religion held public 
opinion in its sway and ingrained a certain method of thinking in the consciousness of 
Lucretius' contemporary public. It is in this role, as a shaper of the popular 
consciousness, that Lucretius aimed to combat religious orthodoxy. The statements of 
Lucretius' philosophical opponents indicate that his philosophical message challenged 
the religious and political status quo, but Lucretius' poem does not convey any clear 
political preferences nor does it offer specific social prescriptions. Furthermore, the 
problems inherent in attributing philosophical motives to political action make it 
difficult, if not impossible, to show conclusively that Lucretius' poem had any real force 
as a political work. De Rerum Natura was not a work of ' political philosophy' except in 
its broadest definition, as it relates to man's relationship with other men.165 The goals of 
the poem are manifold, but its primary concern, as Fowler has noted, was the salvation 
164 Segal (1989) 199. 
165 Cf. Nichols (1972): "Since most men live together with others in political society, a 
crucial part of any philosophy whose goal is happiness must be concerned with man's 
relation with other men, with politics" (15). 
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ofthe individual. 166 Lucretius' goal was to speak to the heart and mind ofthe 
individual. To achieve this goal he had first to combat the competing voices of orthodox 
religion and social politics that dwelt there. Lucretius' preliminary appeals to his 
reader's good will are derived from his knowledge that his teachings must face these 
internal opponents. The poem's greatest obstacle was the resistance it faced in the mind 
of its reader. For this reason, Lucretius adopted a didactic approach that expected 
prejudice and resistance and attempted to circumvent it. 
166 Fowler (1989) 431. 
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Ch. 3 Lucretius and his Reader 
The preceding chapter explored the challenges that Lucretius faced as a 
philosophical missionary in the Late Roman Republic. These challenges culminate in 
the moments when a potential reader becomes an actual reader (when an individual first 
opens the poem) and when this potential student becomes a disciple (when he opens his 
mind to the poem's message). The current chapter will explore the various ways in 
which Lucretius represents this complex relationship between himself and his reader 
within the poem. It will explore the relationship between the poem' s addressee and its 
actual reader and how Lucretius exploits this distinction to create rhetorical incentives 
for the reader to pursue the poem's philosophical lessons. It will also illustrate the 
benevolent nature of his inclusive rhetoric, which is designed to tum the reader into an 
ally in the shared project of his philosophical education. 
I Reader and addressee 
Lucretius names Memmius as the ostensible addressee of his poem, and scholars 
agree that this is probably Gaius Memmius, the political partisan and party hatchet-man 
who was eventually exiled to Athens on charges ofbribery. 167 The relationship that 
these addresses immediately suggest to one familiar with the addresses of Horace to 
Maecenas or ofVergil to Augustus is that of poet and patron or, perhaps in this case, 
prospective patron. But the character and career of Memmius make him seem an 
167 Munzer (1931), and cf. Donahue (1993) 111-22. 
68 
unlikely patron of an Epicurean poet. Furthermore, Lucretius seems to present a 
somewhat condescending attitude toward him (which we will examine shortly), which 
suggests that he viewed himself as Memmius' social equal rather than his deferential 
dependent. 168 It has also been well argued that Memmius is not intended as the actual 
target of the poem's second-person appeals. The reader does not experience the poet's 
addresses to his pupil as a third party listening in on the conversation of others. Rather, 
the general anonymity of these addresses encourages the reader to feel their force 
personally. Diskin Clay has put the point well, "through the complex reader, Memmius, 
[Lucretius] reaches us all," 169 although his economical description ofMemmius requires 
much explanation. And these explanations, which involve the crucial interface between 
the poet and his reader, help to characterize for us the mission and the attitude toward 
that mission that the poem reveals, as its author negotiates the rhetorical complexities of 
this interface within his poem. 
The statistics of these addresses are themselves revealing. Out of the total 412 
second-person addresses within the poem, Memmius is named in only 11 places. 170 The 
scarcity ofMemmius' name seems to corroborate the idea that the reader is meant to feel 
the weight of those addresses. Another scholar's accounting of these named addresses 
168 Roller (1970) 248 and Donahue (1993) 114-15. See also Bignone (1945), Kenney V 977), and Williams (1982) 8. 
16 Clay (1983) 214, and cf. Classen (1968) 95-6 and Conte (1994) who expresses a 
similar but qualified view (9). 
170 The number 11 come from Keen (1985) 1, but others count 12 (see below); cf. also 
Townend (1978). 
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suggests a further reduction in the didactic focus on Memmius. Duane Roller (1970) 171 
finds that, after the initial two addresses in the proem to book 1, the remaining addresses 
take the form of the vocative, Memmi, positioned at line end (with a single exception 
appearing at mid-line) and with little or no significance to the actual content of the verse. 
Roller's statistics reveal the formulaic nature of the named addresses and help to 
corroborate the notion that Lucretius did not conceptualize Memmius as the sole 
recipient ofhis second-person appeals. 
Roller does not make much of his findings beyond suggesting that the 
appearance ofMemmius' name may have served a metrical convenience, but Keen 
attempts to apply his statistics to the question of the poem' s mission. Keen does not 
deny that Lucretius' philosophy had some relevance to its socio-political milieu; he 
acknowledges that the poem shows clear signs that it was written at and for a time when 
Rome was in decline.172 But, despite this acknowledgement, Keen does not accept that 
the purpose of De Rerum Natura was to make converts to Epicureanism. He analyzes 
the didactic language surrounding these 412 second-person addresses and finds in them 
no suggestion that the addressee is expected to make intellectual progress as the poem 
proceeds. Lucretius' language seems to reveal a consistent distrust in the addressee's 
ability to understand the lessons of the poem. Keen concludes, therefore, that the poem 
cannot be a true philosophical text in the sense that it expects "to lead its reader from 
171 Roller counts 12 addresses, adding the conjecture ofGronovius in 2.1080 to Keen's 
11. 
172 Keen (1985), "everything that was happening in the republic seemed part of its 
downfall; and the poet who wrote as a Roman to his fellow Romans would have done 
so with the decay of his nation in mind" (5) . 
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ignorance to understanding," 173 and he posits instead that the poem' s goal was "not 
philosophical instruction but the happiness of the poet's audience."174 Keen attempts to 
cast this assumed goal of "happiness" as part of the hedonistic principle which forms the 
basis of Epicurean ethics, 175 but he precludes the poem's transmission of this ethical 
form of heightened happiness when he denies its efficacy as a vehicle for teaching. 
More simply, Keen suggests that the pleasure of reading a piece of pleasing poetry 
suited this Epicurean end and denies that De Rerum Natura is a work of philosophy in 
the strict sense, calling it instead a piece of "eudaemonistic protreptic." 176 But this 
reformulating of the poem's purpose serves only to assert the unfounded claim that 
Lucretius was primarily a poet and not a serious philosophical teacher, and it does so by 
conflating this assertion with Epicurean ethics. The defect in Keen's further conclusion 
is the result of a more subtle conflation, that of the poem '.s addressee with the poem' s 
actual reader. Keen equates the narrator's attitude toward the poem's addressee with the 
author's expectation of his actual reader' s ability to learn. What Keen's statistical 
analysis of the addresses in the poem does reveal is that the rhetoric surrounding the 
poem's addressee is consistent, but it is important to understand that this relationship 
does not reflect the author's attitude toward his actual reader. 
The problems with determining the poem's actual readers have been addressed in 
the previous chapters; the poem' s addressee is best ascertained by examining the 
rhetoric within the poem. Keen and Roller both account for Lucretius' choice of 
173 Keen (1985) 4. 
174 Keen (1985) 7. 
175 Keen (1985) 7; he cites in particular Epicurus, Ad Pyth. 
176 Keen (1985) 7. 
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Memmius as his poem's dedicatee and sometimes-addressee in the fact that Memmius 
presented a conspicuous example of the corrupt and ruinous lifestyle that Lucretius ' 
philosophy intended to remedy. For Lucretius, Memmius was the perfect candidate for 
the healing lessons that he hoped his poem would provide.177 And he was also a 
specifically Roman example that sets the poem's lessons and motivates its goals in a 
conspicuously Roman context. 178 Yet, there is another, more complex, approach to 
understanding the role of the poem' s addressee, whether named or unnamed, that is born 
partly out of narrative theory. 
This school of thought views the figure of the addressee in the poem as a literary 
device, an "intra-textual construct," 179 that is employed to create "the right situation of 
discourse for Lucretius ' message, one in which the poet can inform and argue with and 
comfort his ideal/actual reader, as the need arises." 180 The similarities between this last 
statement and Clay ' s with which we began lie in the idea that the poem's addresses are 
intended to reach the body of its readers. In neither case is the poem's actual reader 
expected to be Memmius alone. The illusion that the poem is written for the benefit and 
enjoyment ofMemmius is only a part of a didactic fiction which the poet creates.181 The 
key difference between these two ways of understanding the function of this constructed 
reader is that, in Clay's formulation, the reader is expected to identify himself as the 
177 Roller (1970), 248. 
178 Keen (1985) 8, and cf. Donahue (1993) 217. 
179 Yolk (2002) 74. 
180 Johnson (2000) 9. 
181 Cf. Dalzell ( 1996) 51 , where he shares this opinion. 
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addressee, whereas, in the latter model, the reader is expected also at times to distinguish 
himself/ram the addressee. 
Two scholars, Philip Mitsis and Harold Donahue, published this latter theory 
independently in the same year (1993). 182 Both find in Lucretius' Memmius an 
inattentive, uncooperative, and unpromising student, and both cite as his generic 
predecessor Hesiod' s Perses, the indolent brother to whom the poet addresses his Works 
and Days. 183 The function of each of these figures is to create a tension between the 
actual reader and this unwilling, dim-witted addressee, whom Donahue calls the 
"fictive" reader, "thus the reader creates, at the poet's instigation, a fictive reader distinct 
from the narratee, and he strives to maintain this distinction."184 By making his 
addressee a poor pupil, Lucretius incites the actual reader to become a better one. 
The distinction between addressee, or "fictive reader," and actual reader, as the 
true "narratee," occurs when the reader begins to separate himself from this unattractive 
other. The actual reader's desire to be a better student than the fictive reader helps the 
author to position his student on the right side of any given argument. Yolk makes the 
point clear, "the negative depiction of Memmius forces readers continually to negotiate 
their own alliances."185 This device is of special importance to Lucretius given the 
prevailing attitude toward his subject. As we have seen, his contemporary audience was 
not necessarily open to philosophical discourse and was likely to have been particularly 
wary of Epicureanism. Donahue captures the essence of the rhetorical effect: "by this 
182 Mitsis (1993) 111-28 and Donahue (1993) 111-22. 
183 Donahue (1993) 121; Mitsis (1993) 124. 
184 Donahue (1993) 121. 
185 V olk (2002) 81. 
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ploy, he is able to locate the Roman hostility towards his subject in his narratee, a person 
from whom the reader would wish to distance himself." 186 The creation of this fictive-
reader-as-poor-student allows Lucretius to give a voice to his reader's potential 
uneasiness in undertaking an education in Epicureanism and to attempt to answer and 
assuage his unspoken concerns. 
II The honeyed cup 
Mitsis agrees that Memmius functions as a rhetorical device meant to influence 
the way in which the actual reader receives the poem's arguments. But, unlike Donahue, 
Mitsis takes a very negative view of the relationship that this device encourages. He 
finds Lucretius ' rhetorical positioning to be aggressive and condescending, and derives 
this view in part from the poem's central metaphor of the honeyed cup, in which 
Lucretius first characterizes his relationship to his reader and potential student: 
Sed veluti pueris absinthia taetra medentes 
cum dare conantur, prius oras pocula circum 
contingent me !lis dulci flavoque liquore, 
ut puerorum aetas improvida ludificetur 
labrorum tenus, interea perpotet amarum 
absinthi laticem deceptaque non capiatur, 
sed potius tali pacta recreata valescat (1.936-942 = 4.11-17). 
186 Donahue (1993) 122, and cf. Johnson (2000) 6. 
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But just as doctors, when they try to give bitter absinth to children, first smear 
the rims around their cups with sweet and golden liquid honey, so that the 
children's unsuspecting age may be fooled as far as the lips, while he drinks 
down the bitter liquor of absinth and though taken in is not taken, but rather 
being restored in this way regains his health. 
The rhetorical strategy that Lucretius describes in this metaphor implies a kind of 
deception, which, Lucretius assures us, is a benevolent one. Mitsis doubts his sincerity 
and confirms his doubts in his exploration of the rhetoric surrounding the addressee. 
This discussion will provide a convenient inroad for us to begin to consider the character 
of the author-reader relationship that this metaphor implies and the nature of the 
deception that Lucretius is admitting to when he assures us that we who read his poem 
are meant to be "taken in but not taken." 
For Mitsis, the metaphor of the honeyed cup implies a condescending and 
aggressive attitude toward the reader, in which Lucretius "blithely justifies deception as 
a means to psychic health."187 Mitsis refers to the rhetorical setting whereby Lucretius 
entices his reader to side with him against the addressee/fictive reader as a "trap" 188 
designed to suppress and to bypass the reader's own judgment and to strip him of his 
autonomy.189 He goes so far as to conclude his discussion with a warning that we should 
guard ourselves against the manipulative powers of Lucretius' condescending rhetoric, 
"in winking with the poet behind the back of the fool , we ourselves may be swallowing 
187 Mitsis (1993) 119. 
188 Mitsis (1993) 125 and 127. 
189 Mitsis (1993) 119-20. 
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more of the poet's medicine than we expect."190 It may be said that Lucretius' rhetoric 
attempts to influence the way his reader experiences his poem, but this need not imply 
the sinister relationship between unsuspecting and vulnerable reader and aggressive, 
authoritarian narrator that Mitsis describes . 
Lucretius ' fellow Epicurean poet, Horace, provides us additional perspective by 
offering his own educational metaphor: 
Quamquam ridentem dicere verum 
quid vetat? Ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi 
doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima (Serm. 1.1.24-26). 
What prevents one from telling the truth while jesting? In this way charming 
teachers sometimes give children sweets, so that they will be willing to learn 
their ABCs. 
Before proceeding, we should also not fail to notice the Epicurean influence that 
appears in Horace's language. The prima elementa that his teacher wishes to impart to 
his pupils are likely the letters of the alphabet, but these words also describe the atomic 
particles, whose nature and activity comprise the content of the first lessons of 
Lucretius' poem. Likewise, the word blandi, which describes Horace's kind-hearted 
teachers who wish to coax their students to participate more eagerly in their own 
education, hearkens back to Lucretius' plea to Venus to add to his poem the same charm 
by which she incites the generations of animals to propagate, "casting charming love 
190 Mitsis (1993) 123. 
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into the hearts of all," omnibus incutiens blandumper pectore amorem (1.19).191 It is 
not unlikely that Horace was thinking of Lucretius in this passage, or of the educational 
principles that he values. In Horace ' s metaphor, the trick of the charming school-
masters betrays an attitude of caring accommodation for their young students, made all 
the more eager to learn their lessons by the additional incentive of treats. 
There are several differences that distinguish Horace's metaphor from 
Lucretius' . Horace casts himself as a teacher rather than a doctor, and the distasteful 
remedy for his pupils ' ignorance is their primary school lessons rather than an 
unpalatable liquor. The children's enticement to endure their discomfort also takes the 
form of a sweet, but in this case we tend to assume that the sweet is a reward held until 
after the lessons are complete, whereas Lucretius' medens offers the honeyed cup at the 
first, perhaps, without disclosing its medicinal contents. In this way, Lucretius' 
metaphor seems to imply a deception that Horace's does not. But this appearance is not 
necessarily implied by the language of the metaphor. There is no clear implication that 
the child is unaware that there is medicine in the cup, nor that he is unwilling to take the 
medicine in the first place. It is possible that Lucretius' young patient understands as 
well as his doctor the healing properties of its contents but, nevertheless, appreciates the 
sweet coating which makes them more palatable. 
Conjectures about the specifics of an imaginary situation can take us only so far, 
and perhaps we are straining the metaphor at this point, but this close engagement with 
the metaphorical exemplum brings out an important feature of the relationship that it 
191 Cf. also et res per Veneris blanditur saecla propagent (2.173). 
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intends to illustrate. The metaphorical patient may not be aware of the medicine beyond 
the honey-rim, but Lucretius' reader is fully aware that in his cup lies the medicine of 
Epicurean philosophy. Lucretius has been explicit in his philosophical aims from early 
on in the poem, 192 and, in offering this metaphor, he is confirming his intention to 
provide the reader with a philosophical education that he is likely to prefer to take with 
some sweetener. 
Lucretius does not try to hide the fact that he is sweetening his philosophical 
medicine-trying to make it more alluring and convincing-in order to render it more 
palatable. This is a very important factor that Mitsis unduly discounts. 193 Yolk, 
although she accepts Mitsis' reading in large part, finds in it this same weakness: 
Note, however, that in this case, the "doctor" gives away his trick, and avows 
openly the function of the "honey-rim," i.e., his poetry. He appears unconcerned 
that this might diminish the success of his treatment, presumably counting on the 
fact that even adults prefer to take their medicine with a little honey. 194 
While the effects of Lucretius' honey-coating may be in some respects subliminal, his 
application of the honey is overt, and he is candid regarding its purpose. Even adults 
may choose to sweeten their medicine (and why not say children too?), and in this case 
the honey serves to shore up the reader's ability and also his willingness to learn. In this 
sense Lucretius' honey is the proverbial spoonful of sugar helping the medicine go 
down, and the medens is closer to a Mary Poppins than to the paternalistic aggressor that 
192 The proem is a brief excpetion to this candidness, as will be discussed inch. 4. 
193 Mitsis (1993) 113. 
194 Yolk (2002) 97, n. 78. 
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Mitsis describes. Lucretius' language implies that it is the honey, not the doctor, that is 
doing the deceiving, and what is being circumvented is the patient's youthful delicacy, 
improvida aetas, not his critical faculty. Likewise, the deception holds only as far as the 
lips, labrorum tenus. Once the medicine has been tasted, the trick is revealed. In this 
way the patient's naivete is deceived (decepta), while his person remains unharmed and 
his autonomy intact (non capiatur). 
Like that of Horace's schoolmaster and his pupils, the relationship that Lucretius 
cultivates between himself and his reader is one of nurturing care, in which the reader is 
encouraged to employ his critical faculties in appreciating the logic of Lucretius' 
arguments and the value of his teachings for himself. On occasions when Lucretius feels 
that it would be tedious to enumerate every application of a given principle, once that 
principle has sufficiently been explained, he leaves the reader to put those particulars 
together for himself: 
verum animo satis haec vestigia parva sagaci 
sunt per quae pass is cognoscere cetera tute (1.40 1-2). 
But for a keen mind these small footprints are enough; through them you can 
learn the rest yourself. 
Lucretius exhorts his reader to exercise his own discernment and freedom of thought in 
order to pursue a line of reasoning from "one point to the next" and to draw out its 
particulars "himself by himself," a lid ex alia per te tute ipse ( 1.407). 195 
195 Cf. Clay (1983) 225, and see also DRN6.527-34 and 5.1281-82, on which cf. 
Johnson (2000) 60. 
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Clay finds precedent for Lucretius' appeal to his reader's independence of mind 
in Epicurus' own writings and sees him take it a step further by bringing his reader "to 
face the test of applying the moral teachings of his poem." 196 Likewise, W. R. Johnson 
sees Lucretius' sense of his reader's autonomy as an essential component of his 
philosophical mission. In order to rescue us from superstition, writes Johnson, the poet 
creates for us a "fictional spacetime," of which the fictive reader is a part, and in which 
"he teaches his student the great, single truth and its corollary truths by seeing to it that 
the student learns, at each step of the way, how to understand those truths, how to think 
them through, each of them, for herself." 197 
III Negotiating alliances 
The fictive reader helps to align the actual reader with the poem's narrator, but 
this relationship also depends upon the reader's freewill and ability to distinguish good 
arguments from bad ones. It is this autonomy that allows readers to "negotiate their own 
alliances," to reemphasize Yolk's phrase. 198 The above discussion focuses on the 
relationship between the first- and second-person of the text, the "I" and the "you" 
(tu/vos), 199 but Lucretius also establishes this alliance by positioning himself and his 
reader against a third-person "other." The alliance between the narrator and actual 
reader against the "you" of the fictive addressee insinuates an implied third party against 
196 Clay (1983) 225, and cf. his interpretation ofEpicurus' Ep. ad Hdt., 61-2 and 173-75. 
197 Johnson (2000) 5. 
198 Ab 71 ove, p. - · 
199 The poetic plural of the second person pronoun seems to convey little difference; the 
plural of the first person pronoun is more complex, as we will see. 
80 
whom the reader is asked to measure himself, but Lucretius also takes advantage of a 
more obvious outside force that reinforces this alliance. Lucretius often positions 
himself and his reader together in the first person plural, by contrasting the "we" with an 
outside "they," whose corruptive influence threatens to derail the reader's philosophical 
progress and stands as an obstacle between himself and the enlightened group of 
initiated Epicureans. When the rhetorical effects of this contrast are brought into the 
discussion of Lucretius' attitude toward his reader, we can more clearly see Lucretius' 
emphasis on his reader's autonomy and empathetic concern for his well-being. 
Lucretius often introduces this third person "other" by juxtaposing his 
descriptions of the true workings of nature with the commonly held misconceptions of 
others. Early in book 1, he sets his first physical principle- that nothing can come from 
nothing-in comparison to the misguided and destructive misapprehensions of humanity 
at large: 
quippe ita form ida marta/is continet omnis, 
quod multa in ferris fieri caeloque tuentur 
quorum operum causas nulla ratione videre 
possunt, ac fieri divino numine rentur. 
quas ob res ubi viderimus nil posse creari 
de nilo, tum quod sequimur iam rectius inde 
perspiciemus, et unde queat res quaeque creari 
[ ... ] ( 1.151-5 7). 
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Obviously fear so laid hold of mortal men because they witnessed many things 
happening on the earth and in the sky, the causes of which works their reason 
could in no way account for, and they supposed that these things were being 
done divinely. Therefore, when we see that nothing can be created from nothing, 
then we will more rightly ascertain what we seek thereafter, both from what each 
thing is able to be created [ ... ]. 
Lucretius contrasts this physical truth to the mistaken apprehension of"all men," omnis 
mortalis, whose intellectual mistakes are motivated by ignorance and fear. This 
distinction aligns the reader with the narrator, offering him a prospective place within 
the more attractive "we," whom he distinguishes from this hapless and suffering "they." 
"They" look (tuentur) but cannot see (nulla ratione videre possunt) , while "we" perceive 
rightly (rectius perspiciemus) when "we" see (viderimus) the truth of physics. By 
grouping reader and narrator together grammatically, Lucretius makes what would 
otherwise be an appeal to see reason-which risks introducing a polemic-an 
assumption that the reader already sees the truth, and that he recognizes the flaws in the 
alternative view. The groupings allow Lucretius to create an intellectual environment in 
which the reader becomes an ally rather than antagonist. 
The reader's inclusion among this first-person group depends upon his 
acknowledgment that the proposed principle is, in fact, true. Embedded in Lucretius' 
"when" is an if. It is understood that the narrator himself acknowledges the truth of his 
own proposition, and so the reader feels the subtle force of this conditional sense, which 
carries with it the threat of exclusion. His desire to self-identify with those who know 
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the truth and to distance himself from those who suffer from ignorance and fear helps to 
add to the persuasiveness of the proposed physics, and allows Lucretius to issue a 
polemic against an outsider that does not threaten his alliance with his reader. 
Nowhere is the separation between the first-person group of initiated Epicureans 
and a third-person other made more distinct than in the proem to book 2, when Lucretius 
invites his reader to consider the pleasures of looking down from on high upon that 
suffering other.200 It is sweet to witness the hardships of others, he writes, but he makes 
sure to qualify this seemingly callous comment, "in that it is sweet to realize what 
troubles you yourseiflack," "qui bus ipse mal is careas quia cernere suave est" (2.4). 
The generalizing second-person here is also an invitation to the reader to share in that 
pleasure and to join the narrator in the temples of the wise: 
sed nil dulcius est, bene quam munita tenere 
edita doctrina sapientum temp/a serena, 
despicere unde queas alios passimque videre 
errare atque viam pal antis quaerere vitae [ ... ] (2 .6-9). 
But nothing is sweeter than to occupy serene temples well fortified by the lofty 
teaching of philosophers, from whence you can look down upon others and see 
them drifting here and there and seeking a path for their errant lives. 
The sweetness comes in recognizing one's own safety and happiness, and this 
recognition comes in comparison to the distress of others. Lucretius' disturbing 
descriptions of the plight of those others leads the reader to separate himself from that 
20° Cf. Conte's (1994) 30, on this passage as the best expression ofthe poet and reader' s 
relationship to the Sublime. 
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group and to identify himself with those who enjoy peace and happiness. Again it is the 
grammatical groupings that make the distinction. You too are able (queas) if you try, to 
distinguish yourself from those lost and aimless others (alios) by seeking refuge among 
us, the philosophers whose lofty perspective affords sight and provides the knowledge of 
what is necessary for happiness, "therefore we see that the nature of the body needs only 
a few things[ ... ]," ergo corpoream ad naturam pauca videmus I esse opus omnino [ . .. ] 
(2.20-21) . 
At times (especially at the beginning of the poem) Lucretius stresses that others 
have the power to seduce the reader away from the first-person group, and he warns the 
reader against their corruptive influence: 
tutemet a nobis iam quovis tempore, vatum 
terriloquis victus die tis, disc is cere quae res" (1.1 02-1 03). 
At some time you yourself may seek to separate from us, overwhelmed by the 
terrifying words of the priests/poets. 
Here the other are the vates-a term which encompasses both priests and poets-who 
proliferate frightening tales about the supernatural, and Lucretius casts these fixtures of 
Roman society as outsiders leading those who wander in ignorance and fear. Nor should 
the reader let the rumor of common opinion lead him astray: 
illud in his rebus ne te deducere vera 
possit, quod quidamfingunt, praecurrere eagar" (1.370-371). 
On this topic, I am compelled to anticipate the following, lest the fictions of 
certain people gain the power to draw you away. 
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Here, it is an anonymous other (quidam), whose ignorant misapprehensions of nature 
threaten the stability of his reader's alignment with the narrator as he sets forth the 
principle of void. Lucretius perceives the possible threat that they pose to his reader's 
loyalty and attempts to forestall any misgivings that may arise by anticipating and 
rejecting their arguments in advance. 
In each of the examples above, Lucretius begins with the assumption that his 
reader is a willing participant in his philosophical education, but the warning make it 
clear that this cooperative relationship is a tenuous one, subject to the critical 
compliance of his reader. In this way, Lucretius' seemingly coercive rhetorical 
positioning can be seen as a protective measure that attempts to secure their cooperative 
relationship against outside influence. The rhetorical force of these outside others serves 
further to align the reader with the narrator and reveals Lucretius' intention to create a 
common ground between narrator and reader as enlightened individuals united by their 
shared ability to see truth and reason.201 It is not condescension toward an inferior mind 
that motivates Lucretius to create this sense of allegiance in his reader, but a desire to 
impart truth and to warn against the distractions of unfounded fear and misguiding 
falsehoods. 
These more complicated views of the relationship between the first- and second-
person entities in the poem share an integral component with the simpler version Clay 
201 Cf. Conte (1994): "The very fact that the reader of a sublime text is a 'sublime 
reader,' both perceiver and creator of that text's sublimity, puts the poet and the 
listener on the same level: both are reverent spectators impelled to become agitated 
[ ... )" (20, and cf. 8). 
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described when he wrote that "through[ ... ] Memmius Lucretius reaches us all."20~ The 
intra-textual constructs serve to secure the reader's loyalty, to gain his trust, and to 
convince him that the poem's teachings are correct and for his good. This is the essence 
ofLucretius' evangelism. 
IV Rhetorical affectations: oratory, satire, and diatribe 
As we have begun to see and will see again and again, Lucretius' poem is full of 
subtle enticements designed to elicit his reader's good will and cooperation. Foremost 
among these enticements is his choice to coat his philosophy in the honey-sweetness of 
poetry. In examining the multiplicity oftechniques by which Lucretius makes his 
philosophy compelling, Susan Wiltshire (1974) put it well when she wrote, "Lucretius' 
eagerness to please goes far beyond his choice of poetry [ . .. ] . One begins to expect that 
there is honey inside the cup as well as around the edges."203 The preceding discussion 
of Lucretius' effort to align himself with his reader examples one of the ways in which 
he attempts to sweeten his reader's experience of the poem, and it has given us insight 
into the benevolent character of these insinuations of rhetorical sweetness. But there is 
yet another element that the above discussion brings to light. The poem's rhetorical 
202 See above, p. 6S . And cf. Segal (1990), who notices a slightly different rhetorical 
effect of the switch between grammatical person that signals a shift in the generic 
voice of the poet: "One result of such resonances [with the poetic tradition] is a 
continual shifting between the objective, distancing, third-person analysis of death in 
the framework of Epicurean physics, and a warmer, more affect-laden first-person or 
second-person discussion rooted in the literary tradition. [ ... ] The interplay between 
the two voices often takes the grammatical form of a change of persons, from the third 
person to the first or second" ( 46). 
203 Wiltshire (1974) 34, and cf. Amory (1969) 153-4. 
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positioning depends upon the nature of its genre, in which the characters of the narrative 
consist of the authorial or narrative voice, the reader, and the fictive reader and third-
person other, who serve as something like antagonistic interlocutors against whom 
Lucretius can direct his polemics. These elements are also present in other genres of 
persuasive writing with which Lucretius' poem shares several telling affinities. When 
we examine these elements in the context of Lucretius' philosophical mission, we begin 
to see more clearly the significance of these other genres on the poem' s rhetoric, which 
in turn clarifies for us the shape that Lucretius' intention to persuade lends to his poem. 
A good example of the complexity and fluidity of the poem's rhetorical form can 
be found in book 3, the final section of which scholars have cordoned off due to its 
distinct rhetorical style.204 Leonard and Smith (1942) give this section high praise, 
noting its "apostolic fervor" and calling it "one ofthe most moving and elevated 
passages in all ancient poetry."205 Later scholars have explored the passage in depth, in 
order to determine the character and the source of the distinct rhetorical affect that this 
section of Lucretius' poem presents. 
Book 3 seems to be divided into three distinct sections:206 an introduction (1-93), 
in which Lucretius illustrates the evils of the fear of death and outlines his arguments 
204 The end of book 4 constitutes a similar example. I focus here on book 3 because it 
receives fuller attention in the scholarship. 
205 Leonard and Smith (1942) 492. 
206 Earlier scholarship seems to have preferred a four part division. See Rand (1934), 
who divided the book into four sections following the structural pattern of oratory: 3.1-
93=Prooemium, 3.94-416=Narratio, 3.417-829=Argumentatio and 3.830-
1 094=Peroratio. Rand was followed by Owen (1968), who outlines this same 
structure in each book of DRN. See also Leonard and Smith (1942) 418-419 and 
Bailey ( 194 7) 984-985. 
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against it, followed by a series of arguments on the material nature of the soul and its 
consequent mortality (94-829 or perhaps -869, as we will see later), and a final section 
(830 or 870-1094) which supports the previous arguments but in a noticeably different 
manner and tone. Despite this contrast in tone, the consensus of modem scholarship is 
that the book comprises a contiguous whole, the various sections being united by the 
book's overarching intent to persuade.207 Scholars attempt to illustrate this unifying 
rhetoric by looking for influences on structure and didactic method outside the genres of 
epic or didactic poetry. Ever since C. J. Classen published his influential (1968) article 
on Lucretius' adoption of persuasive strategies from rhetorical theory, "Poetry and 
Rhetoric in Lucretius," intriguing models for Lucretius' persuasive presentation of his 
philosophy have been found in oratorical and other prose genres. E. J. Kenney (1971) 
names the two distinct rhetorical styles that he finds in book 3 "Expository" and 
"Emotional," the one meant to appeal to logic and to the intellect, the other to the 
passions, just as oratory attempts at different times "to teach, to delight, to move," 
docere, delectare, movere, and utilizes different modes of persuasion for these different 
207 Cf. Classen ( 1968), " ... the poetical and philosophical aspect should not be seen 
separately: they are inextricably connected and interfused by the poet as two 
complementary features of one scheme" (1 00); Kenney (1971 ): "Neither type of 
passage [the Expository type nor the Emotional type] is meaningful without the other; 
they are complimentary to each other in the grand strategy of the poem, and in both the 
poet is in full control of his aims and the means which he has chosen to achieve those 
aims" (15); Asmis (1983): "While the style of Lucretius' 'confirmation' may be said to 
be predominantly 'philosophical' by contrast with the predominantly 'rhetorical' style 
of the 'refutation,' both styles blend into a single style of 'philosophical rhetoric' 
which is unique to Lucretius" (53); Clay (1983): "What Lucretius' language reveals is 
not the contradiction of a poet caught between two worlds; it reveals the constant 
motion of a philosophical poet moving between two worlds" (236); and Gale (1994) 1-
84. 
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purposes.208 Elizabeth Asmis (1983) argues that this section ofbook 3 follows the 
structure of the rhetorical "thesis," which, she suggests, probably came down to 
Lucretius indirectly from the Peripatetics and the early philosophical oratory of 3rct c. 
Greece. Asmis extends the middle portion of the book to 869, calling this section the 
"Confirmation" and the last section, from 870 on, the "Refutation."209 
Kenney also looks to the Cynic diatribe and to consolation literature as structural 
models for this last portion of the book. 2 10 B. P. Wallach-the title of whose (197 6) 
monograph gives this final section the commonly used name, "The Diatribe against the 
Fear ofDeath"-follows Kenney and expands his study ofthis section's affinities to 
diatribe, drawing a thorough comparison of this section' s structural and rhetorical 
similarities to the diatribes of the Cynic philosophers Bion and Teles.211 Because of 
Lucretius' rhetorically rich presentation of his philosophy,212 each ofthese scholars 
mentions the likelihood of influence from Bion, whom Diogenes Laertius reports to have 
been "the first to dress philosophy in flowery clothes."213 
Yet more scholars have found unexpected influences from other poetic genres . 
Since the beginning of the 201h century, scholars have compared Lucretius to the 
satirists, finding in his poem parallel uses of apostrophe, prosopopoieia, character 
208 Kenney (1971) 14-20. 
209 Asmis (1983). 
2 1° Kenney (1971) 29-34. 
2 11 Wallach (1976) 11-109. It is noteworthy that Asmis (1983) also lists Bion and Teles 
among Lucretius ' predecessors in the development of a "philosophical rhetoric" ( 41-
42). 
2 12 For a discussion of the supposed novelty (or not) of an Epicurean utilizing rhetoric, 
see Classen (1968) and Wallach (1976) 1-10. 
213 Diog. Laert. 4.52 npd:rroc; Biwv riJv <ptlvocra<piav av8tva ev£8ucrev; cf. Dudley (1967) 
62-69, Kenney (1971) 17-20, Wallach (l976)passim, and Asmis (1983) 41-2. 
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skethes, parody, etc. , especially at the end of the third book. Some list passages with 
particular satiric qualities,2 14 or passages parallel to a particular satirist's? 15 Clyde 
Murley (1939) even offered an intriguing reexamination of the satiric genre by including 
Lucretius among its canonical authors .216 But the appearance of such strong likenesses 
between De Rerum Natura and satire is not as surprising as it may seem, when one 
considers their common evolution. C. W. Mendell (1920) offered a convincing 
redefinition ofthe satiric genre, basing his reexamination on a reading of Horace' s 
Sermones . He found the genre to be too narrowly defined by its invective and comic 
content and preferred to see satire as predominantly philosophical in nature and deriving 
from other genres of popular philosophy such as- again- the Cynic diatribe. In 
addition, Phillip De Lacy (1948) postulated a continuous evolution in post-Epicurus 
Epicureanism. He resisted the view that the school remained dogmatic and unchanging 
after Epicurus' death and found among these evolutionary developments the adoption of 
the popular philosophic essay.217 
If we combine the insights of these two scholars, we come to a view of 
' 
Lucretius' didactic poem as an evolved form of popular Epicurean literature, a view of 
214 Pierrepont (1912). 
215 Dudley (1965), who explores Lucretius ' debt to Lucilius in particular. 
216 Murley (1939), who argues "that the bulk of satire in Lucretius is very considerable, 
comparable with the amount we have from Lucilius or Persius; and that he may well 
for Horace have elevated the definition and tone of Roman satire and should do the 
same for us" (395). 
217 De Lacy (1948): "It is of course difficult to draw any conclusion from the use of 
common-places; but this much at least is certain, that Lucretius and the later Greek 
Epicureans were alike in writing works designed to attract the reader to the Epicurean 
philosophy, and that in these works they used literary and rhetorical devices similar to 
those used by Cynics, Stoics, and other popular moralists" (22). 
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satire as a verse form of the popular philosophical essay, and the similarity of both of 
these genres to the Cynic diatribe, another form of popular philosophy. It is easy to see 
De Rerum Natura in the intersection of these (and other)218 genres and arising from 
similar developments. Lucretius ' poem shares many commonalities with these other 
genres, because they all share a common purpose: each one, in its own way, is 
attempting to win the minds of its readers and to bring them over to its own point of 
view, and each one uses the manifold rhetorical devices at its disposal to do so, just as 
any other genre does whose object is to persuade? 19 The case is well summed up in M. 
C. Randolph's (1942) description ofthe elements of satire: 
To illustrate his thesis, win his case, and move his audience to thought and 
perhaps to psychological action the Satirist utilizes miniature dramas, sententious 
proverbs and quotable maxims,220 compressed beast fables (often reduced to 
animal metaphors), 221 brief sermons, sharp debates,222 a series of vignettes, 
218 We may, of course, also include epic among these genres, cf. Gale (1994) 99-128. 
219 On Lucretius' emphatic attention to persuading his reader, see Clay (1983) 212-266: 
"But what is remarkable about this didactic poem is the efforts its poet expends in 
attracting his reader to its argument" (216); and on his use of rhetoric to do so, see 
Wallach (1976), "[ ... ]Lucretius did employ rhetoric in that he observed and selected 
'the available means of persuasion,' [quoting Aristotle Ars Rhetotrica 1354a] which 
range from straightforward explanations to the emotional use of elements drawn from 
the Cynic-Stoic diatribe, and that he was interested in obtaining the agreement of the 
listeners to whom he was expounding a mixture of Epicurean doctrine and 
philosophical commonplaces" (3-4), and Asmis (1983): "Lucretius views himself as 
smearing the bitter cup of philosophy with the honey of poetry. But his poetry 
throughout serves the rhetorical aim of persuasion: poetic music and diction are joined 
with rhetorical arrangement and style to create a 'philosophical rhetoric' that is 
intended to compel as it teaches" (50). 
22° Cf., e.g., DRN3 .1023, hie Acherusia.fit stultorum denique vita. 
221 Cf., e.g., DRN 2.352-366, in which a heifer searches for her lost calf. 
222 Cf., e.g., DRN 3.931 ff. , in which personified Natura rebukes a man reluctant to die. 
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swiftly-sketched but painstakingly built-up satiric "characters" or portraits,223 
figure processions, 224 little fictions and apologues, visions, apostrophes, and 
invocations to abstraction-anything and everything to push his argument 
forward to its philosophical and psychological conclusion?25 
As the many parallels show,226 the same could very well be said of Lucretius, and 
perhaps better, since he takes up his philosophical mission more in earnest than the 
satirists, who may be said to arraign vices and commend virtues, but less 
programmatically and with greater wit. Even if, as Mendell suggest, they do so with 
philosophical sincerity, this latter object often seems to gain their greater attention. 
Lucretius' rhetoric is motived by the same basic concerns: to "illustrate his thesis" he 
becomes logical and his poem feels like didactic; to "move his audience to thought" he 
becomes emotional, colorful, and engaged, and his poem no longer feels like pure 
didactic but begins to take on the flavor of these other genres, whose strong and frequent 
use of these emotional appeals is their defming feature. In short, Lucretius may be said 
to make his case twice and in two different ways in an effort to bring his arguments to a 
''philosophical and a psychological conclusion." 
Lucretius avails himself quite freely of the many rhetorical techniques common 
to other genres, and it is to his credit as a philosopher that De Rerum Natura does not 
223 Cf., e.g., DRN3.1060 ff., in which a troubled man travels from the city to the country 
and back. 
224 Cf., e.g., DRN3.980 ff., in which Lucretius allegories mythical tortures ofthe dead. 
225 Randolph (1942) 373; cf. Dudley (1965), who also cites the above passage. 
226 The list of examples could go on and on. I have limited the preceding list to only 
those passages of DRN that will receive attention in the upcoming chapters of this 
work. 
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become entirely something else in their use, but remains, in its careful blending of sober 
didacticism with these more flamboyant techniques of persuasion, Lucretius' own 
unique creation. As many ways as there are to convince his reader of his arguments and 
to explore those arguments to their intellectual and emotional conclusion, Lucretius is 
capable and willing to utilize them all. His various rhetorical affectations are anchored 
together in the principle objective of engaging his reader, winning him over, and moving 
him to "psychological action." 
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Ch. 4 Venus and the Progressive Naturalization of Myth 
"What could define God [is thinking of God] as the embodiment of the 
laws of nature. However, this is not what most people would think of that God. 
They made a human-like being with whom one can have a personal relationship. 
When you look at the vast size of the universe and how insignificant and 
accidental human life is in it, that seems most impossible." 
-Stephen Hawking on ABC World News with Diane Sawyer, June 7, 2010. 
Hawking's understanding of the nature of divinity, which he describes in the 
above quotation, seems surprisingly similar to the Epicurean theology that Lucretius 
espouses in De Rerum Natura. Yet, if we imagine Lucretius, like Hawking, as a 
physicist who conceives of the divine as a part of the physical universe that his scientific 
discipline describes, these similarities become less surprising. Lucretius does not 
question the existence of gods-contrary to the claims of his philosophical 
opponents227- , but he does assert that those celestial beings who dwell in an 
undetermined part of the infinite universe (1.958-1020) are likely to exist very far away 
from our own world (2 .1 090-11 04). And considering the perfect and everlasting state of 
peaceful serenity that defines their divinity they are even less likely to bother troubling 
themselves with the insignificant affairs of humankind (1.44-49 = 2.646-51 ), nor 
perhaps would they even notice our measly existence. 
227 See above, ch. 2, pp. 52-56. 
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Yet this is not the picture of the gods that the reader finds at the beginning of his 
poem. Lucretius opens his poem with an invocation to Venus, the patron goddess of the 
sons of Aeneas, the founders of Rome, and "the pleasure of men and of gods," 
Aeneadum genetrix, hominum divumque voluptas ( 1.1 ). He calls upon her directly, 
envisioning her arrival on earth accompanied by all the comely attributes of spring's 
awakening: 
te, de a, te fugiunt venti, te nubila caeli 
adventumque tuum, tibi suavis daedala tellus 
summittit flo res, tibi rident aequora ponti 
placatumque nitet diffuso lumine caelum (1.5-9). 
You, goddess, you do the winds flee, you do the clouds ofthe sky flee and your 
coming, for you does the fecund earth send up soft flowers, for you does the 
plain ofthe sea smile and the calmed sky shine with soft light. 
Birds fill the forests with their song (1.12-13) at her arrival, and herds of cattle frolic 
happily in the fields (1.14-16). All the world seems to come to life and rejoice at the 
sight of her, and the sound and imagery of Lucretius' poetry evoke all the happiness and 
delicate majesty, such as must also have inspired Vivaldi's La Primavera. This opening 
celebration of the goddess ' generative power is followed by a symbolic portrait of her 
capacity to tame the tides of war. In a scene possibly inspired by Hellenistic 
portraiture,228 Venus cradles Mars in her lap, holding her lover in sway while he feasts 
his now docile eyes upon her beauty, and his breath hangs sweetly upon her lips (1.31-
228 Edmunds (2002) 346-48. 
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40). Lucretius sets both these scenes in the second person, speaking to the goddess as if 
she can hear him, and as if she can and will bring about what he asks, first to attend to 
his writing of the poem and to add to it her seductive charm ( 1.21-28), and next to keep 
war away from Rome, so that the needs of the state will not steal attention away from his 
message of peace (1.29-30, 41-3). 
The beauty of these opening lines has long been celebrated, yet this consensus 
regarding the proem's poetic force has been coupled with a great divergence of opinion 
as to its meaning for Lucretius' philosophical program.229 It has sometimes even served 
as the principle piece of evidence for arguments asserting the logical incoherence of the 
poem and of the weakness ofthe poet's own mind.230 More recently, scholarship on the 
proem has tended to concentrate on its possible symbolic meaning within the poem,231 
but Monica Gale has since provided the invaluable insight that the proem contains an 
"intentional polyvalency" of symbolism. Thus she allows that any interpretation-
provided that it is consistent with the larger poetic or didactic goals of the whole poem-
ought to be considered fair game.232 This concept of"intentional polyvalency" is one 
that I heartily embrace and which will help to shape the remainder of my arguments. In 
this chapter, I discuss the proem as a conspicuous example of this kind of polyvalency of 
229 See Elder (1954), esp. 88-91, and Gale (1994) 208. 
230 This passage was fodder for supporters of Patin's theory of l 'Anti-Lucrece chez 
Lucrece, see for example Regenbogen ( 1961 ), esp. 363-77. 
231 See the discussion ofprior scholarship in Gale (1994) 208-209, who cites the 
representative examples ofGiri (1915), Hahn (1941), Bignone (1945) 136-44 and 427-
43, Elder (1954), Giancotti (1959), Minadeo (1965), Kleve (1966), Flores (1979), 
Asmis (1982), and Clay (1983) 82-110 and 226-34. 
232 Gale (1994) 209 and 217. 
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meaning, which will set the stage for the upcoming interpretations of other, less 
understood passages that also present a variety of meanings for a variety of readers. 
In the case of the proem, this attitude of openness liberates scholars from the task 
of trying to find a single, definitive meaning for Lucretius' proem by divining its 
intended symbolism. Rather, we are free to acknowledge that the hymn to Venus is 
there to mean whatever it did/does mean to whoever may be reading it, and we can begin 
to explore its rhetorical function as an intentionally dynamic overture to a potentially 
diverse readership. In this chapter, I will explore the twofold rhetorical purpose that 
motivated Lucretius to begin his poem on Epicurean philosophy with this highly-
interpretable appropriation of myth. The current exploration will illuminate how the 
proem serves to attract and to enthrall the reader with its beauty and familiarity, and how 
it unites reader and narrator intellectually, providing for them a common ground from 
which they can depart together. This exploration serves also to identify and to 
illuminate the rhetorical elements of wordplay and literary allusion by which these larger 
effects are achieved, and to describe and to place them within the complex of Lucretius' 
didactic strategy-a strategy unified by the singular goal of persuading the reader. 
I Venus' charm and a beginning 
The proem's most explicit function is to attract the reader. The ostensible 
purpose ofthe invocation of Venus is to ask the goddess to add charm, lepos, to the 
poem, and indeed Lucretius' elegant language and lovely imagery make these opening 
lines some of the poem's most beautiful and attractive. Stephen Greenblatt's recent 
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description of his personal experience ofthe poem provides an insightful example. In 
the preface to his book, The Swerve, which examines Lucretius' influence on 
Renaissance Humanism, he tells the story of how as a young man he bought an old copy 
of De Rerum Natura for a mere ten cents, intrigued more by its sexy, surrealist cover-art 
than by its content. Some time later, he reports, without any pressing interest in ancient 
physics or Epicurean ethics, he idly picked up the book for a bit of light summer 
reading, and immediately found himself captivated: "Startled by the intensity, I 
continued, past a prayer for peace, a tribute to the wisdom of the philosopher Epicurus, a 
resolute condemnation of superstitious fears , and into a lengthy exposition of 
philosophical first principles. I found the book thrilling."233 
Greenblatt's experience of the poem is, perhaps, not unusual. In fact, it seems to 
be the purpose of the first proem to generate just this kind of unexpected enthusiasm in 
casual readers like Greenblatt. The author of a treatise expounding a philosophy with 
the sullied reputation of Epicureanism would have to provide some enticements to the 
reader ifhe wanted to give his work the chance of being read. This effort to entice his 
first readers in the ancient world becomes all the clearer when we consider that the poem 
may not have carried the title that we know it by today. On the walls of Herculaneum 
and of Pompeii, as well as in Ovid's Tristia (2.261 ), the poem is referred to not by its 
subject, De Rerum Naura, but by its incipit.234 A casual Roman reader, uninterested in 
philosophy or spooked by Epicureanism, would have much more readily picked up a 
hexameter poem called Aeneadum Genetrix (Mother of the Sons of Aeneas), than a work 
233 Greenblatt (2011) 1-2. 
234 Clay (1983) 82-3 . 
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whose form and title clearly betrayed its philosophical content. As this reader began, he 
may have been charmed by the proem's beauty and intensity, as Greenblatt was, and 
continued reading. Before long, he would come upon its philosophical message, and if 
he was turned off at that point he might still put the book down, but at least Lucretius 
had gained the opportunity to draw him in. 
Only the reader already familiar with the Epicurean content of the poem would 
find the proem surprising or unorthodox. When compared with other examples of 
hexameter poetry, such as the Homeric hymns and perhaps even the didactic of 
Empedocles, the opening hymn to Venus comes across as more or less conventional.235 
And it is no accident that Lucretius chose to hide his Epicurean doctrines behind the 
fas:ade of literary convention. The proem is Lucretius' effort "to meet his audience 
where they are,"236 to establish a familiar and comfortable starting place from which to 
depart. The proem is there to catch the reader's attention, to assure him, "to overcome 
all prejudices and, in turn, to prejudice him,"237 to prepare him for his coming "ascent to 
Epicureanism."238 This ascent would be arduous, and its beginning required a firm and 
comfortable footing. To this end, Lucretius begins his poem with an unambiguously 
positive vision of Natura and of nurturing divinity ,239 free of the coming challenges that 
235 Gale (1994) 209-10, and see Sedley (1989) on the possibility that Empedocles' 
Physics began with a hymn to Aphrodite. 
236 This is the conclusion of Clay's examination of the proem, but I owe this wonderful 
summarizing phrase to Kirk Summers (1995) 48 . 
237 Classen ( 1968) 109. 
238 Strauss (1968) 76. 
239 Clay (1983) 87. 
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he will make toward these na'ive personifications of natura (with a lower-case n), when 
it will be deprived of divinity and sentimental personification. 240 
The invocation has obvious precedents in hexametric poetry, but its rhetorical 
purpose is also a reflection of the techniques of oratory. It functions, in effect, as a kind 
of exordium designed to render its audience benivolus, attentus, and docilis. Classen 
first noted the many parallels between the force of Lucretius' proem and, for example, 
the rhetorical theory that Cicero prescribes in De lnventione. The exordium is the first 
place where one should, according to Cicero, adapt one's rhetoric to the preconceived 
opinions of the listener (1.21), and where one should attempt to pique the audience's 
interest by the novelty and importance of one's subject (1.23). 241 
Lucretius incorporates both ofthese rhetorical aims within his proem. He 
stresses "the novelty of the subject," rerum novitas ( 1.13 9), and of his rendering into 
Latin "the shadowy discoveries of the Greeks," Graiorum obscura reperta (1.136). He 
emphasizes their importance by illustrating their bearing on our conception "of the 
universe and ofthe gods," de summa caeli ratione deumque (1.54), and on the state of 
the human species, which "lies upon the. ground crushed beneath religion's weight," 
humana [ ... ] vita iaceret I in ferris oppressa gravi sub religione (1.62-3). And he makes 
emphatic pleas that his audience not allow their preconceived notions to cause them to 
cast aside the gifts that he is offering (1.50-53).2-12 
24
° Clay (1983) 93 . 
241 Classen (1968) 100-109. See also Schrijvers (1970) 260, n. 31 and 276, n. 54, and 
Gale (1994) 211. 
242 Quoted above, ch. 2. pp. 4 1-42. 
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These likenesses to the oratorical idiom suggest that Lucretius' request to Venus 
for lepos stretches beyond the "charm" of poetry to include also the appeal of rhetoric, 
both of which are to be put to the singular purpose of attracting the reader.243 This dual 
request for the power to charm his reader reflects Lucretius' desire to emulate Venus' 
power to lead willing herds wherever she wishes, "thus captivated by your charm [the 
herd] follows you desirously wherever you proceed to lead them," ita capta Iepore I te 
sequitur cupide quo quamque inducere pergis (1 .15-16). His request for lepos is, in 
effect, a request for psychagogic power?44 
But to lead his reader toward the goal of Epicureanism, he must first establish a 
firm starting point from which to depart. The proem's hymn to Venus provides that 
common ground for narrator and reader; it creates an agreeable starting point from 
which they may begin their journey together. For Lucretius and his experienced reader, 
the hymn is a complex of symbolism and metaphor, an allegory describing the 
interrelation of natural forces, couched in the conventions of epic language, which yet 
never violates Lucretius' own linguistic conventions, as we will see. For the first reader, 
however, the hymn is perfectly conventional. It jibes with mythological, religious, 
patriotic, and literary traditions and therefore provides the reader an easy and inviting 
first step on a journey that will eventually call into question the fundamentals of his prior 
thinking. 
243 Classen (1968) 101-4, cf. Cic. De or. 2.176, 1.30, 3 .55; Brutus 322; Horace Ars P. 
99-100. 
244 Classen (1968) 104. 
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In the first book, Lucretius places his ethical and theological doctrines in the 
background and deals more substantially with the fundamental principles of Epicurean 
physics, on which the rest of the philosophy will be based. Even without the emotional 
and ideological difficulties that these fraught subjects would impose upon the reader, the 
science alone-understanding the basic principles of atomism and how they work 
together-would have offered a serious challenge to the uninitiated. Lucretius will ask 
his reader to envision his world as a composition of atoms and void, in which all 
substances are to be understood as the conglomerations of invisible particles falling 
eternally through a limitless emptiness. It is sometimes easy to forget, given the 
startling likeness of these principles to those of modern science, how strange and 
unlikely these ideas must have seemed to an ancient audience, even when divorced from 
their theological implications. Lucretius was asking his readers to imagine a theoretical 
physics of other-worldly proportion and to apply those physical theories to their own 
world and their own lives. In an age of philosophical incredulity, and without the 
technology to help provide proof of his claims, the task of bringing this strange world of 
atoms into view must have been very nearly impossible. Yet, Lucretius undertook it 
with only the vividness of his poetic imagination as his lure and his microscope. 245 
If we consider Lucretius' poem as a work that intends to bring the science of 
atomism to a wide audience, we can then view the proem as his first effort in 
acquainting his readers with the awesome strangeness of the physical world. And we 
can illuminate some key features in the structure and rhetoric of this attempt by 
245 On the dialectical function of Lucretius' imagery, with which he clarifies and 
enforces his arguments see West (1969) 15-17 and 136-144. 
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comparing the proem of De Rerum Natura to the opening of another, modem work 
whose goal was also to popularize cutting-edge physical science. In 1988, Stephen 
Hawking published A Brief History of Time, a book on cosmological and quantum 
physics which would quickly become the most widely read scientific treatise ever 
written. It is a work devoted to making the technicalities of modem physics and the 
unbelievable wonders that it reveals-black holes, quarks, other dimensions, the 
flexibility of time, worm-holes stretching though an ever-expanding universe-
accessible to a wide audience, and it was an unprecedented success. It is perhaps not 
surprising, if we postulate a similar goal for Lucretius, that Hawking's first chapter, 
entitled "Our Picture of the Universe," in many ways serves the same function as 
Lucretius' proem. Like the proem, Hawking's introduction is also, in essence, an 
attempt to create a common starting point with which the reader can easily identify and 
from which author and reader can begin their journey together. 
Hawking too begins with a myth. He tells the story of a prominent scientist 
lecturing on the constitution of our solar system and coming into conflict with a 
curmudgeonly old woman who insists that his theories are false-for, as everyone 
knows, the world is in fact a flat disk resting upon the back of an enormous tortoise. 
When the scientist smugly asks what she supposes to lie underneath the tortoise, the old 
woman triumphantly replies, "it's turtles all the way down."246 One may wonder why 
Hawking chose to begin a sophisticated work of modem science by first relating such an 
absurd cosmology. The answer lies in recognizing in Hawking's myth the same 
246 Hawking (1988) 1. 
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rhetorical forces that motivated Lucretius' proem. Both myths unite author and reader 
intellectually and idiomatically and provide a starting point from which to diverge. For 
Hawking the myth serves as a springboard into the programmatic questions that his book 
will address: "Where did the universe come from and where is it going? Did the 
universe have a beginning, and if so, what happened before then?"247 These rhetorical 
questions set the agenda for his book, and by leading to these issues from a common 
starting point-the shared ridicule of the world-turtle mytheme-reader and author can 
begin to consider these present themes from the same vantage point. 
Lucretius also uses his proem to raise questions (indirect, rather than rhetorical) 
that anticipate the main themes of his poem. Lucretius moves rapidly from the pure 
mythology of Venus' hymn toward an understanding of nature that is attainable by man, 
that can be grasped and passed on. His encomium of Epicurus, which follows directly 
upon the hymn, describes the Master returning from the great expanse of the universe in 
triumph, bringing back as booty knowledge of "what can happen, what is impossible, 
and how each thing's power has an end and a deeply rooted boundary stone," quid possit 
oriri, I quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique I quanam sit ratione atque alte 
terminus haerens (1. 75-77); Lucretius himself will reveal "how the motions of the sun 
and moon are made, and by what force things happen on earth," solis lunaeque meatus 1 
quafiant ratione, et qua vi quaeque gerantur I in ferris (1.128-30). He will spend the 
rest of the poem answering these questions, and these answers are the gifts which he has 
already exhorted his reader not to reject, ne mea dona[ .. . ] relinquas (1.52). 
247 Hawking (1988) 1. 
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Lucretius is attempting to move from one world-the everyday world to which 
his reader is accustomed-to another strange and unfamiliar world of microscopic atoms 
and infinite space, and his language reflects the unfamiliarity of this new world. Hear of 
the primordia, he writes, but he anticipates the reader's reaction to the novelty of his 
vocabulary and identifies this and other ways of referring to these invisible building 
blocks as technical terms: 
quae nos 'materiem ' et 'genitalia corpora ' rebus 
reddunda in ratione vocare et 'semina ' rerum 
appellare suemus (1.58-60).248 
which in rendering our account we are accustomed to call 'material ' and 
'generative bodies' of matter, and to name them the ' seeds' of matter. 
As Diskin Clay has pointed out, "Lucretius' care in drawing attention to his distinctive 
manner of speaking serves to set his world off from that of his reader. "249 The reader is 
to distinguish between the commonly understood meaning of these terms and the 
technical meanings that Lucretius is imparting to them, and this difference begins to 
draw the distinction between the reader' s world and this new one. But I would 
emphasize that Lucretius is not establishing this technical vocabulary in order to 
distance the reader from himself. Rather, he is attempting to close the gap between 
himself and his reader by letting him in on his own way of speaking-now "our" way of 
speaking, nos appellare suemus-and is actually putting the perceived distance between 
248 I have added the quotation marks to Bailey's text to emphasize the technical nature of 
these terms. 
249 Clay (1983) 96. 
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the reader and his old conception of the world. Thus this conspicuous creation of a 
technical vocabulary serves also to move reader and narrator together away from the 
familiar intellectual space in which they began toward a new and different conception of 
the universe. 
Two factors make it impossible to say exactly how Lucretius made the move 
from the hymn to Venus into the thematic questions with which he sets the agenda of his 
poem. There seems to be a lacuna after line 49, and lines 44-49 on the eternal peace of 
the gods (which are repeated in a perhaps more appropriate context at 2.646-51) may 
have been mistakenly inserted into the proem. (This latter issue will be discussed in 
detail at the end of this chapter.)251> But despite these shortcomings in the security of the 
text, we can see fairly well that the tone of the proem changes at line 50. Here Lucretius 
makes his first plea for his audience's attention25 1 and sets out his first theme. Open 
your ears and your mind, he writes, auris animumque [ ... ] adhibe (1.50), and hear of the 
primordia, "out of which nature creates, increases and nourishes all things and back into 
which nature returns these same things when they die," unde omnis natura creet res 
auctet alatque I quove eadem rursum natura perempta resolvat (1 .56-7). As soon as the 
narrative of the hymn ceases, the narrator is heard addressing his reader. They are ' 
coming upon the first difficult stretch of the journey, where the terrain begins to look 
treacherous and unfamiliar, and Lucretius exhorts the reader to take heart and forge 
ahead, ne mea dona[ ... ] contempta relinquas (1.53). Had Lucretius not availed himself 
250 See below, pp. 1 ?.7-133. 
251 Above p. 41-42 . 
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of the lepos that Venus' hymn provided the poem's beginning, could he have expected 
his current request to meet friendly ears? Could he hope to have earned the currency 
necessary to give purchase to his pleas? Without the hymn at the outset of the poem, it 
is hard to imagine such an accommodating reader. It is the opening hymn and its 
transcendent charm that grants Lucretius the right to impose upon his audience his 
request for their unprejudiced attention. 
To return momentarily to our comparison, we must address an important 
difference between Lucretius' and Hawking's opening myths. Ostensibly, Lucretius' 
hymn is reverent and sincere, while Hawking's anecdote characterizes the turtle-
obsessed old woman derisively from the start. Despite this difference, however, their 
purpose is basically the same. Hawking approaches his myth from the standpoint of his 
modem reader, who is apt to view such primitive cosmologies as ridiculous. But he 
soon turns this ridicule back on the reader when he later asks, "why do we think we 
know better?"252 Hawking's purpose is not to ridicule a na'ive old woman's beliefs, but 
to question our confidence in our own. Hawking momentarily defends this false 
cosmology in order to call attention to the carelessness of our own convictions about the 
nature of the universe by pointing out our equal inability to provide evidence for our 
own beliefs. 
The beginning of Lucretius' poem moves in the opposite direction, but the effect 
is the same. Lucretius is writing for an audience that is apt to identify easily with this 
picture ofVenus as an active and present god, and so he momentarily sides with the 
252 Hawking (1988) 1. 
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reader in supporting a theological viewpoint that he intends to dismiss. Having crafted a 
traditional hymn in reverence to a god, he then begins to call into question the image of 
the universe that it assumes. We cannot know what thoughts hide in the lacuna between 
the addresses to Venus in the hymn and when he turns to address his reader and to 
describe for him the first atomic principles, but even this empty space seems to suggest a 
challenge similar to Hawking's. Why do we think we know these things about Venus? 
Is a goddess really the best explanation for the generative properties of our universe? 
As he proceeds, the goddess Venus quickly succumbs to the more abstract entity, 
Natura/53 and this personified version of Natura soon becomes naturalized in tum into 
unpersonified natura, "deprived of the capital letter by which Lucretius' editors observe 
her divinity . "254 Lucretius declines to pay reverence to this form of nature as something 
unknowable, and he vehemently countermands the supposed piety of traditional religion. 
As we have seen;"' Lucretius' aim is to redefine piety and to question the traditional 
sources of morality. He begins by challenging religion's beneficence, and offers the 
cruel and needless sacrifice of the innocent Iphigeneia by her father, Agamemnon, and 
his ministers of state as a legendary example ofreligion' s negative influence-"such 
great evil was religion able to induce," tantum religio potu it suadere malo rum (1.1 01 ). 
For Lucretius, this legendary episode provides proof enough that religion is an insecure 
arbiter of morality. 
253 Clay (1983) 83-6 and 228. 
254 Clay (1983) makes this comment about Venus in book 4 (228), but it is aptly applied 
to his reading of Natura in the proem as well (83-6 and cf. 95). 
255 See nbov~. ch. :2. pp . 40-41 ,mel sg-)9 . 
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In sum, the proem facilitates the move from a common way of thinking to a less 
familiar view. For Lucretius, physics are inextricably bound together with theology and 
with ethics, and the proem serves the complex function of initially accommodating the 
reader's expectation of each of these things. It attracts him with its beauty and its 
unthreatening representation of divine providence, but it also functions as a stepping 
stone leading away from traditional conceptions of morality and the divine. It moves, as 
Schrijvers has suggested, per falsa ad vera,256 through an attractive and familiar 
falsehood toward the true conception of nature that the myth obscures-a truth that 
provides its own equal beauty and its own superior standards ofmorality. 
II Naturalization and progress 
So far we have seen how the proem offers a first reader an attractive first step 
from which to move from common opinion to the truth. Now we will jump ahead to the 
revelation of that truth, and examine the path that reader and narrator have traversed in 
order to arrive there. In the case of Venus, the reader will not learn the full reality until 
the fourth book, where Lucretius will reveal that the reality is quite different from what 
the hymn ofthe proem suggests. The end of the fourth book dramatically redefines the 
role of Venus. The name of the goddess once called alma, "nourishing" (1.2) and 
Aeneadum genetrix ( 1.1) now becomes slang for a common prostitute, vulgivaga Venus, 
"a public Venus" ( 4.1071 ). The dissonance between these two versions of Venus is 
256 Schrijvers ( 1970), though Gale ( 1994) rightly criticizes his view of myth as simple 
falsehood: "Rather than teaching truth by means of falsehood, he exploits the truth 
concealed in myth to strengthen his exposition of Epicurean philosophy, while 
rejecting its 'literal' meaning" ( 4). 
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difficult to reconcile,257 especially when seen out of context, but it must be remembered 
that Lucretius has carefully and systematically led the reader up to this point. For a 
reader who has taken in the lessons intervening between these two conceptions of 
Venus, the dissonance is far less jarring. 
Venus returns in this new form in the fourth book in the context of human 
physiology. The reverence, beauty and awe of the divine which the reader felt in the 
first proem now yield to matter-of-fact discussions of bed-wetting ( 4.1 026-29) and wet 
dreams (4.1030-36). Mention ofthis last biological function leads Lucretius into a 
description of the physiology of sexual desire itself. It is a description in which divinity 
and love have as much to do with sexual attraction as they do with boys' wet dreams. In 
this passage, boys' sexual desire is enflamed at random by passing dream-images of 
beauty, 258 and is extinguished just as easily in their sheets, "often as if the whole deed 
had been done," quasi transactis saepe omnibus rebus ( 4.1 035). For Lucretius, our 
waking desires are incited just as meaninglessly by the real images of our lovers 
(4.1037-57), and our loves are equally fruitless in the pursuit of real satisfaction (4.1084-
1120). In fact, they often produce more pain than pleasure ( 4.1 073-83), and the lover is 
stricken by sexual desire as if by a mortal wound: 
namque omnes plerumque cadunt in vulnus, et illam 
emicat in partem sanguis unde icimur ictu 
257 For some examples of the attempt, see Kleve (1966), Flores (1979), Asmis (1982), 
and Clay (1983) 82-110 and 226-34. 
258 These images themselves are physical in the sense that Epicureans held that 
perception was caused by stray atoms sloughed off the surface of objects coming into 
physical contact with the sense organs (DRN 4.26-142). 
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[ ... ] 
sic igitur Veneris qui telis accipit ictus, 
[ ... ] 
unde feritur, eo tendit gestitque co ire 
et iacere umorem in corpus de corpore ductum. 
namque voluptatem praesagit muta cupido. 
Haec "Venus" est nobis; hinc autemst nomen "Amaris," 
hinc illaec primum veneris dulcedinis in cor 
stillavit gutta et successit frigida cura ( 4.1049-1 060).259 
For all men generally fall towards a wound, and the blood spurts toward the 
place from which we are struck by the blow[ ... ]. So, therefore, he who receives 
wounds from the shafts of Venus,[ ... ] tends toward the source ofthe blow, and 
desires to unite and to cast his fluid from body to body; for his dumb desire 
presages delight. This is "Venus" to us, from this, moreover, comes the name 
"Amor," from this that drop of love's sweetness first dripped into the heart, and 
chill anxiety followed. 
259 I have modified the text from Bailey's ( 194 7) edition to reflect better the possibilities 
that the Latin allows when unencumbered by modem typographical conventions. I 
have capitalized Amaris to reflect its use as the name of Venus' son, rather than the 
lower-case abstraction, "love," and I have de-capitalized the second occurrence of 
Venus' name, because by this point in the passage the word venus has been reduced to 
its natural, un-personified meaning. Cf. Clay (1983) on these same lines: "Here Venus 
is abstracted from her associations with spring [as in the first proem], deprived of the 
capital letter by which Lucretius' editors observe her divinity, and her name reduced to 
an indirect manner of speaking about passion and sexual intercourse" (228) . I have 
also added quotation marks to the names "Venus" and "Amor" to distinguish their use 
here as colloquialisms, and I have emphasized the modifiers, haec, hinc, hinc, to 
indicate the force of their relationship to the above lines. 
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This account of the true nature of sex takes the sublime conception of the 
generative goddess ofthe proem and turns it on its head. Instead of buttressing the 
traditional picture of Venus with conventional literary language as he did in the proem, 
Lucretius now employs those conventions to attack the traditional version of Venus' 
seductive powers and to leave naked biology in its place. Literary allusion, along with 
suggestive wordplay, now becomes a tool with which he divests Venus of her divinity. 
As a result, the above passage has been called "a punning reduction of the mythology of 
Venus to physiology,"260 in which "Lucretius employs allusive irony to attack the 
erroneous notions of love that he saw at work around him. "261 His ironic allusions are 
aimed at attacking the romanticized version of love, especially that version espoused by 
contemporary poetry.262 In his attack on romanticized loveNenus, Lucretius co-opts 
many of the traditional poetic images of love's power in order to undermine them. Here, 
love's power to "wound" is given sinister, literal force. Love enters the body like 
"shafts," telis, and semen leaves the body like blood from a gash. This combined image 
of love and war recalls the pairing of Venus and Mars in the proem, but Venus no longer 
pacifies the works of war, but seems instead to embody them. Where love does not 
260 Betensky (1980) 292. 
261 Kenney (1970) 380. 
262 Lucretius does not aim at one specific target in these attacks. Although many of his 
poetic allusions are reminiscent of Catullus, for example, it is more likely that 
Lucretius employed these poetic tropes as a form of "system reference" (Edmunds 
[2001] 143-50), i.e. his allusions are meant to recall conceptual categories larger than 
single texts. Kenney (1970) put it well, "this sort of nonsense, as Lucretius must have 
regarded it, was in the air" (389). 
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strike, it seeps, penetrating to the heart, depriving its victim of his senses and leaving 
behind the icy chill of anxiety, also perhaps like the chill of death.263 
These naturalized and debased images of the violence of sex are meant to replace 
the romanticized, poetic images of love. To this end, Lucretius also employs the 
naturalizing force of etymologizing puns?64 Nor should these puns be regarded as 
comic or light-hearted figures of speech.265 Lucretius' stated theory of language takes 
very seriously the idea that the "elements" of language (letters and the sounds that they 
make), having been produced by nature ( 5.1 028), provide a very real representation of 
the process of atomic creation. In the formation of words we can see that the same 
elements combined in different ways can produce a variety of distinct results (1.823-29), 
just as different words can be formed by varying the arrangement ofletters.266 Lucretius 
263 Cf. et gelidos artus in leti frigore linquit [anima] (3 .401) and in manibus vero nervi 
trahere et tremere artus I a pedibusque minutatim succedere frigus I non dubitabat 
~6.1190-1192); and see Segal (1990) 161. 
26 Jane Snyder (1980) gives the best account of Lucretius' use ofwordplay, deriving her 
basic claim from Friedlander ( 1941 ), whose argument is equally compelling but less 
expansive. Other studies dealing directly or indirectly with the subject of wordplay 
include Ahl (1985), Dionigi (1989), Schiesaro (1990), and Armstrong (1995). 
On the subject of naturalizing etymologies, Snyder points out that Lucretius was not 
unaware ofthe efforts of the Stoic etymologists, which suggests that much of 
Lucretius' own verbal play can be thought of as a similar attempt to seat the tenets of 
his philosophy within existing mythological traditions by forging conceptual likenesses 
between tradition and philosophical innovation through the likeness of sound and form 
of important words and names (90-1 and 1 02). 
265 Snyder (1980) finds precedent in Democritus and other Greek philosophers for the 
significant use of verbal play. Throughout this work she argues convincingly that 
Lucretius' puns "are not simply word games intended for amusement, but function as 
significantly as repetition, rhetorical elements, Ennian echoes, or any of the other 
devices which Lucretius uses to hammer home his message" (52). 
266 There is also precedent for the analogy of elementa as both atoms and letters in 
Democritus' description of the stoicheia (Aristotle, Metaphysics 985b16-19); see 
Snyder (1980) 34-37 and Diels (1889) 14. 
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examples this principle by demonstrating how "fire," ignis, can be seen to come out of 
"wood," !ignis (1.892-914). Here the lexical elements render visible the substantive 
change brought about by the accretion and correlation of the atomic elements. 267 In this 
way Lucretius utilizes a special kind of wordplay to explain or otherwise to clarifY and 
to enrich his subject matter by exampling in words the points that he is arguing?68 
Lucretius' theory of language encourages the reader to understand the likeness of sound 
as revealing a natural relationship between words and the objects they represent.269 In 
this way, Lucretius makes his "punning reduction" of Venus' mythological attributes 
very much in earnest. In this passage, Cupid (with a capital "C") is reduced to mere 
"desire," cupido,270 which in this context does not warrant a personifYing capital-letter. 
"Venus" becomes vulnus, "the wound" from which "love," Amor, emanates as mere 
biological "fluid," umor.271 
This kind of wordplay employs the power of etymology to re-characterize the 
nature of these mythical figures. The reader is meant to question the traditional roles of 
these supposedly divine entities through his new awareness of the origins of their names 
267 See Friedlander (1941) 2 and 17, and Snyder (1980) 31-51. 
268 Snyder (1980): "Lucretius' punning, an integral part ofhis style, enhances his 
didactic technique both through the reinforcement of his atomic theory, whereby the 
elementa form the stuff of words as well as the stuff of the universe [ ... ] (145). See 
also Friedlander (1941 ), and cf. West (1969) 96-97. 
269 Snyder (1980) 52-73. 
270 This interpretation helps to relieve the discomfort that Brown (1987) expresses in 
understanding the term nomen Amaris as a reference to the God of love (20 1-2). 
271 Friedlander (1941) 18. Cf. Bailey (1947) ad lac. and Snyder (1980) 94. The close 
association of the gods Venus and Am or in this passage, both in their proximity and in 
the similar way in which they are each correctively etymologized, casts serious doubt 
on Brown's (1987) thesis that Lucretius is only attacking the concept of amor here 
(which Brown renders in the lower-case) and maintains a positive view of Venus 
throughout book 4 (91-99). 
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and of the new significances that these origins imply. In effect, these puns help to 
naturalize the divine by renaming it. Lucretius' etymologies replace the traditional 
meanings of the gods' names, which the emphases in my translation attempted to 
indicate: "This is 'Venus' to us, from this, moreover, comes the name 'Amor, "' i.e., this 
wound (vulnus) is Venus; this fluid (umor) is Amor.272 And this renaming of divine 
characters is a part of a process of naturalization that Lucretius began long before book 
4. 
In the second book, Lucretius takes great pains to affirm the insentience of the 
earth and the lack of divine providence in the processes of agriculture. At the 
conclusion ofthese arguments he offers a lengthy passage that ridicules the cult of the 
Magna Mater, a goddess of agriculture and fertility. At the end of this passage he makes 
special allowance for the idiomatic use of divine names: 
hie siquis mare "Neptunum" "Cererem "que vocare 
constituet fruges et "Bacchi" nomine abuti 
mavult quam laticis proprium proferre vocamen, 
concedamus ut hie terrarum dictitet orbem 
esse "deum Matrem, " dum vera re tamen ipse 
religione animum turpi contingere parcat (2.655-660).273 
If someone should decide to call the sea "Neptune" and grain "Ceres" and prefers 
to misuse the name "Bacchus" rather than to speak the proper term for that 
272 Friedlander (1941) 18 and cf. Snyder (1980) 94-95. 
273 I have placed the proper names (including deum Matrem, which I capitalize) in 
quotes to emphasize their use here as colloquialisms (Leonard and Smith [1942] also 
add quotes to the first two names and Rouse [1975] also capitalizes deum Matrem). 
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liquid, we would allow this man to speak of the Earth as "Mother of the gods," 
provided that in actuality he refrain from tainting his mind with base religion. 
After Lucretius articulates this concession, the reader may properly understand the 
colloquial use of divinity as simply a convenient descriptive device for the phenomena 
of nature. And this concession to metonymy is also an effort at renaming and 
redefining. The gods' names are reduced to linguistic convention, colloquialisms that 
indicate the natural item with which that god is associated: "Neptune" is the sea; "Ceres" 
means grain, and "Bacchus," wine, and the earth is "Mother of the Gods" only in that it 
contains a great abundance of atoms from which it brings forth all these other 
agricultural products (2.589-99). 
In light of this concession to the idiomatic use of divine names, the Venus 
passage of book 4 can be seen all the more clearly as a redefinition of the name "Venus" 
as a term for sex, abstracted from its mythological and poetic attributes. Like the 
agricultural gods of book 2, whose names become simple metonyms for the produce 
associated with them in myth, the name of Venus is reduced here to her most 
fundamental mythological attribute, sexual desire.274 It is as if Lucretius is continuing 
274 See Catto (1988), "here Lucretius defines Venus as sex" (103), who improves upon 
earlier interpretations by acknowledging the emphasis on redefinition; cf. Kenney's 
(1970) translation of 4.1058, "this is what we are told to call Venus" (384), which 
reflects his goal of emphasizing the polemic with contemporary poetry, and Brown 
(1987) 200-202, whose note on these lines unfortunately deemphasizes the redefinition 
of names that his own translation suggests (149). Brown also misses the significance 
of the repetition of venus in 1059 as a demythologized, de-capitalized metonym for 
"love." Clay (1983) securely identifies the use of venus as a metonym: "This is the 
Venus of metonymy, the goddess we speak of even more indirectly with the English 
word sex" (233); so, Gale (1994): "Finally, Venus herself reappears at the end of book 
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the conspicuous creation of technical vocabulary that he began in book 1, when he first 
defined his use of the term primordia. But in this case the term is already familiar; it is 
the meaning associated with it that the reader is to understand in a new way, without 
"tainting his mind" with the misconceptions of the universe that the myth itself implies. 
III Revelation along the way 
In likening these two passages, I am suggesting that Lucretius expects his reader 
to follow a long trajectory of thought. The reader is to use what he has learned about the 
metonymic use of divine names in book 2 when reading about Venus in book 4. The 
move from the Venus of the proem to the Venus of book 4 takes place gradually and 
periodically over these 4,000-plus lines of verse, but key passages stand out as 
particularly conspicuous paving blocks that lead toward the new Venus of book 4. In 
other places throughout his poem, Lucretius seamlessly incorporates the didactic of 
redefinition into his poetry, gently retuning his lyre strings to harmonize with the 
changing tone of his argument. The passage in book 2 is just one step along the way. 
Although Lucretius does not mention Venus directly in that passage, he makes his 
concession to colloquial language explicit, and this acceptance of colloquialism is a 
large part ofthe redefinition of Venus that is to come. But Venus has been undergoing a 
gradual transformation from the time that she first appeared in the proem. Even within 
the proem itself, the attractive picture of springtime regeneration quickly shifts its 
4, to be stripped of all divinity and revealed as no more than a metonym for sexual 
intercourse" (213). 
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association away from the traditional conception of the goddess toward a more 
1. . . f h . fi f 275 natura 1st1c conceptiOn o t e generative orce o nature. 
As early as line 56, immediately after the reader has been introduced to the novel 
concept that invisible atoms comprise the world, Lucretius no longer holds Venus alone 
responsible for the generation of matter. 276 Natura quickly usurps Venus' role as the 
force controlling those primordia, "out of which nature creates, increases and nourishes 
all things and back into which nature returns these same things when they die," (1 .56-
57). 277 Natura is a much more ambiguous figure than is Venus. For one thing, she-or 
should that be it?-is responsible for destruction as well as generation, and she/it is a 
concept more easily divorced from the anthropomorphic qualities of Venus. It is an 
open question for Lucretius' editors whether and when the word deserves the 
capitalization that would acknowledge Lucretius ' intention to personify this natural 
force. 278 Given the ready allowance of mythological language that the proem displays 
and the abundance of active verbs in these lines (creet, auctet, alat), it is not difficult to 
imagine this force as a goddess here. But because of the shift in focus toward the 
275 Clay (1983): "As Lucretius begins to move closer to the austere philosophy that will 
liberate his reader from the charm oftraditional religious conceptions, Venus genetrix 
is left behind, even in the first proem" (95); cf. Catto (1988). 
276 With the phrase rerum natura sola gubernas (1.21), Lucretius isolates Venus as the 
only god who acts in the world, and by promoting Venus to the role of sole divine 
actor he removes all the other gods of the pantheon from view, particularly Jupiter; see 
Asmis (1982). This does not preclude his further effort to remove all divinity from the 
works of nature; in fact, it saves him having to deal with each god separately. If Venus 
is seen as the sole divine actor, nature becomes our only substitute once this goddess is 
left behind. 
277 See above. p. 105 . 
278 In 1.56-57, Leonard and Smith (1942) print Natura; Bailey (1947) and Rouse (1975) 
each print natura. 
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"natural" principles of physics, it is also likely that Lucretius intends to convey natura as 
an unpersonified, purely metaphorical force that governs the laws of atomic cohesion 
and dissolution. This is just one more instance in which the proem offers a polyvalency 
of meaning for readers of different experience levels. Certainly, the experienced reader 
would conceptualize this occurrence of natura in its "natural," unpersonified version, 
while the novice reader is free to read in the "capital letter," so to speak, and to imagine 
the personified, provident version of the goddess that this reading entails. The 
experienced reader's understanding of nature is informed by the Epicurean physics that 
the rest of the poem will present, but the association with the goddess, Natura, is there 
for Lucretius to exploit in his mission to attract first readers. Unfortunately, this is an 
ambiguity that modern language and editorial convention do not allow us to reproduce. 
Lucretius' tendency to cast his argument in ambiguous terms that he will later 
correct continues beyond the poem's introductory lines in a long, drawn out process of 
"progressive revelation." This concept is important for our understanding of Lucretius' 
treatment of Venus and for the arguments of the upcoming chapter as well. Daniel 
Solomon (2004), who coined the term, has shown how Lucretius continues his 
naturalization, not only of Venus, but of natura, beyond the proem and into the 
argument of the first book. Lucretius presents alternating false versions of nature, each 
ofwhich offers a step toward the true Epicurean conception, and each of which "evokes 
in different readers different mental images and emotional responses."279 For Solomon, 
the reader's emotional response to these misleading versions of nature, whether overly 
279 Solomon (2004) 264; cf. also Solomon (1998) 175-248. 
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positive or misleadingly negative, 280 is the litmus test of the reader's proper 
internalization of Epicurean principles. 
Early on in Lucretius' description of the properties of atoms, it is earth's 
fecundity that signals their abundance (1.250-261). Natura here seems like a benevolent 
force, which Lucretius describes using familiar poetic topoi, with rains falling from 
"father sky," pater aether, "into the womb of mother Earth," in gremium matris terrai 
(1.250-251 ); crops spring from the ground and from trees without the effort of 
cultivation (1 .252-253), and fat herds of cattle enjoy easy fodder and plentiful mother's 
milk (1 .254-261).28 1 But Lucretius soon tempers this brief indulgence in nature's 
seeming providence by showing nature's equal capacity to do harm (1.271-298). Nature 
is composed of atoms, and though these atoms are invisible, we must not doubt their 
presence "just because the elements of matter cannot be seen with the eyes," quod 
nequeunt oculis rerum primordia cerni (1.268). The wind too is invisible, but it can 
produce terrifying storms that wreck huge ships (1 .272) and devastating floods that ruin 
bridges (1.285-286) and anything else that stands in their way (1.289). In these 
examples, nature reveals its unfeeling cruelty and becomes harder to imagine as a 
provident divinity . 
280 Solomon (2004): "Over and over, Lucretius tempts his novice reader to experience an 
alternation of delight and horror; every time, he exposes both emotions as impetuous 
and self-centered, in contrast to a more philosophical presentation of the same topic" 
(280). By acknowledging the challenge presented by the overly positive passages as 
well as the negative ones, Solomon is adding an important dimension to Clay's (1983) 
interpretation of Lucretius' pedagogical strategy, as best exampled by the plague scene 
at the poem' s close, "the final test of [the reader' s] mastery of the poem" (266). Cf. 
Gale (1994) 228 and Schiesaro (1994) 102-3. 
281 Lucretius seems here to share Greek literary precedents with Horace Epodes 16 and 
Vergil Eclogue 4, Solomon (2004) 273. 
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Finally, the true version of natura as an unpersonified, unfeeling, improvident 
force is codified in Lucretius ' assertion ofthe insentience of the earth (2.652). But 
Lucretius moves toward this view even before this. All the elements of nature are at 
their core atoms and void, even our own bodies, and all that happens in the world is done 
by and within these two elements. Our very humanity and all the deeds of mankind can 
be reduced to the "accidents" or "outcomes,"282 eventa, of atoms and void (1.449-450). 
Even the grandest events that mankind has ever recorded-the massive assembly of the 
Greek armies and their famous exploits on the beaches of Troy (1.464-482)-the reader 
"may well call the 'outcomes' of body and of place," ut merito possis "eventa " vocare I 
corporis atque loci (1.481-482).283 Given this reductive redefinition of even such 
conspicuously purposeful events, the reader must begin to disregard any perceived 
intention behind the works of an unpeopled nature. If even the greatest intentions of 
mankind are now to be regarded as illusions-nothing more than accidents of the 
material world-, how could one attribute any purpose to the even more obviously 
accidental events of natural phenomena? 
By extending our consideration of the polyvalency of language in the proem into 
the argument of the first book, we can see that Lucretius is continuously naturalizing 
nature. But what is the reader to think when he reflects back on the initial picture of a 
seemingly provident Natura, after he has accepted the argument of book 2, which 
282 I prefer Snyder's (1980) trimslation "outcomes" for event a, instead of the more 
common "accidents," because it better reflects the effect of Lucretius' thematically 
significant puns, invenies eventa in 1.450 and adventu eventa in 1.458 (98). 
283 Again I have inserted quotation marks into Bailey's text to indicate the purposeful 
creation of a technical vocabulary. 
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solidifies the concept of nature as a rich but unreasoning collection of atoms? Lucretius' 
former language-pater aether, mater terrae-reflects his knowledge of the poetic 
tradition and creates an understated polemic with this new conception of nature, which, 
for the now experienced reader, corrects the language of poetry through the vehicle of 
allusive irony, yet simultaneously sympathizes with the nai"ve associations of the 
novice. 284 As Solomon has shown, even for the novice these misleading associations are 
not the final word?85 Nor should they be understood as an arrogant, paternalistic 
attempt to deceive. It is important to maintain the perspective of the grand trajectory of 
the poem's argument, in which, as Clay has shown: "Lucretius is not deliberately 
misleading; he is leading."286 Through this gradual process of "progressive revelation," 
the errors of common opinion are given voice in order to comfort the reader and to 
correct him. In this way, Lucretius adds further stepping stones beyond that of the 
proem, which continue to soften the grade of his reader's ascent from the traditions of 
myth to the innovations of Epicurean physics. 
In this same way, Lucretius also makes a gradual, though immediate, approach to 
the naturalized conception ofVenus. Once Lucretius has begun to set out the first 
principles of atomic physics, he makes Venus share equal responsibility for the 
generation of living things with the atom-rich earth. Lucretius demonstrates the 
indestructability of the atomic building blocks of matter by offering the continuous 
manifestation of new life as proof of their inexhaustibility . If the components of living 
284 Solomon (2004) 275. 
285 Solomon (2004) 281. 
286 Clay (1983) 93. 
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things were habitually destroyed along with the beings that they comprised, what 
material would there be left from which to create new life? Lucretius poses the 
question: 
unde animale genus generatim in lumina vitae 
redducit Venus, aut redductum daedala tellus 
unde alit atque auget generatim pabula praebens? (1.227-229) 
From what source does Venus keep bringing the different kinds of animals back 
into the light of life, or from what source does the fecund earth nourish them 
once brought back and increase them in kind providing them with food? 
Although the traditional version of a provident, generative Venus still gets pride of place 
here, she shares a narrow table with "the fecund earth," daedala tellus. It is still early in 
Lucretius' argument, and we are a long way from book 4, but already the name Venus is 
beginning to shade into its colloquial application, "as no more than an expression of the 
power of life to renew itself in the spring. "28 7 
Lucretius equates Venus with a natural force of generation not only by casting 
Venus and earth together in the same generative role, but by repeating the language and 
imagery of the proem to encourage the reader to reassess the provident deity of those 
early lines.288 Almost every phrase of this passage recalls the Venus ofthe proem, 
animale genus""' genus animantum (1.4), generatim in 1.227 and 229 = 1.20, in lumina 
vitae""' lumina solis (1.5), redducit Venus and redductum ""'quo quamque inducere 
287 Clay (1983) 228. 
288 Gale (1994) 211-213. 
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pergis (1.16), daedala tellus = 1.7,pabula praebens..,. pabula laeta (1.14). Now, instead 
ofVenus compelling the earth to emit its produce, tibi [sc. Venus] suavis daedala tellus I 
summittitflores (1.7-8), the earth itself provides nourishment and increase of life on 
equal terms with Venus-not by its power to charm, but from its massive store of atomic 
resources. 
By the time we get to book 2, Lucretius can separate himself and his reader from 
"certain others" who in their ignorance still believe in the providence of divinity .289 And 
Venus' generative role is even further subordinated to the material physics of an 
improvident nature: 
at quidam contra haec, ignari materiai, 
naturam non posse deum sine numine credunt 
tanto opere humanis rationibus admoderate 
tempora mutare annorum frugesque creare 
et iam cetera, mortalis quae suadet adire 
ipsaque deducit dux vitae dia voluptas 
et res per Veneris blanditur saecla propagent, 
ne genus occidat humanum (2.167-174). 
Yet, contrary to these things, certain people, ignorant ofthe material causes, 
believe that without the power of the gods nature could not so neatly 
accommodate the needs of the human race, changing the seasons of the year and 
creating crops and the other timely things which nature persuades to visit upon 
289 Cf. 1.370-371, above p. 77. 
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mankind, and which it brings forth-itself the leader and the shining pleasure of 
life-coaxing generations to reproduce themselves through the acts of Venus, 
lest the human race die out. 
At this point in his overall argument, Lucretius is ready to take one more step toward the 
naturalized Venus of sexual metaphor that the reader will find in book 4. In this passage 
he makes a conspicuous correction of the conception of Venus to which he acquiesced in 
the proem. The passage has rightly been called "a demythologized paraphrase of 1.20," 
which already aims to reduce the name of Venus to mere sexual metaphor.290 Venus' 
place of honor as hom inurn divumque voluptas ( 1.1 ), is usurped by nature as vitae dia 
voluptas. Nature itself leads living things, ipsaque de due it dux, just as they once 
followed Venus, te sequitur cupide quo quamque inducere pergis (1.16).291 Venus, who 
used to bring about the zealous propagation of species, effie is ut cupide generatim saecla 
propagent (1.20), by her power to coax through the promise of pleasure, incutiens 
blandum ... amorem (1.19), is now merely the vehicle through which nature itself incites 
reproduction, res per Veneris blanditur saecla propagent.292 
This passage has been called a virtual palinode to the proem, 293 and the 
appellation is accurate in this modified form. It is a palinode in the sense that it corrects 
the conception of Venus that the proem celebrates. But it is not a palinode in the strict 
sense, because this correction requires a comparison which is left implicit. It is up to 
290 Gale (1994) 211-12. 
291 Cf. Snyder (1980) 77. 
292 Gale (1994) 212. 
293 Gale (1994) 212. 
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those whom Clay calls "penetrating readers"294 to reflect back upon the proem w1th 
hindsight and to apply this new understanding of nature, divinity, and providence to his 
previous understanding ofthe proem. Lucretius provides ample stimulus for such 
retrospection through his reapplication of the programmatic terms of the proem, and 
certain passages stand out by the quantity and concentration of their self-allusions. But 
no one of them ranks as the sole apology or corrective of the language of the proem, nor 
does the poem require such an apology. 295 The above passage is only part of the gradual 
transition to the new conception of Venus, of which the earlier passage (1.227-229) 
along with the passages on nature are also parts. The long trajectory of the argument 
encourages the reader to reflect back on these changes as he progresses through the 
poem, and Lucretius gives the reader time and space to make the required mental 
adjustments himself as his argument proceeds. 
IV A return to the beginning 
T. LUCRETI CARl DE RERUM NATURA LIBER VI EXPLICIT. LEGE FELICITER. 
AMEN. 
-Niccolo Niccoli, closing his own transcription of Lucretius' poem. 
These intervening steps toward the ultimate redefinition of Venus help to mute 
the disharmony between the contrasting portrayals of the goddess in books 1 and 4. But 
when the reader returns to the proem again upon completion ofthe poem-as Niccoli's 
294 Clay (1983) 48. 
295 Clay (1983) 231. 
126 
closing comment seems to invite him to do-a strident difference might still be felt. The 
dissonance between these two versions of Venus indicates the distance that Lucretius 
and his reader have put behind them since traversing these four thousand-some lines. 
They are also an indication of how much the reader has changed. His ascent to the 
Epicurean heights has reduced the Venus ofthe proem to a faint and disembodied echo. 
The reader is no longer the na'ive newcomer who could take for granted the mythological 
portrayal of Venus in the proem. But this beautiful beginning is not now to be cast off 
wholesale. Venus ' hymn takes on a new meaning for the experienced reader, but still 
constitutes the "resplendent portal," which the reader can now reflect back on with the 
knowledge of what lies within.296 Or perhaps it is "an imposing doorway, which looks 
quite different when seen from the inside. "297 In these phrases, Clay and Gale liken 
Lucretius' proem to something which the reader moves through, and which changes in 
character when viewed from the other side. Both of these metaphors, in essence, 
describe the polyvalency of meaning that the proem is intended to convey-its 
appearance beckons the novice to enter, and it encourages backward glances that 
reinforce the lessons lying within its interior. In this way the proem is not unlike the 
honey-rim of the medicine cup. 
In keeping with Lucretius' metaphor, the reader's first sip was the sweetest. But 
even this first taste of poetry carried with it an undercurrent of philosophical education, 
imperceptible though it might have been to the novice reader. Throughout their journey 
together, Lucretius has encouraged his reader to penetrate the sweet surface of his 
296 Clay (1983) 231. 
297 Gale (1994) 215. 
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poem, 298 and to fmd his own way through to the particulars of his argument, like a keen-
scented hunting dog picking up faint tracks (1.398-417). Relying on his knowledge of 
Lucretius ' special use of words and metaphor, the experienced reader is now able upon 
reflection to see through to the allegorical qualities of the proem, and Venus genetrix, 
"Venus the generative," can now take her proper place in the encomium of natural 
atomic fecundity that lies beneath her hymn. 
The springtime imagery that first seduced the reader retains its seductive 
qualities even after his understanding of it has matured. The retreat of the winds and 
clouds and the coming of fair weather now exhibit their sublime beauty as part of the 
natural cycle of generation and decay, to be followed in turn by generation anew. This 
celebration of the return of spring now takes on a cosmological significance. Birds and 
beasts reproduce themselves, enchanted not by a goddess but by the joy that all living 
things feel in being part of the living world. And the reader, no longer awestruck at the 
appearance of divinity, thrills instead in the pure enthusiasm of the renewal of life. The 
tides of war are not to be averted by the lofty hand of a god acting for the benefit of 
mankind, but each man can make peace for himself by cultivating the inner calm that 
comes from secure knowledge of the true nature of the physical world and of mankind's 
place in it. 
But there is still some question about the harmony of all this within the proem. 
Following hard upon the portrait of Venus as active protector of Rome and soothing 
298 Clay (1983) 48 and 231. 
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Mars in her quiet lap, a few lines seem to interrupt the pleasant image with talk of the 
distance of the gods from our world and their apathy toward human affairs: 
omnis enim per se divum natura necessest 
immortali aevo summa cum pace fruatur 
semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque lange. 
nam privata dol ore omni, privata periclis, 
ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri, 
nee bene promeritis capitur neque tangitur ira (1.44-49). 
For, the gods by their very nature in themselves must by necessity enjoy an 
immortal lifetime together with the highest peace, far removed from our troubles 
and separated by a long distance. For, divested of all pain, divested of danger, 
themselves powerful in their own resources, needing nothing from us, they are 
neither captivated by our merits nor touched by anger at our faults. 
These lines express the first of the Principle Doctrines of Epicurus, in which he asserts 
the aloof invulnerability of the divine to all forms of trouble (npay).!a-ra), including that 
which comes from within themselves and that which comes from external sources.Z99 
These lines also appear in book 2 ( 646-651 ), where they fit more comfortably as the 
culmination of Lucretius' argument on the insentience of the earth and his derisive 
299 To ).!UKUpl.OV Kai. a<p8apwv oun: mho np<iy).!a'ta EX£1. OU't£ aA.A.cp napEX£1., W<H£ OU't£ 
6pyaic; OU't£ xapt<H m>VEXE'tat ' EV acr8£Vd yap nav 'tO 'tOl.Oihov (fr. 139, Bailey [1926] 
94; Usener [1887] 71). 
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description of the Magna Mater procession (2.600-643).300 Because these lines are so 
well integrated with the argument of book 2, it is most likely that this was the original 
locus of their composition. As a result, scholars have questioned the appropriateness of 
their reappearance in book 1. To talk of divine apathy seems counterproductive to the 
intention of the proem, whose function is to attract reluctant readers . Assuming that 
Lucretius intends to lead up to the Epicurean theology gradually, as we have seen that he 
does, this passage seems to some to give the game away too soon. This is an old 
objection which has recently been given new life.301 
Diskin Clay saw these lines in the proem as a "collision of two worlds,"302 the 
world of Epicurean philosophy coming into violent contact with the world of traditional 
religion and mythology. But given our understanding of the rhetorical function of the 
proem as a gradual first step towards the more challenging notions of Lucretius' 
theology, are we not surprised to find such violence here? Would not this "collision" 
disturb the serenity of Lucretius' carefully crafted poetry? It has been proposed that an 
editor may have mistakenly inserted these lines into the proem from a marginal note. 
The contrasting pictures of divine providence between this passage and the hymn to 
Venus provide some explanation as to why an ancient commentator might have 
excerpted this passage from book 2 and marked it beside the proem wishing to point out 
the seeming contradiction.303 Others suppose that Lucretius himself might have jotted 
300 David West ( 1969) provides an insightful reading of the structural parallels between 
this passage and the passage on the procession (111-12). 
301 For a full review ofthe early history ofthe debate, see Bailey (1947) 601-3. 
302 Clay (1983) 94. 
303 This opinion was originated by Isaac Voss (1618-1689). 
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these lines in the margin himself, intending to incorporate them more fully at some later 
date. 304 The coincidence of the theme of peace has led most modern editions to accept 
these lines as a genuine part of the proem, 305 though most still also mark a lacuna either 
before or after them. 306 
The lines may be an uncomfortable fit within the proem, but arguments in 
support of excluding them had mostly disappeared until late in the 201h century. More 
recently, certain scholars, driven by a renewed appreciation of the rhetorical function of 
the proem, have revisited the issue. According to these scholars, the abrupt 
discontinuity of theological sensibility offends the expectation of dissemblance and of 
the delicacy with which Lucretius handles the transition from mythological tradition to 
Epicurean theology. 307 Appreciation of the proem's intended function-as a buffer 
between the world of the reader and that of the experienced Epicurean-strengthens the 
argument against preserving these lines. In the view of these scholars, the proem would 
serve this function more simply and without additional complication if these lines were 
excluded. But I hope to show that the differing contexts in which they appear provide 
these lines themselves with a strong polyvalency of meaning, strong enough to preserve 
the preferred interpretation of the proem's rhetoric even if the lines are kept. 
In book 2, which concentrates on the rejection of an earth-goddess, these lines 
indicate baldly the absence of divine providence on earth, but in the proem this meaning 
304 This opinion was originated by Guisanni (1896). 
305 Following the argument of Friedlander (1932) and (1939). 
306 Leonard and Smith (1942) mark a lacuna after 1.43, Bailey (1947) after 1.49, and 
Martin (1963) transposes 1.50-61 to after 1.135. 
307 Asmis (1982) 469-70 and Gale (1994) 215-17. 
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is muted by their proximity to Venus' hymn. The assertion that the gods dwell in eternal 
peace (1.44-45) is natural even for a traditional conception of the gods, and it stems 
easily from Lucretius' request for national peace, "pour forth sweet nothings from your 
mouth, lustrous one, requesting tranquil peace for the Romans," suavis ex ore loquellas I 
funde petens placidam Romanis, inc/uta, pacem (1 .1 0). It is equally traditional to assert 
that the gods are free from pain and danger and are capable of controlling their 
admiration or anger as they please (1.4 7 -9). 
Lucretius mentions these divine qualities as they relate to humankind only twice, 
by inserting first-person pronouns. The gods are "removed from our troubles," semota 
ab nostris rebus (1.46) and "need nothing from us," nil indiga nostri (1.48). But when 
these statements are removed from the arguments of book 2 that lead up to the rejection 
of the divine on earth, they do not necessarily convey the same hardline theological 
doctrine. Even here Lucretius ' language is subtle enough to carry the same polyvalency 
of meaning as the rest of the proem. In the first example, the reader may focus on the 
concept of rebus as "troubles" and understand the attending pronoun as simply a 
familiarizing modifier-"from our troubles," might mean simply "from the kind of 
troubles that habitually afflict us." This idea is also natural for a traditional conception 
of divinity, and it is readily available for the reader's mind to settle upon. In the second 
case, it is also no great stretch from orthodoxy to say that these divine beings do not 
"need" anything of us. In this case too, nil nostri might be taken to mean "nothing of 
our kind," i.e . the gods have no need of our kind of life. Certainly one would expect that 
the gods live lives quite different from our own. And even if we take nil nostri to mean 
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"the kind of things that mortals might supply," this reading does not do great damage to 
the traditional conception of the gods. Their lack of "need" does not necessarily imply 
that they could not receive such gifts, if they chose. Likewise, there is some ambiguity 
behind the unstated subject of bene promeritis, "the well-deserving," which prevents its 
being generalized to the sense of a universal permanent. Just as their lack of "need" 
does not preclude the gods' ability to receive, their chosen temperance in exhibiting 
favor or censure also does not exclude their ability to initiate such interactions 
electively. The resulting tone is one of qualification rather than of stark prohibition, i.e. 
"the gods are not [always] moved to delight or anger even at those 
[individuals/situations] that well deserve it." 
In the second book, the prevailing arguments against divine providence on earth 
and the derision of mankind's misguided worship of the Magna Mater bring out the 
universal, Epicurean significance of these first person pronouns. Before the arguments 
against divine providence have been established, the reader is free to concentrate solely 
on the themes of the gods' eternal peace and their generalized grandeur and self-
sufficiency. Whatever temporary pause these lines might elicit is easily forgotten once 
the reader is whisked away by Lucretius' plea for attention and his preliminary 
discussion of atoms. The sense of elation that the proem inspires is enough to 
overwhelm any doubt about the role of divinity in the world. To the experienced reader, 
these lines foreshadow the theological arguments to come, but for the novice these 
shadows are scattered by the brilliant light of the proem. 
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The matter will have to remain unsettled, but for our understanding of the proem 
it really makes little difference. In either case, the repetition of this portion of text is 
indicative of Lucretius' programmatic strategy of polyvalency and correction. If the 
lines are genuine, we can see their reappearance in book 2 as another sort of palinode-a 
moment in the poem when the reader is strongly encouraged, by the repetition of 
familiar text, to look back on what came before with more experienced eyes. If they are 
not genuine, then their appearance in the margins of the proem is proof that these lines 
actually do create the impetus to reevaluate the ideas expressed in the proem in light of 
the later arguments. In effect, both scenarios support the theory behind Lucretius' 
didactic strategy. 
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Appendix: Reading between the lines 
Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur amantque, 
inversis quae sub verbis latitantia cernunt (DRN 1.641-642). 
For fools wonder at and love all things more, which they think they find hiding 
beneath overturned words. 
Because in essence Lucretius' efforts to create a multiplicity of meanings were 
motivated by that fact that his ideas ran against the grain of a prevailing orthodoxy, it is 
useful to compare his didactic strategy to that of other writers whose philosophical 
conceits ran counter to the orthodoxy of their time. In "Persecution and the Art of 
Writing," Leo Strauss identified a unique rhetorical strategy which, he claims, the free-
thinking author must adopt when attempting to convey a message that opposed the 
orthodoxy of an oppressive government or was in some other way abrasive to the fabric 
ofhis society.308 Strauss called this strategy "writing between the lines." His 
identification of this peculiar writing style led to the application of a new hermeneutic, 
since the author who writes between the lines must also be read between the lines, if the 
full meaning of his words are to be understood: It ought first to be stressed that there are 
clear differences in the writing strategy that Strauss identified in those other authors and 
the strategy that we see Lucretius employ in De Rerum Natura. Lucretius is, in the long 
run, candid in presenting his message, nor do we have reason to believe that his personal 
safety was threatened by an oppressive government. However, his theological and anti-
308 Strauss (1952) 23-24. 
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political doctrines did call into question some important assumptions on which Roman 
society relied, and, as we have seen in the works of Cicero, his ideas did provoke a 
strong reaction from his philosophical opponents. Because of these basic similarities, 
Strauss' hermeneutic offers a useful inroad to thinking about how we should read 
Lucretius, as an author whose desire to oppose traditional religion sometimes compelled 
him to "write between the lines." 
Strauss' hermeneutic has been criticized on the grounds that it rationalizes 
reading beyond an author's intended meaning and that it makes a text vulnerable to any 
interpretation that one can stretch one's imagination to accommodate. 309 Therefore, in 
order to avoid contaminating the author's intended message with scholarly imagination, 
one needs to find valid reasons for searching out meanings beyond an author's stated 
assertions. To this end, Strauss identified two specific criteria which an author must 
exhibit in order to warrant being read in this way. Firstly, the work in question must 
have been composed in a time and place when a political or social orthodoxy was 
enforced by law or by custom.310 We have already seen from the discussion in chapter 2 
that Epicureanism' s theology was perceived as a serious threat to civilized society. But 
even so, this kind of threat was too insubstantial to meet the criterion as Strauss 
proposed it when interpreting authors such as Al-Farabi or Spinoza,311 who would have 
309 Strauss (1988) cites and rebuts such criticism. 
310 Strauss (1952) 32. 
311 Both of whom Strauss ( 1952) deems worthy of reading between the lines; see his 
introduction to Persecution and the Art of Writing (7 -21) and its final chapter "How to 
Study Spinoza' s Theologico-Political Treatise" (142-201). 
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faced immediate retribution had they clearly asserted ideas that grated against the 
prevailing religious orthodoxy. 
Lucretius did not face a government or religious body that sought to silence 
Epicureanism so aggressively. For that reason he was not compelled to put his true 
philosophical doctrines completely out of sight, nor did he require esoteric teachings 
with which to expand the opinions hidden in his exoteric work.312 Nevertheless, 
Lucretius did expect his teachings to meet a significant counter-force. He did not fear 
retribution from an outside third party, but he faced strong psychological resistance from 
his own reader, whom he expected to be loath to tum his life over to be guided by a 
philosophy that required him to abandon traditional forms and expressions of piety and 
religious cultus. Epicureanism threatened to take the reader down a seemingly 
dangerous path, one that would not only lead him away from comforting delusions of 
providence (for delusions they would prove to be) but would also force him to leave 
behind his accustomed place in a society that accepted those delusions as truth.313 
Lucretius understood these difficulties and wished to provide his reader with something 
as comfortable and compelling as the beliefs he would be expected to abandon. With 
this in mind, he opened his treatise with a charmingly traditional myth and flavored his 
philosophy throughout with honey-sweet verse. Nor did he give up this strategy once 
3 12 Strauss (1952) justifies his deeper readings of these authors partly based on their 
comments regarding the difference between esoteric and exoteric teachings ( 17 -18); 
see also Strauss (1988) 221-2. 
313 Cf. Strauss (1988): "Philosophy or science [ .. . ] is the attempt to replace opinion 
about 'all things' with knowledge about 'all things'; but opinion is the element of 
society; philosophy or science is therefore the attempt to dissolve the element in which 
society breathes, and thus it endangers society" (221). 
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the poem was underway but remained willing to adapt his presentation to his reader's 
comfort whenever the philosophy threatened to repel him. 
Strauss' second criterion requires that the author must show himself at some 
point to contradict the orthodox view, even though outwardly he upholds it. 314 Here 
again we must make a distinction between Lucretius and Spinoza, for example, who 
adhered to orthodox Christian dogma on the surface of his writings, but who can be seen 
to contradict it surreptitiously by contradicting himself on key points. In Strauss' view, 
these contradictory opinions then form the basis by which a careful reader may 
reconstruct the reasoning that surreptitiously undermines the orthodox opinion. 315 
Again, this is not what we see in De Rerum Natura. For the most part, Lucretius states 
his true opinions patently and adheres to them, although he does share this trait in his 
tendency to make what we may call "apparent contradictions." In admitting that 
Lucretius often seems to contradict himself, I do not mean to imply the kind of internal 
inconsistency that led Patin to posit his theory of L'anti-Lucrece chez Lucrece. These 
seeming contradictions are of a very different character than those that indicate the 
internal inconsistency which Patin imagined to reveal the weakness of Lucretius' 
314 Cf. Strauss ( 1952): "If an able writer who has a clear mind and a perfect knowledge 
of the orthodox view and all its ramifications, contradicts surreptitiously and as it were 
in passing one of its necessary presuppositions or consequences which he explicitly 
recognizes and maintains everywhere else, we can reasonably suspect that he was 
opposed to the orthodox system as such and-we must study his whole book over 
again, with much greater care and less naivete than ever before" (32). 
315 This example follows the reasoning laid out in "How to Study Spinoza's Theologico-
Political Treatise," Strauss (1952) 142-201: "If an author who admits, however 
occasionally, that he speaks 'after the manner of man,' makes contradictory statements 
on a subject, the statement contradicting the vulgar view has to be considered as his 
serious view" (177). 
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philosophical conviction. On the contrary, the basis on which this dissertation stands is 
that those instances in which Lucretius seems to contradict his own Epicurean dogma are 
not genuine contradictions but the manifestations of the fluid rhetorical character of his 
poem, which blends didacticism with poeticism and the familiar conventions of 
mythological language, exploiting each for the purposes of persuasion. 
The first and most obvious example of this blending of styles is again the 
opening hymn to Venus, which Lucretius clothes in its full mythical attire. His opening 
plea for divine benefaction seems at first drastically incongruous with his Epicurean 
philosophy, but as we have seen Lucretius systematically corrects this impression of 
incongruity. As the reader is coaxed onward and learns that the gods neither attend to 
the needs of mankind nor respond to his actions in any way, he may again wonder at 
other passages in the poem in which Lucretius uses language that suggests divine 
providence. But we have seen how Lucretius resolves this kind of incongruity in his 
concession to the use ofmetaphoricallanguage (2.655-660). 3 1 ~> Lucretius acknowledges 
that he and his reader live in a world steeped in mythic traditions and that these 
traditions pervade their language. His concession neatly sums up the tension between 
his philosophical mind-set and his, at times necessary, colloquial mode of expression. 
Lucretius' strategic use of mythological vocabulary and literary tropes does not 
signify a real incongruity in the poem nor an internal inconsistency within the poet's 
thought. Instead, they reflect Lucretius' need to appropriate common terms and to 
redefine them for his own purposes. Even in cases in which alternate vocabulary is 
316 See above , ch. 4, pp. 114-16. 
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available, Lucretius employs this ongoing adaptation of mythic language 
("Venus/Amor" as sex, "Ceres" as agriculture, etc.) in order to accommodate his 
reader's changing ability to understand his use ofthese terms. These accommodations 
indicate the poet's willingness to adapt his discourse to conform to those changes. The 
seemingly discordant language of the proem is, in tum, reflective of the tension between 
a culture of myth and religion and Epicurean philosophy-a tension which itself 
motivates the whole of the poem from its inception. 317 
Given this more nuanced understanding of Lucretius' seeming contradictions, we 
are now in a better position to evaluate them in terms of Strauss' second criterion. Does 
this apparent inconsistency represent the type of contradiction that indicates ulterior 
opinions beneath the surface of his writing? The answer is still no, but with some 
important qualifications. The variety of expression within the poem clearly does not 
equate to the type of internal inconsistency that Strauss identified in other authors-it 
does not belie a subversive undercurrent buried beneath an artificial fac;:ade. It does, 
however, indicate that Lucretius was writing in various ways, or on different levels, for · 
different readers. The novice may understand the invocation to Venus at its surface 
level, while the expert, penetrating reader may appreciate the natural beauty of atomic 
physics rather than the mythological artifice. In his multi-faceted style ofrhetorical 
presentation, Lucretius has created the kind of layering that Strauss' second criterion 
aims to describe in principle. It is not important that Lucretius does not hide his true 
beliefs for the duration of the poem. The key element that concerns this criterion is that 
317 Clay (1983) 82-110 (particularly 99-110, on the unity of the proem with the rest of 
the poem). 
140 
Lucretius intends to camouflage his full meaning from some of his readers for a time. 
He is willing to adapt his method of presentation to create a surface-level narrative that 
would appeal to the expectations of the naYve reader without ever abandoning or fully 
contradicting his true philosophical doctrine. It is this willingness to modify his mode of 
writing to suit his reader's evolving capacity to accept his teachings that Lucretius shares 
in common with authors like Spinoza. Spinoza himself, in his Treatise on the 
Improvement of the Understanding, set as his first rule of living "To speak with regard 
to the capacity of the vulgar[ .. . ] that in this way they might offer ears favorable to 
hearing the truth," Ad captum vulgi loqui [ . . . ] quod tali modo arnicas praebebunt aures 
ad veritatem audiendam. 318 Leaving aside the complications posed by applying the 
word vulgus to Lucretius' audience;~ 1" we see here the same desire to accommodate the 
trepidatious reader that he expected his poem to meet, and which prompted him also to 
seek out friendly ears, vacuas auris [ ... ] semotum a curis adhibe (1.50). 
In his hope to disseminate Epicurean philosophy, Lucretius did not simply offer 
an unsituated alternative to traditional values. His goal was to redefine traditional piety, 
to create a new form of religious reverence, and to replace the traditional sources of 
religious knowledge with those derived from knowledge ofthe works of nature. To this 
end he aimed to replace traditional forms of religious expression with a new form of 
philosophical discourse. In doing so, he adopted and transformed those traditional forms 
to suit his own needs. This co-opting of traditional sources of knowledge not only 
allowed him ready access to poetry as an existing mode of religious dissemination, but 
318 Van Vloten and Land (1913). 
319 See above, ch . 1, pp. 31-32. 
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by seating Epicurean ideas in the form usually associated with traditional myth he was 
able to strengthen his own doctrines by their association with these other traditions. J. 
D. Minyard describes the object of this approach (in another context) as twofold, "to 
attach the force of rhetoric and literary association to Epicurean observation and 
analysis."320 On the one hand, by relying on prevailing forms of rhetoric, Lucretius was 
able to confer the intellectual credibility of that discipline to his philosophical 
arguments. On the other hand, by associating those arguments with the traditions of 
epic, he was able to confer upon them the literary cache of that genre, the gravity of its 
tradition, and the emotional force of myth. In Minyard's words: 
The attachment of a feeling to Epicurean description and the revision of feeling 
about the inherited res publica is a necessary part of weaning a non-
philosophical audience from the old ideas and fixing them to the new. It requires 
poetry or rhetoric, not logic, because analysis can only convince. It cannot 
persuade. 321 
This adaptive reframing of Epicurean ideas within traditional formats allowed Lucretius 
to make a more gentle shift in thought and emotion through a "revision of feeling" by a 
slow process of "weaning" from the familiar and of familiarization with the unknown. 
Just as Spinoza endeavored "to speak with regard to the capacity of the vulgar," 
Lucretius too, through his adoption of conventional, mythological vocabulary, aimed to 
speak, as Clay put it, "as men and poets speak within his world. "322 In another lucid tum 
320 Minyard (1985) 68 (emphasis added). 
321 Minyard (1985) 68. 
322 Clay (1983) 237. 
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of phrase, Clay described this rhetorical layering of meanings as "the constant motion of 
a philosophical poet moving between two worlds."323 It is precisely his desire to cross 
boundaries-to move fluidly between the distinct worlds of poetic mythology and 
physical science-that makes Lucretius unique among classical authors. His desire to 
cross these borders is motivated not by poetic aspiration alone, but by the sincere desire 
to convey his physical and ethical doctrines to his fellow man in a way that they are 
most likely to accept and to understand. 
323 Clay (1983) 236. 
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Ch. 5 Didactic Latency 
The preceding chapter discussed the phenomenon of intentional polyvalency as it 
appears in the proem of book 1. This chapter will expand on the concept of 
polyvalency, exploring examples throughout the poem, and paying particular attention to 
how the poem' s sub-surface meanings contribute to Lucretius' overall didactic goals. I 
will first touch upon some previously documented examples of the phenomenon I am 
calling "didactic latency" and move on to new examples that further illustrate the depth 
and range of this didactic strategy. 
One extended example of this kind of reading takes us from the light of the 
proem and its celebration of birth to the darker realms of Lucretius' arguments on death. 
In his influential (1990) monograph, Lucretius on Death and Anxiety, Charles Segal 
illustrates a fuller spectrum of Lucretius' arguments against the fear of death than had 
been previously acknowledged. Segal's main contribution in this work is to show that 
Lucretius complements and anticipates his explicit arguments against the need to fear 
death with instances of deeply-felt poeticism that tacitly address the extra-rational fears 
that linger beneath the surface of the human psyche: 
Lucretius's treatment not just of death but of the fear of death brings together the 
two strongest directions in the De Rerum Natura[ . .. ]. The combination of 
common-sense argumentation, the "hard" evidence of Epicurean science, and the 
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humane wisdom and authority of an ancient poetic tradition enables him to meet 
diverse anxieties at many levels and for many different kinds of readers. 324 
Lucretius' logical arguments regarding the fear of death are to be found, for the most 
part, at the end of book 3. But even before this, Lucretius takes advantage of his poem's 
place within a tradition that employs allusion, implication, and veiled appeals as 
elements of its expressive modes. 325 According to Segal, Lucretius' vivid images of 
violent death, dismemberment, and putrefaction early in book 3 provide graphic 
evidence of the material nature of the soul. But these images serve also to address the 
reader's fears of annihilation and bodily violation, which are displaced from the 
fundamental fear of death itself. 326 
In his analysis, Segal acknowledges the multiplicity of meanings at work within 
single passages. Lucretius' account of limbs severed in battle (3 .634-669), for example, 
functions on the surface to illustrate that the soul, being spread throughout the body, can 
itself be divided. When separated swiftly from the trunk, a limb may momentarily retain 
enough of the stuff of life "to be seen trembling on the ground," ut tremere in terra 
videatur (3.644). The division ofthat part of the soul that remains in the arm from that 
which stays in the still fighting body (3.648) indicates that the soul is also subject to 
destruction. Lucretius casts these grotesque images of bodily mutilation in a mode of 
vivid poetic expression that allows him to deal with the personal emotions that these 
324 Segal (1990) 11. 
325 Segal (1990) 26-7, 34-39 and 46-50. Gale (1994) also finds that Lucretius places 
himself conspicuously within an epic tradition that extends from Homer to Ennius to 
himself (99-128). 
326 Segal (1990) throughout, but see especially 3-45 on myths of"primary boundary 
violation" as they relate to the displaced fear of death. 
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images of violence evoke in the reader. They compel the reader to see the need for a 
reasoned understanding of the nature of death and prepare the reader for the 
philosophical arguments to come at the end of the book. 327 
A close look at Lucretius' language corroborates Segal's conclusion, revealing 
the personalizing poeticism that Lucretius imports into his biological exemplum. The 
severed limb does not lie unattended, even though its loss goes unnoticed by its owner. 
It "is seen," videatur, and the spectacle is introduced as the account of eye-witnesses 
who "recall" the event, memorantur (3 .642). These subtle reminders that these 
horrifying images were witnessed by real people and experienced by real victims takes 
them momentarily, or subconsciously, out of the safer discourse of intellectual argument 
and places them within a poetic tradition that seeks to personalize human suffering. 328 
By suffusing his logical argument with this underlying poetic discourse, 
Lucretius begins to separate the fear of death from fears regarding bodily violation and 
"the body's alienation from itself'329-to separate the fear of dying from the fear of 
being dead. Segal ' s purpose is to illustrate how Lucretius utilizes implicit poeticism to 
address his reader's emotions regarding death-those that are "least rational, and 
therefore most powerfu1."330 Lucretius seems to acknowledge that these subconscious 
fears , only half-realized by the rational mind, cannot be fully articulated and dealt with 
in the modes of logical argument. Their very irrationality gives them a power that logic 
327 Segal (1990) 124. 
328 Segal ( 1990) 34-7. 
329 Segal (1990) 122. 
330 Segal (1990) 22. 
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cannot overcome, and this fact leads Lucretius to deploy poetic modes that evoke a 
latent discourse that unearths and alleviates these subconscious fears. 
These few paragraphs do not do justice to Segal's full arguments on the 
subtleties of Lucretius' suppressed didacticism regarding the fear of death. It is my 
purpose here only to provide a sense of the function and character of this mode of latent 
expression, as Segal describes it. My goal in this chapter is to expand this view into 
other areas of Lucretius ' argument in which his poetry conveys an undercurrent oflatent 
meaning that complements the logical arguments on the surface of his discourse. We 
have already seen such an instance in the proem to book 1. What Gale identifies as 
"intentional polyvalency" in the proem, Segal describes in the later books as a 
"polyphony" among different voices.331 My aim is to classify these scholarly 
expressions as independent articulations of the same rhetorical phenomenon or mode of 
discourse that dwells beneath the poem's surface. Lucretius obscures the deeper 
philosophical significances of his proem with a veil of myth and poetry; in his 
descriptions of death and the anxiety that it produces, his argument lies like a shroud 
over his latent exploration of the deeper psychological significance of these scenes of 
bodily violation, which allows the reader to scrutinize those grim features of death that 
he cannot countenance bare. 
331 Segal (1990) 47. 
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I Latent Myth 
This chapter will focus on Lucretius' latent discourses as they pertain to myth 
and how these discourses relate to the didactic purposes of his poem' s argument. 
Scholarship on the topic of "latent myth" culminates again in Gale (1994), who coined 
the term and whose exploration of the phenomenon in Lucretius strongly influences this 
study. But the phenomenon of latent myth was first identified, not in De Rerum Natura, 
but in the Aeneid by R. 0 . A. M. Lyne in his ( 1987) monograph exploring the "further 
voices" that echo throughout Vergil's complex poem. Lyne' s description of what he 
calls "implicit myth" sets the stage for Gale and others to explore this rhetorical tactic in 
Lucretius.332 
Lyne observes that "artistically conscious and literate poets" often take 
advantage of their audience's awareness of "cultural associations," in order to create a 
density of allusiveness in their poetry that goes beyond explicit metaphor.333 These 
cultural associations, he argues, include allusions to traditional myths, which the poet 
expects his reader to recognize or "sense" even in the absence of any explicit reference 
or signal.334 Lyne discusses an example of implicit myth at Aeneid 12.473-77, in which 
Juturna, acting as Tumus' charioteer, is likened to a swallow: 
nigra velut magnas domini cum divitis aedes 
pervolat et penn is alta atria lustrat hirundo [ . . . ] (Aen. 12.4 73-77). 
332 Gale (1994) 156 and Fowler (1989) 420 explicitly cite the origin of this theory in 
Lyne (1987). 
333 Lyne (1987) 139. 
334 Lyne (1987) 139. 
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Just as when a black swallow flies through the great house of a wealthy lord and 
frequents the lofty halls on the wing [ ... ]. 
Lyne explores the significance of this passage as an implicit reference to the myth of 
Procne and ltys, which casts Juturna as the mourning mother turned into a swallow. 
Lyne sees the implied comparison ofTurnus with Itys and of Jutuma with Procne as 
foreshadowing the hero's imminent death and his guardian's future mouming.335 For 
Lyne, these subliminal associations serve the same function as explicit mythological 
allusions, but their mere implication serves to produce the layering effect that 
characterizes Vergil's poetics. The latent meanings allow the poet to speak with "further 
voices" that complement or complicate the narrative voice on the surface of his poem. 336 
Gale applies similar readings to Lucretius' poem and (although she calls it by a 
different name) defines the phenomenon in similar terms. Gale defines "latent myths" 
as "passages where mythological characters, themes or situations seem to lie at the root 
of Lucretius' imagery or phraseology or choice of exempla, without an explicit 
reference."337 And she identifies various types and their effect. For example, Lucretius 
expands the Epicurean principle that "nothing can arise out of nothing," null am rem de 
nilo gigni (1.150),338 to preclude the idea that there ever could have existed giant beings 
somehow grown to impossible proportions (1.199-204). 339 In this passage, Lucretius 
complements his effort to introduce atomic principles as the source of truth with the 
335 Lyne (1987) 130-144. 
336 Lyne (1987) 140. 
337 Gale (1994) 156. 
338 Cf. Epicurus Ep. ad Herod. 38, npdrwv j.!EV on ou8f:v yiv£tat EK TOU 1-!TJ OVTO<; 
(Bailey [1926] 20; Usener [1887] 5). 
339 Gale (1994) 182-3. 
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implication that rival traditions-those that invoke mythical giants-must necessarily be 
false. 
In other cases, Lucretius evokes a myth within his scientific discourse with the 
implicit purpose of demythologizing the phenomenon under discussion. 34° For example, 
in book 5 (650-655) he explains the natural concourse of the sun in terms reminiscent of 
myth. Lucretius uses suggestive expressions-de Iongo cursu, "in his long track,"341 
suos efflavit languidus ignis, "exhausted he breathes out his own fires"-that create a 
sense of personification and remind the reader of the charioteer of myth. The reminder 
serves as a two-pronged attack on mythological aetia. In combination with the physical 
arguments on the surface, the latent allusion serves to debunk the myth by suggesting its 
origin as a nai"ve misinterpretation of the natural phenomenon. 342 Even in this 
naturalistic description, the reader may see how the image of the sun's daily course 
across the sky might suggest the familiar human image, misapplied anthropomorphically 
to a divinity. In addition, the personifying expressions that evoke latent myth serve also 
to indict the poetic tradition that maintains this misinterpretation. 
These subtle allusions create a sub-surface dialogue between Lucretius' voice of 
scientific reason and an unreasoning mythological tradition. By suppressing these 
polemics, Lucretius is able to give expression to these subliminal voices without 
interrupting the natural flow of his scientific argument. And by suffusing his scientific 
340 Gale (1994) 185-9, and cf. Hardie (1986) 185-7. 
341 I intend the word "track" for cursus to bring back to life the appropriate metaphor of 
the race course which common cosmological parlance has deadened in the English 
word "course." Bailey (1947) gives "journey." 
342 Gale (1994) 188. 
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discourse with suggestive poetic images, he is able to appropriate the material of myth 
for use in his own accounts of nature. 343 In this way, Lucretius' veiled polemics, both 
with myth and with the poetic tradition, have a subtle presence which lends his poem the 
same polyphonic texture that Vergil's implicit mythological allusions add to the Aeneid. 
Again, it is difficult to do justice to such a complex argument, both Lyne's and 
Gale's, in such a short space.344 My purpose here is to provide a sense ofthe function 
and character of Lucretius' latent myths as they have been previously recognized, and 
also to characterize the research that has led to the expectation of such poetic depth 
beneath the surface of Lucretius' argument. Once the expectation of this depth has been 
established, however, the trick lies in attuning one's ear to the polyphony of Lucretius' 
discourse. The reader must learn to listen for these latent voices, but there is risk here. 
As Gale notes, once one is alerted to such subtle references, one begins to hear them 
more and more. 345 The more one hears, the more one bends his ear to listen. As Gale 
343 Gale (1994) 190-1. 
344 The majority of Gale's (1994) argument consists oftwo examples too extensive to be 
adequately summarized here. The first finds many latent references within the Culture 
History of book 5 (783-1457), which set up a sub-surface polemic with the rival 
accounts of man's prehistory in the Hesiodic, and heurematistic traditions (156-182; 
and see also Segal [ 1990] 225-6). The second explores a process of implicitly 
comparing Epicurus favorably to the gods of the pantheon and of the heurematistic 
tradition. Epicurus is seen to surpass these traditional gods by virtue of his scientific 
discoveries, yet his status as a divine or immortal figure (deus ille fuit, deus 5.8) is to 
be understood as a prudent equivocation whereby Epicurus can be seen as a 
replacement for the gods of myth, but which never truly contradicts Epicurean 
principles (191-207; again see also Segal [1990] 218-19 and 225, and Duban [1979] 
and [1982]). 
345 Gale (1994) 179. 
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readily admits, "a degree of subjectivity is involved in detecting hints of this kind. "346 
On this point, we may let Lucretius remind us that "various voices do not cease to fly 
through the breeze," nee variae cess ant voces volitare per auras ( 4.221 ). Thus it is our 
task to attend to the polyphony of the text, but also to be on guard against hearing voices 
carried on the wind. 
Strauss' criteria for finding acceptable cause to read "between the lines" apply 
here and permit us to seek out such examples in Lucretius' poem. m But Lyne provides 
us another important criterion for identifying certain passages of interest to this kind of 
reader. Before explicating the passage in Aeneid 12, Lyne remarks on the unusual 
character of this particular simile, noting that its surface meaning seems "fairly 
unproductive and unintegrated."348 Lyne takes this lack of integration as a sign of 
something lurking beneath the surface, a sign that "something optional is being 
neglected."349 That neglected something, he feels sure, ought to bring the simile into 
sharper focus within the surface narrative, and he finds the poignancy that he expects by 
recognizing the implicit reference to Procne. Too often in Lucretian scholarship, as we 
have seen, this feeling of a lack of integration has led critics to dismiss certain passages 
as poor argument and Lucretius as an inferior poet. But scholars such as Gale and Segal 
have made important new discoveries and revealed new depths to Lucretius' poem by 
pursuing these moments of disintegration or inconsistency positively. Therefore we 
346 Gale (1994) 156). 
l47 s A 1· ,, - . ,,., 
· , ee ppenctiX . pp. 1_>)- '·u . 
348 Lyne (1987) 141. 
349 Lyne (1987) 141. 
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should also allow a lack of thematic integration and an inconsistency of tone to impel us 
to pursue deeper meanings within Lucretius' poem. 
Note too that Lyne takes pains to indicate that the implied poignancy ofVergil's 
metaphor is "optional." Although the experienced reader may recognize that its flatness 
and lack of thematic association begs deeper reading, nevertheless, the surface narrative 
stands on its own. A less attentive reader might pass by such subtleties without a second 
thought, or simply may not care to pursue them. In De Rerum Natura, this ability to 
"opt out" of this sub-surface discourse of the poem is integral to Lucretius' application 
of these latent meanings. As we have seen in the proem to book 1, it is just this quality 
that enables Lucretius to give his philosophical treatise the unadulterated flavor of an 
epic poem. Yet, this same quality that prudently allows some readers to overlook these 
deeper readings also allows these readings to resist discovery by modern readers who are 
not sufficiently attuned to the permeating culture of myth. As a result, readers seeking 
these latent meanings must look for certain signs. 
The first of these is the lack of integration that Lyne recognized in Vergil' s 
simile. The second, which can act as both a signal and a confirmation that one is on the 
right track, is the use of wordplay. As we have seen, the mythological richness and 
striking imagery of the proem in book 1 creates a sense of discontinuity that Lucretius 
encourages his penetrating reader to explore. We noted also that meaningful puns play a 
part in helping the reader to assimilate these contradictory elements:' 50 These subtle 
signs are all Lucretius offers, and all he can offer if he wishes to maintain the full 
350 S · t I 4 11 1 14 , ee a 10ve, c 1. , pp. "'"- . 
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didactic effect of his latent allusions. But these two characteristics, put into 
combination, provide sufficient impetus for a reader to seek to read more deeply and to 
confirm these deeper reading once he has hit upon them. The following arguments will 
explore instances of deeper readings which have not yet been recognized or explored. In 
each, striking imagery and a lack of thematic integration combines with revealing 
wordplay to signal the allusive depth that is being suppressed. 
II The Specter of Tantalus 
Our first example takes us again to book three, in which Lucretius makes it his 
didactic goal to free men's minds from the fear of death-that greatest of all fears that 
leads men to the Epicurean sins of greed and ambition, which in turn, he tells us, can 
lead to crime and-most poignantly in the time of the Late Republic-to civil war.351 In 
this book he teaches that "the precincts of Acheron are not manifest anywhere," 
nusquam apparent Acherusia temp/a (3.25), and that as a result "no one is delivered into 
the pit of black Tartarus," nee quisquam in barathrum nee Tartara deditur atra (3.966). 
And since our deaths mean the absolute end of our existence and hence our ability to 
feel anything at all, then "obviously, there is nothing for us to fear in death," scire licet 
nobis nil esse in morte timendum (3.866). 
The final part of Lucretius' didactic strategy in this book is to rationalize and 
replace the well-known myths that perpetuate the fear of death-in particular, the myths 
351 
unde homines dum se falso terrore coacti 
effugisse volunt Ionge longeque remosse, 
sanguine civili rem conjlant divitiasque 
conduplicant avidi, caedem caede accumulantes (3 .68-71 ). 
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of damned souls tortured in the bowels of the underworld. Against the threat of these 
mythical bogeymen he wields the philosophical weapon of naturalizing allegory. The 
torments of mythology, he assures us, are actually experienced here on earth by people 
whose fear of death and of the gods constantly harasses their minds and robs them of the 
pleasures of life. Against the unfounded fear of physical punishment after death 
Lucretius advances the real possibility of degenerative tortures of the mind. The 
mythical Tityos, he tells us, is actually the man rent not by supernatural birds, but by the 
overweening passions of love (3.984-94). Sisyphus with his rock is the ambitious man 
who continually labors for power in vain (3.995-1 002). The Danaids, constantly trying 
to fill their leaky vessel, are those who can never be satisfied with the pleasures of life 
(3.1003-10). And the Furies, like Cerberus and Tartarus itself represent man' s fear of 
punishment for the crimes he has committed (3.1011-22). The result is a list of 
mythological allegories, which replace the supernatural circumstances of these 
underworld myths with natural and all too familiar examples of human anguish. 
It is important, however, to distinguish Lucretius' allegories from the different 
mode of allegorizing practiced by Lucretius' contemporaries. 352 For other philosophical 
sects, notably the Stoic, allegory was a means to defend myth and to reconcile their own 
philosophical views with the authority of mythological tradition.353 On this topic, Ilaria 
Ramelli (20 11) provides the most compelling argument, noting that Stoic allegory is not 
just an effort to defend the philosophy but an integral part of the philosophical system 
352 On the subject of Lucretius ' efforts to establish a naturalizing system of allegory to 
compete with similar efforts of rival philosophical systems, see Gale (1994) 85-94. 
353 Gale (1994) 19-25. 
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itself. 354 She bases her argument primarily on the conception of allegory articulated by 
Chrysippus, who held that the expression of truth may take various forms-philosophy, 
poetry, legislation, etc. Since (by the Stoic principle of immanentism) this truth will 
always prove to be one and the same, the vehicle of allegoresis allowed them to extract a 
philosophically valuable lesson from any of these other forms, including poetry and 
myth.355 Like myth and theology, myth and physics were for the Stoics equally 
acceptable expressions of a single philosophical truth. This expectation of a single truth 
lying at the heart of all cultural forms of expression allowed the Stoics to appropriate 
these cultural forms into the context of their own philosophy.356 
Though we have seen Lucretius concede to myth in some respects, he does not 
value it on equal terms with the truths made available by the study of physics. As a 
result, he engages in allegory in a manner which carefully qualifies the philosophical 
value of these traditional forms of expression. In the above examples, Lucretius clearly 
lays the emphasis on debunking the myths rather than on preserving them. From the 
start, Lucretius puts the myths in their proper place as misrepresentations ofreality,357 
354 Ramelli (2011) 335-41: "Stoic allegory was not, or certainly not only, a 
literary/rhetorical device or skhema, but it was primarily philosophical in its value" 
(336). 
355 Ramelli (2011): "Poetry, expressing myth, and cultic traditions must therefore be 
interpreted allegorically in order to detect the truth hidden in them, and since truth is 
one, just as the Stoic Logos is one, the truth thereby detected will be one with the 
ghilosophical truth of Stoicism" (337). 
3 6 Ramelli (2011): "[Stoicism] aimed at integrating into its own philosophical system 
the traditional expressions of theology -poetic, cultic, iconographic ... -with a view to 
the creation of a broad cultural synthesis, including the traditional heritage, but 
~hilosophically legitimized in the due forms" (340). 
35 Cf. Gale (1994): "Allegorism is only permitted if we first have a clear idea about the 
nature of the gods and the world" (30), and see also West (1969) 103-4. 
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and he spends his allegorizing efforts primarily in creating natural etiologies which are 
to replace the supernatural ones suggested by the myths. We can see Lucretius exhibit 
this same naturalizing strategy in his underworld allegories as we saw in his explanation 
of the movement of the sun. Here, the comparison of the myths to natural states of mind 
serves to debunk the myths by illustrating their historical origin in these conspicuous 
examples of human suffering. 
Yet, Lucretius does find something of value in the myths that is worth saving. 
Lucretius maintains the intrinsic emotional value that these mythical tortures inspire, 
even after he reveals the underworld to be an unbelievable fantasy. He effectively 
captures the pathos of the myths and reassigns that same awe and dread to the prospect 
of a misspent existence. Through these psychological allegories, Lucretius naturalizes 
the underworld myths by dissolving them in the corrosive environment of etiology and, 
by doing away with these myths, furthers his larger goal of shifting the reader' s focus 
away from his unfounded fears of an afterlife and toward bettering the quality of his life . 
Lucretius concludes, "it is here that fools' lives in time become a living Hell," hie 
Acherusiafit stultorum denique vita (3.1 023). His allegorical transference of the pathos 
ofthe underworld myths to the living world of the reader exemplifies this conclusion 
many times over. 
So far, I have purposely ignored one item in Lucretius' catalogue of the damned. 
The principle figure in this list that Lucretius chooses to allegorize is Tantalus (3.980-3), 
but not the Homeric Tantalus, who is plagued by eternal thirst and hunger in the midst of 
157 
food and water (Od. 11.582-592). That "tantalized" but unsatisfied Tantalus would 
seem to fit well with the overarching theme of the book,358 but Lucretius chooses to 
allegorize here the Tantalus who is tortured by a rock that hangs constantly over his 
head. 359 This Tantalus he compares to the man plagued by fear of the gods and of the 
unknown, and always anxiously awaiting a "fall," casum. 360 
At the end of the book, however, the specter of the Homeric Tantalus can be 
dimly made out. Lucretius gives his reader one final psychological exemplum (3 .1 053-
68)-that of the man who runs from his lush city home to his country villa and 
immediately back again to the city, "as if to put down a burden," quasi onus deponere 
possit (3 .1 059). But his efforts, and the efforts of all such men are in vain, since the 
burden that wearies them is really the fear of death that lingers, only half-realized, 
within their own minds, "they seem to sense that there is a burden upon their mind 
which wears them down with its heaviness," sentire videntur I pondus inesse animo 
quod se gravitate fatiget (3.1 054). This character sketch leads Lucretius to issue a vivid 
warning, which he casts in the first person to express the danger to us all, if we neglect 
to cultivate a true understanding of the universe through Epicurean philosophy and risk 
allowing ourselves to be mastered by the caprice of our own neurotic desires. Nor will 
we ever find lasting satisfaction or happiness under this affliction, he assures us, but 
358 Cf. West (1969) 98. This also poses a minor problem for Gale's (1994) interpretation 
of 4.1097-1104 as a reference to a previously allegorized myth, in that Lucretius has 
not allegorized the Homeric Tantalus before the example she cites at 4.1097-1104, as 
she readily acknowledges. My interpretation of the latent myth of Tantalus helps to 
solve this problem. 
359 Pindar 01. 1.55-64, Euripides Orestes 4-7, and see West (1969) 98. 
360 On the pun, see West (1969) 98. 
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vainly searching for relief we will make ourselves slaves to an indistinct and 
unquenchable sense of longing: 
sed dum abest quod avemus, id exsuperare videtur 
cetera; post aliud, cum contigit illud, avemus, 
et sitis aequa tenet vitai semper hi antis (3 .1 082-84 ). 
But as long as what we want is not there, it seems to surpass all else; afterward, 
when we have gotten it, we want another thing, and an equal thirst for life grips 
us forever agape. 
The appearance of the thirst metaphor here has long puzzled commentators, and 
despite some good observations the metaphor is still lacking a satisfactory explanation. 
Bailey and Kenney have made the best contributions so far. 36 1 Kenney calls these lines 
"a fresh twist to the image of the unsatisfied dinner guest," citing 3.938, in which Natura 
insists that the dying man ought to be satisfied with what life has given him and should 
take his leave, ut plenus vitae conviva.362 Bailey points us to Natura's alternative 
argument, that if the dying man has thus far been unsatisfied with life he should not 
expect to find an extension of it any more pleasing, quod placeat, nil est: eadem sunt 
omnia semper (3 .945).363 Neither example is as parallel as one might like, and, more 
importantly, neither accounts for the sudden appearance of this striking metaphor here 
nor the emphasis on thirst specifically. This powerful image of the perpetually open, 
361 See also Wallach (1976) 101-2. 
362 Kenney (1971) 243 . 
363 Bailey (1947) vol. 2, 1074. Bailey also cites the "occasional resemblance in 
expression," by which he must mean omnia, semper, and perhaps eadem""' aequa. But 
how these resemblances bear upon our understanding of the parallel he does not say. 
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thirsty mouth is difficult to account for in its immediate context. It seems somewhat 
jarring and unintegrated with the surrounding text, inviting us to follow up our sense that 
there ought to be something more. Pursuing the latent myth of the Homeric Tantalus 
here unpacks the metaphor and leads us to a fuller understanding of Lucretius' 
waming.364 
Lucretius' former underworld allegories have primed the reader to think of 
psychological phenomena in terms of myth, and the presence of Tantalus here-as the 
mythological archetype of chronic dissatisfaction-is well-warranted by the immediate 
context of his argument. The mythical Tantalus suffers under his constantly unfulfilled 
desire to eat and drink, while he perpetually strains to satisfy both-at times reaching for 
the fruit just above his head, at times for the water running away from under his chin, 
but both are forever just beyond his reach. The victim of the fear of death, also 
constantly strains here and there attempting to satisfy his protean desires, but his endless 
struggle to find relief leaves him equally dissatisfied, "forever gaping," open-mouthed, 
like Tantalus. And like Tantalus, the victim of the fear of death lives surrounded by the 
stuff that could bring him satisfaction and happiness, but because he does not understand 
that the true source ofhis angst is an unrealized desire to escape death, the objects of his 
misplaced desires lose their power to relieve his despair as soon as they come within his 
grasp--and he himself falls into the grip of an unchanging "thirst" that leaves him 
"forever gaping," as if to drink the receding waters of his wasted life. 
364 Segal (1990) is the only one who glimpses Tantalus in these lines: "We recognize 
that, in our foolish desire for ever more life, we are indeed like Tantalus or the 
Danaids" (72). But even he does not seem to realize, in this passing recognition of 
Tantalus "or the Danaids," the full significance of this specific myth. 
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In addition to the thematic appropriateness of the myth to this portion of his 
argument, Lucretius signals the latent context in another way, by first punning on the 
name a few lines earlier, when he asks the programmatic question: 
Denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis 
quae mala nos subigit vitai tanta cupido? (3 .1 07 6-77) 
After all , what is this great and wicked desire for life 
that compels us so greatly to anguish in danger and doubt? 
Lucretius repeats the words tanto and tanta echoing in sotto voce the name of his 
unnamed subject in the lines ahead. And the juxtaposition of these words at the 
beginning and end of the sentence with opere and cupido portray lexically the plight of 
Tantalus, whose great labor is eternally perpetuated by his great desire. 
Within the passage, the metaphor of psychological "thirst" culminates in the 
phrase semper hiantis, "forever agape," which other ancient authors besides Lucretius 
have also used to describe the Tantalus figure and to evoke the pathos of his plight. In 
his Thyestes, Seneca has Tantalus describe his own torture. At the opening of the play, 
having been drawn unexpectedly up from the underworld, Tantalus immediately begins 
to fear some more sinister punishment: 
[ ... ] peius inuentum est siti 
arente in undis aliquid et peius fame 
hiante semper? (Thyestes 1-6). 
Has something been found worse than parching thirst amid the waves and worse 
than hunger forever agape?" 
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When we first meet Tantalus, Seneca too presents us with this characteristic image of the 
perpetually open mouth, transferred by hypallage to the cause of its opening, here 
hunger rather than thirst. And here too his is a "gaping" mouth, described by the 
participle of the mimetic verb hi are. 
Given the exact correspondence of terms, one may be led to wonder if Seneca's 
description is a self-consciously intertextual reference to the very passage that we are 
considering. But this possibility seems precluded by the context of his play, which lacks 
a plausible motive for the reference. Why, at the outset of his mythological tragedy, 
would Seneca have wanted to remind his readers of Lucretius, of all poets? For this 
reason, the reference seems not to have been inspired by Lucretius. Rather, it is much 
more likely that the image, and therefore the phrase, carried an intrinsic and much earlier 
association with the myth of Tantalus. 
This association is confirmed for us by the appearance of the same metaphor in 
the works of Lucretius' fellow Epicurean, Horace. In his first Satire, Horace acerbically 
derides people's tendency always to be dissatisfied with their station in life-whatever 
that happens to be-and always to long for the greener grass on the other side of the 
fence. Horace too is drawn to compare this psychological malady to the plight of 
Tantalus: 
Tantalus a labris sitiens fugientia capt at 
flumina-quid rides? mutato nomine de te 
fabula narrator: congestis undique saccis 
indormis inhians [ ... ] (Satire 1.1.68-71 ). 
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In his thirst, Tantalus strives for the waters that escape from his lips-why do 
you laugh? Change the name, and the story is told about you. You sleep upon 
sacks of money piled up everywhere but gaping for more [ ... ] . 
The comparison that Lucretius left implicit, Horace here makes explicit. A surrogate 
Tantalus, this stingy character is equally "open-mouthed" (inhians again), unable to 
drink in real pleasure from the sprawling river of his wealth. And like Lucretius, Horace 
renders his depiction of Tantalus as a warning-this could be you, dear reader, if only 
we supply your name instead of his, mutato nomine, "with the name changed." 
Lucretius' first person verbs also cast the reader as the potential subject of this 
psychological torture, and the implicit comparison of the reader's potential plight to that 
of Tantalus encourages him to see that the name has already been changed. 
III Latent didacticism 
The likeness in the language and significance of these later examples to 
Lucretius' passage helps to bring the latent myth out of hiding. But we are left to ask 
ourselves why he chose to hide the myth in the first place. Why not make the 
comparison between myth and reality explicit as Horace would do-as he himself had 
already done in his previous allegorical examples? Lucretius' motivation to conceal the 
myth at this later point lies in his theory of philosophical education. In his poem, 
Lucretius seeks to instill Epicurean ways ofthinking deeply within his pupil ' s 
consciousness. His aim in this passage, as throughout his work, is to help the student of 
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Epicureanism not only to learn the doctrines ofthe philosophy, but to internalize them 
and make them an integral part of the way he experiences his world. 
This didactic strategy can be traced back to the Master himself. In the opening 
and closing paragraphs ofhis Letter to Herodotus, Epicurus gives us a glimpse of the 
theory behind his pedagogy. He first engendered the desire to instill Epicurean 
principles deeply within his disciples' consciousness, and he achieved this end in part by 
rendering these principles in a form that would facilitate easy memorization and quick 
review. 365 Epicurus intends his letter to serve as a sort of philosophical digest, both for 
students who cannot master the complexities of his more detailed works and for 
experienced students in need of a ready reminder of the fundamental doctrines, "so that 
at each opportunity [students] may be able to aid themselves on the most important 
matters," tva nap , EKUO"'tOUr; 'tWV Katp&v Ev 'tOtr; KUpto'tU'totr; ~ofl8ctv au-rotr; OUVCOV'tat 
(35.5-7). This self-reliance, he continues, allows students to pursue their further 
education by themselves "in a manner not requiring speech," Ka-ra -rov livt::u cp86yycov 
-rp6nov (83.12), that is without the need for recourse to explicit instruction from a 
master.366 
365 Ep. ad Herod. 35-6 and 83 (Bailey [1926] 18 and 53-54; Usener [1887] 3 and 31). 
On this topic, see Clay (1983) 60-63 and 169-91. 
Epicurus' Kyriai Doxai constitute another example of this same effort to effect 
the internalization of his philosophy; see Clay (1983) 72-81: "The genius of some of 
the Kyriai doxai is that they succeeded in their end by slightly altering or reforming the 
wisdom fixed in the memories of Greeks, whose education was based on memorization 
and example" (78). 
366 See Bailey ( 1926) 55, and cf. Clay ( 1983) 1 7 5. 
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Epicurus' unconventional disciple, Lucretius, shared the same goal of facilitating 
his disciples' internalization ofEpicureanism.367 He also expected his students to be 
able to apply his general examples to specific cases by themselves and without explicit 
instruction-like keen-scented hunting dogs following the faint tracks of his argument: 
namque canes ut montivagae persaepe ferai 
naribus inveniunt intectas fronde quietes, 
cum semel institerunt vestigia certa viai, 
sic alid ex alia per te tute ipse videre 
talibus in rebus poteris caecasque late bras 
insinuare omnis et verum protrahere inde. (1.404-409) 
For just as mountain-ranging hounds often uncover with their noses the leaf-
covered resting places of a beast, when once they have begun to follow the sure 
path of its tracks, so too will you yourself by yourself be able to see from one 
thing to the next in such matters and to penetrate every invisible hiding-place and 
to draw out the truth from therein. 
Lucretius is invoking this Epicurean didactic principle when he leaves the Tantalus myth 
undiscovered within his own narrative. He expects his attentive reader-already primed 
by the former explicit underworld allegories and by the verbal cues within and preceding 
it (hiantis and tanto ... tanta)-to recognize the unnamed myth here . 
367 See Clay (1983) 176-85: "Lucretius' expectations of his reader reflect Epicurus' 
expectations of his, although Lucretius is less insistent that his reader memorize his 
doctrines" (181 ). 
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But in this case the quarry is also the bait, which leads the reader toward 
Lucretius' larger pedagogical goals. By following the trail of allusion that Lucretius has 
left for him, the reader is not just rooting out one particular myth that has gone to 
ground, he is also practicing the hunt. As soon as the reader recognizes the myth hiding 
within the psychological exemplum, he has himself-even if unconsciously-performed 
his own mythological allegoresis. By seeing the myth within the psychological 
exemplum, the reader is implicitly likening the two. He is creating a new, naturalized 
context for the myth. As in Lucretius ' former explicit allegories, this new context of 
psychological etiology serves to redefine the reader's understanding of the myth-a new 
understanding which the reader has now created for himself He now sees Tantalus as a 
character of his own world- the real world, rather than as a figure of myth. 
It should be clarified at this point that by inducing the reader to see the myth 
within the natural phenomenon here, instead of the other way around, Lucretius is not 
effecting the inverse of his previous allegories. There is a complex system of 
redefinition at work, made even less discernable by its implicit nature. It should be 
remembered first that Lucretius' goal regarding myth is not to banish it in its entirety. 
Rather, his aim is to extract a core truth from myth by giving some explanation of its 
natural origin which, in turn, suggests its value for our understanding of the natural 
world. 368 The latent myth functions in the same way. It is the impulse to assimilate the 
mythical and the real-an impulse that Lucretius has established in his previous 
allegories-that allows the reader to recognize the latent myth in the first place. 
368 See Gale (1994) 182-89, who cites Hardie (1986) 185-6. 
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Operating on this impulse, the reader does not think of replacing the psychological 
exemplum with the mythical one, but of assimilating the two allegorically, with the 
expectation that the natural etiology is to be privileged over the myth. Following the 
example that Lucretius has set, the reader readily puts this newly discovered myth into 
its proper place himself, seeing it as a misrepresentation of a real phenomenon derived 
from a misattribution of the pathos that the natural exemplum now carries on its own. 
This is a complex rhetorical system to describe in detail, and the description may 
seem to suggest that a high degree of intellectual sophistication would be required for 
the reader to participate in its complexities. But it should be remembered that these 
complex reactions are of the kind that can be felt in the briefest moment of subconscious 
recognition. Its full significance need not, and well may not be, fully articulated in the 
mind of those who experience it, but its effects can be influential nonetheless. In this 
short passage, the reader is given the opportunity and the psychological impetus to put 
the theory of myth that Lucretius has exampled throughout the book into practice for 
himself. And in creating for himself this new, Epicurean version of this particular myth, 
the reader has acted upon an essential part of Lucretius' didactic mission-to encourage 
the impulse to extract nature's truth from within supernatural fictions. By allowing the 
reader to draw these conclusions for himself, within the sovereign space of his own 
mind, Lucretius lends his Epicurean doctrine the persuasive force and endearing charm 
ofpersonal epiphany. 
IV The earth and the goddess 
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Our next area of inquiry will take us back a step in Lucretius' poem to his second 
book. I proceed in my argument by regressing in the text because the coming example is 
of a more complex character and is better understood with the hindsight gained from the 
example in book 3. 
At the start of book 2, Lucretius encourages his reader to enjoy the serenity that 
his study of the atomic world has thus far afforded him-a serenity which is most 
poignantly felt in contrast to the tribulations of others, who are tossed by rough seas or 
by the tides of war (2.1-6). The value of these examples is metaphorical as well as 
literal. To the educated Epicurean, the majority of humanity seems to suffer by their 
ignorance as they live out a wandering and uncertain existence (2.9-13). The physical 
lessons to which the reader was introduced in the first book now allow him to begin to 
view these troubles from afar and, Lucretius assures him, "without your own share in the 
danger," tua sine parte pericli (2.6). Here the reader first glimpses "the lofty, serene 
temples fortified by the teachings of the wise," munita [ . .. ] edit doctrina sapientum 
temp/a serena (2.8), and he is invited to approach them more closely, to read on and 
continue his education. 
The coming lessons of the second book will present a new challenge to the 
reader ' s accustomed way of thinking. In this book, Lucretius begins illustrating the 
motion and properties of atoms, but he soon acknowledges the theological implications 
of these physics. Those who have chosen to pursue these material doctrines soon find 
themselves at odds with those ignorant of them, and at the heart of this contrast lies the 
rejection of divine providence. We have seen these lines before in the context of 
168 
Lucretius' naturalization ofVenus,wJ but they bear repeating here as they present an 
initial step in the reader's introduction to Epicurean theology: 
at quidam contra haec, ignari materiai, 
naturam non posse deum sine numine credunt 
tanto opere humanis rationibus admoderate 
tempora mutare annorum frugesque creare 
[ ... ] (2.167-170). 
Yet, contrary to these things, certain people, ignorant of the material causes, 
believe that without the power of the gods nature could not so neatly 
accommodate the needs of the human race, changing the seasons of the year and 
creating crops [ ... ] . 
It is important to note the emphasis that this denial of divine providence places on the 
topic of agriculture. The troublesome lacuna preceding these lines (after 2.164) prevents 
us from knowing the precise context of this statement, but Lucretius' contra haec 
suggests that they come after some remark on the generative properties of the atoms 
themselves. 370 But even with the lacuna, the purpose of the passage is clear. Lucretius 
is separating the reader from those who mistakenly attribute generation--especially 
agricultural generation-to a divine source. 
Lucretius soon follows with a full and explicit denial of divine benefaction in our 
world, "the nature of the universe was in no way divinely created for us: stained as it is 
with fault so great," nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam I naturam mundi: tanta stat 
369 ,\·! . , •j I . j ') -, I I 
. 1,1\ L. C 1 . '-t. pj). ---'--'-1 
370 See Fowler (2002) 230. 
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praedita culpa (2.180-181). For Lucretius, the earth is an imperfect tutor of human life 
and offers only reluctant accommodation to the needs of mankind. He repeats these 
lines in the fifth book (5 .195-9=2.177 -182) and there takes up the argument in detail 
(5.195-234). He illustrates the earth's hostility to human life, giving asa prominent 
example the toilsome labor and grudging rewards of agriculture (5.206-217). He asserts 
this point in book 2 but does not pursue it. Rather, he dismisses it as a subject better 
suited for a later time, "which things, Memmius, we will make apparent to you later on," 
quae tibi posterius, Memmi, faciemus aperta (2.182). This foreshadowing of the earth's 
many faults thus stands as an apparent digression here, and the sense that this move 
toward the argument against providence is premature or unwarranted at this point in 
book 2 has led some editors to suspect that 2.165-183 are misplaced. 371 But the passage 
has been successfully defended in consideration of what might have appeared in the 
lacuna and the greater relevance that it might have born as its conclusion. 372 And even 
in the absence of the material of the lacuna, the passage serves an important function at 
this point in the poem, because it anticipates the argument that will be addressed 
throughout the book. 
In the course of describing the nature of the atoms, Lucretius introduces the idea 
ofthe earth's insentience. Its various produce comes not from benevolence nor divine 
will, but as a matter of course from its abundant store of atoms (2.589-599). From this 
atomic bounty earth gains the appellation "mother," to which, as we have seen, 
371 Lachmann (1850), Munro (1886), and Muller (1959) 20-4. 
372 Fowler (2002) 234-5. 
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Lucretius gives qualified concession as a figure of common parlance (2.655-60). ·173 But 
by any other understanding, the name is a misnomer derived from a misapprehension of 
nature. As a conspicuous example of this kind of misapprehension, Lucretius gives us 
his sardonic portrayal of the rites of the Magna Mater cult (2.600-43). This passage 
levels its argument equally at the rites themselves and at allegorizing attempts to explain 
them.374 But even before Lucretius arrives at these explicit denials of providence and of 
an earth-goddess of any kind, he addresses the issue subliminally through the vehicle of 
latent myth. 
Early on in book 2, Lucretius describes the variety of shapes that different atoms 
take and how these invisible differences cause them to act differently and to produce 
different types of matter with different characteristics. The first conceptual challenge 
that this lesson poses is the assertion that invisible things may "look" different. 
Lucretius illustrates this idea with an example from the animal world. We may not be 
able to distinguish an individual animal from the rest of its kind-its distinguishing 
features are, in effect, as invisible to us as the atoms that Lucretius is describing. Yet, 
though these distinctions are invisible to us, their existence is attested by the animals' 
ability to recognize individuals among themselves. To illustrate this truth, Lucretius 
offers a surprisingly emotional description of a mother cow searching for her lost calf, 
who, unbeknownst to her, has already gone to the sacrificial altar: 
nam saepe ante deum vitulus delubra decora 
373 SL'C ~tbO\c. ch -l. pp. 11-t- 1" 
374 See West (1969) 103-14 for a detailed account of the interplay of these facets of 
Lucretius' passage, in which his purpose is "to contrast the mythological account of 
Mother Earth and its allegories with the Epicurean truth" (111). 
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turicremas propter mactatus concidit aras, 
sanguinis exspirans calidum de pectore jlumen; 
at mater viridis saltus orbata peragrans 355 
nanquir75 humi pedibus vestigia pressa bisulcis, 
omnia convisens oculis loca si queat usquam 
conspicere am is sum fetum, completque querellis 
frondiferum nemus adsistens et crebra revisit 
ad stabulum desiderio perfixa iuvenci, 360 
nee tenerae sa/ices atque herbae rore vigentes 
jluminaque ilia queunt summis labentia ripis 
oblectare animum subitamque avertere curam, 
nee vitulorum aliae species per pabula laeta 
derivare queunt ani mum curaque lev are: 365 
usque adeo quiddam proprium notumque requirit (DRN 2.352-366), 
For often before the gods' decorated temples, a bull-calf falls slaughtered by the 
incense-smoking altar, exhaling a hot stream of blood from his breast. But the 
mother, wandering the green pastures bereft, traces footprints pressed in the earth 
by cloven-hoofed feet, casting her eyes into every place if anywhere she might 
be able to glimpse her lost offspring, and she fills with laments the leaf-bearing 
grove at which she stands and goes back again and again to the stable, pierced 
375 I prefer Mooney's nanquit (i.e. nancitur) here (correcting the uncertain readings of 
the mss., nonquit, o inquit and o inquid) over Bailey's quaerit based on the comparison 
with Ovid Fasti 463. Cf. Leonard and Smith (1942) 345. 
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through with longing for her calf, nor can tender grasses and herbs fresh with 
dew and that stream touching upon its highest banks offer her mind pleasant 
distraction and turn away her sudden sadness, nor can the different faces of other 
calves throughout the happy fields divert her mind and lighten her sadness: so 
earnestly does she seek the one she recognizes as her own. 
The function of this passage as a scientific exemplum comes across most clearly in the 
phrase vitulorum aliae species, which I have translated liberally here as "the different 
faces of other calves." The literal meaning of these words, "other appearances of 
calves," reflects the scientific principle that Lucretius intends to illustrate-like animals, 
atoms also bear a variety of invisible "appearances," species. But Lucretius ' poetic 
sympathy and focalizing language-illaflumina, "that (sc. familiar) stream," familiar, of 
course, to the cow--compels us to experience this pastoral landscape through the cow's 
eyes. For the cow, and so for us, vitulorum aliae species carries a different meaning-
she sees other calves and recognizes by their appearance that they are not her own. 
But why does Lucretius render this passage, whose explicit function is to 
example a principle of atomic physics, with such a confluence of perspective? Why 
such a strong shift in focus onto the experience of the cow? The emotional weight that 
Lucretius gives this exemplum has seemed to some to unbalance the trajectory of his 
scientific argument.376 But, as we have learned from Lyne and from our previous 
example, this surprising shift in tone is more productively understood as a sign of some 
376 See Bailey ( 194 7) on these lines, "the picture in his mind gets the better of him, since 
much ofthe detail is irrelevant to the argument, the point of which is contained in 364-
6; no other calf could satisfy the mother" (861 ). 
173 
deeper thematic undercurrent showing through the surface argument. In this case, we 
will see that the cow is thematically linked with Lucretius ' coming denial of a provident 
earth-goddess. Before we encounter Lucretius' description of the Magna Mater 
procession and his following rejection of the earth' s divinity, we first find in the cow a 
kind of Ceres, whose divinity has been so wholly excised from this naturalized version 
of her myth that her own role is now performed (no less poignantly) by Lucretius' cow. 
Other scholars have acknowledged that there is some greater significance to this 
passage beyond its function as scientific exemplum. Charles Segal ( 1970) dedicates an 
article to his reading ofthis passage as a continuation of Lucretius' "sustained attack 
upon religio." He likens it to the Magna Mater passage and to the scene oflphigeneia's 
sacrifice (1.84-101), in that this passage also "dramatizes the cruelty ofthe 
practitioners."377 Certainly, the emotional qualities imparted to Lucretius' description 
do highlight the cruelty of the sacrifice, and it is likely that this emphasis does factor into 
377 Segal (1970) 104. In this article, Segal examines the passage as a condemnation of 
religious "luxury and artificiality which can destroy true peace and pleasure" as 
opposed to the peace and enjoyment of happiness which Epicureanism provides, but he 
links this luxury very closely with the intended effects of religious efforts. He is 
perhaps following Amory (1969): "For the atomic argument the calf does not need to 
be sacrificed on an altar; it could just as well have been killed accidentally, or even just 
lost, but Lucretius chooses instead a situation which allows him to attack religion" 
(161); "Iphigenia' s sacrifice was extraordinary and barbarous; that ofheifers was 
standard and indeed generally regarded as a sign of piety, but in book II Lucretius 
encourages us to view the sacrifice of this particular calf as another impium factum" 
(160). 
I also mention hesitantly the interpretation of Nichols (1976), "the proof [of the 
differences in atoms] is that even things of the same species differ from each another, 
which must be caused by differences in the constituent atoms" (67), which to my mind 
seems to confuse both the scientific purpose of the analogy and gravely to 
mischaracterize the philosophical significance of the passage, which he takes somehow 
to be that "the elimination of the terrors of religion cannot dispel all grief and pain" 
(70). 
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Lucretius' larger arguments against traditional forms of religious piety. But these 
emotional effects come primarily through our sympathy with the cow; the practitioners 
of the sacrifice themselves receive none of the poet's attention. In contrast, in the 
Iphigeneia scene Lucretius takes great pains to point his finger at those perpetrating the 
crime-the Greek captains, ductores Danaum delecti (1.86), and Agamemnon, her 
maestum parentem (1.89), whose "fatherly name," nomine patrio (1.94), does not save 
his daughter from their violent hands, sublata virum manibus (1.95), nor from "her 
father's slaughter," mactatu parentis (1.99). In the cow passage, however, our attention 
focuses almost entirely on the cow herself. The performers of the sacrifice remain 
unnamed and unseen and, in effect, as mysterious to us as they are to the cow. 
It is not actually the sacrifice itself which garners the attention in this passage; 
indeed, the sacrifice is described in only the first three of its fifteen lines. Rather, it is 
the cow' s search and her expressions of grief which capture our attention and beg our 
consideration. In considering these elements, the cow passage becomes irresistibly 
similar to the myth of Ceres/Demeter.378 We can take as our model the Homeric Hymn 
to Demeter, though I do not wish to suggest that this is the only possible source for this 
myth, nor even that this is necessarily the version that Lucretius was thinking of when he 
composed his description of the cow. Rather, this kind of intertextual relationship may 
378 Segal (1970) also notices the similarity, but does not care or hazard to make much of 
it (112-13). His review of the evidence brings him to only a tentative conclusion: " It is 
not impossible that such associations could be subliminally present for Lucretius and 
his audience" (133). 
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be best described as a mythological topos or commonplace, of which the Hymn to 
Demeter is the most conspicuous example.379 
The image of the cow's grief, "pierced through with longing for her calf," 
desiderio perfixa iuvenci (2.360), reflects the sadness of Demeter, "wasting away with 
longing for her deep-breasted daughter," n68cp /ltv68oucra ~a8usffiv-rotO 8uya-rp6~ 
(HDem. 201). Likewise, the physical expression of these mothers' grief takes a similar 
form. Finding no comfort in her usual repasts, the cow ignores otherwise tempting 
grasses, herbs, and streams (2.361-3). Demeter too refuses her usual comforts, "grieving 
she tasted neither ambrosia nor nectar sweet to drink," ou8€ no-r' U/l~POcrtl]~ Kat 
v€napo~ TJOD7t010t0 nacrcra-r' UKTJXE/lEVT] (H Dem. 49-50). 
The goddess and the cow seem to come together in their human expressions of 
grief. Demeter is anthropomorphized and imagined to suffer by her toilsome journey 
and lack of food, and it may be that Lucretius is personifying the cow in these 
descriptions of her mourning. (It may also be the case that he is accurately describing 
the behavior of actual cows, as he professes to be doing.) In either case, his animal 
model exhibits no less capacity for grief than does the goddess, and each expresses her 
grief in recognizably human forms, the one appropriated to the world of the divine, the 
other to the animal world. The cow's grasses and herbs stand in for Demeter's nectar 
and ambrosia, but carry no less value or potential attraction for the cow than their 
379 I also do not wish to make too little of the potency of to poi as allusive vehicles. On 
the complexity of this kind of allusion and its potential for various interpretations, see 
Hinds (1998) 34-4 7, e.g. on the so-called "many mouths" topos to which Vergil alludes 
at A en. 6.625-7: "The so-called commonplace, despite our name for it, is not an inert 
category in this discourse but an active one, with as much potential to draw poet and 
reader into, as away from, engagement with the specificities of its history" ( 40). 
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heavenly counterparts do for the goddess . The goddess covers the entire earth with the 
speed of flight. Lucretius ' description carries the reader along with the cow from forest 
to stable to river as she searches through her entire world, making the journey seem as 
vast (for a cow) as Demeter' s journey across land and sea. 
One detail of the hymn deserves special consideration. When Demeter arrives at 
Eleusis, the daughters of Keleos escort what they take to be a sad old woman to their 
home for employment as a nurse. These girls are described as "like goddesses, having 
the bloom ofyouth," cb<HE 9cai, KOUpTJl.OV av9o<; EXOUO'Ul (HDem. 108), and they run 
about playfully "holding up the folds of their lovely dresses," E7nOXOJ.lEVUt £av&v nruxa<; 
iJ..LEpoEV'-cwv, "and their hair flowed about their shoulders like a crocus bloom," UJ..L<pi oe 
xat-cm I WJ..LOt<; aiooovw KpOKT]tq> av9Et OJ.!Olat (HDem. 176-78). The girls epitomize the 
attractiveness of youthful beauty and gaiety, just the sort that we imagine in Persephone 
as she played (nmsouoav) picking flowers with the daughters of Ocean just before her 
capture (HDem. 5). But the sight of these other daughters does not lighten Demeter' s 
grief nor does it soften her mourning posture as "with sorrow in her heart she walked 
behind them, her head covered over," omo9E <piA.ov -cETIT)J.lEJ.lll ~-cop I o-cdxc Ka-ca Kpfl9cv 
KEKaAUJ..LJ.lEJ.lT) (H Dem. 181-182). The girls have no power to ease Demeter' s suffering 
for the loss of her own daughter. This is the essential point that brings Demeter's myth 
to mind in Lucretius ' scientific exemplum, both for his reader when encountering it in 
book 2 and for Lucretius when composing it. 
The confluences of circumstance and meaning that we have seen so far are still 
not quite enough for us to consider the parallel as something outside the intertextual 
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realm ofthe commonplace. But in this same feature of the hymn we find a resonance of 
imagery that suggests the possibility that Lucretius may have had this text specifically in 
mind as the source of his allusion. When Metaneira sends the girls to escort Demeter 
back to their home, and they happily run to retrieve her, as we have seen them do, the 
poet of the hymn describes the girls' joyful sprint with a brief simile. They run "just as 
deer or calves in the spring season leap about the meadow, their hearts satisfied with 
food," ai 8' roc; -r ' ii EAUq>Ol ii n6pnec; ilapoc; &pnl UAAov-r' av A8t!lffiVa Kopecrmi!l8Vat 
cpptva cpop~'ft (HDem. 174-175). Here Demeter grieves for the loss of her daughter in 
the presence of young girls who are described as happy calves. With the same dejected 
apathy, Lucretius' cow witnesses actual calves leaping about their happy pastures, 
pabula laeta (364). The correspondence of the images-the one metaphorical, the other 
literal-suggests that this version of the hymn may have been Lucretius' model for the 
cow passage. But we should bear in mind that this possibility does not require that his 
reader understand his allusion as a sophisticated literary intertext, nor that Lucretius 
desired or expected him to. It is of no importance to Lucretius' purpose whether his 
reader is able to identify a specific text behind his allusion, provided that he recall some 
version of the myth, for which a general familiarity with the main events of the myth 
would be sufficient. The passage can evoke either reaction or even both 
simultaneously. 3 ~ 0 There is no reason why Lucretius would want to limit the reach of 
this charged image only to those with an intimate knowledge of this literary version of 
the myth. The significance of the literary correspondence for the purposes of this 
380 Edmunds' (2001) discussion of "system reference" bears consideration here (above. 
ch. 4. n. 262). 
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argument is simply that it helps to affirm that the roots of Lucretius' portrayal of the cow 
do, in all likelihood, lie in this myth. 
Some further evidence of Lucretius' intention to cast his cow as the earth-
goddess of myth is provided by wordplay that anticipates the allusion. As an 
introduction to his analogy illustrating the variable forms of atoms, he first confirms that 
this variety is paralleled in the animal world: 
quorum unum quidvis generatim sumere perge, 
invenies tamen inter se differre figuris. 
nee ratione alia proles eognoseere matrem 
nee mater posset prolem; quod posse videmus 
nee minus atque homines inter se nota cluere (2.347-351). 
Go on and take any one species of animal you wish: still you will find that they 
differ among one another in their forms. In no other way could an offspring 
recognize its mother nor a mother its offspring-and we see that they can, and no 
less than humans, be recognized among themselves. 
In this confirmation of the bond between mother and offspring we hear in a murmur the 
utterance of the name Ceres alongside her role as mother, eognoSCERE matrem (or 
perhaps within it, eognosCERE mat REM). The sound of Proserpina may be heard too in 
the phrase posset prolem, and the repeated word proles may be heard as a kind of calque 
for her cult name, K6pYJ. 381 The god of the underworld and his crime are likewise given 
voice in the word differre , i.e. Dis ferre. Alone, each of these verbal assonances requires 
381 On the cult name, K6pTJ, see Burkert (1985) 159. 
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some use of the imagination, but in their abundance they support one another, and once 
the latent myth has been recognized they are not easily dismissed as mere coincidences. 
But whether every reader recognized the verbal plays or not (certainly there would be 
many who did not), they may stand for us as a confirmation of Lucretius' intention to 
move his narrative tacitly toward the world of the myth. 
But the purpose of this implicit move toward myth is ultimately to move us 
farther away from it. The insertion of the latent myth at this point in book 2 serves the 
same didactic function that the latent myth of Tantalus served with regard to the 
underworld myths of book 3. Its recognition provides subliminal stimulus for the reader 
to allegorize and to naturalize a myth that is centrally related to the philosophical theme 
of the book. As we have seen, the philosophic thrust of the book is to assert the earth's 
insentience and to deny its divinity and the providence of any supposed earth-goddess. 
In Rome, two cult figures embodied the notion of a provident earth that Lucretius is 
fighting against. One was the Magna Mater, the Greek Cybele, who was imported to 
Rome from Asia Minor in 204 BC.382 Lucretius will deal with this version of the earth-
goddess explicitly and extensively by describing her violent and terrifying rites in a 
critical vein while simultaneously ridiculing the rationalizing allegories of the veteres 
Graium docti poetae (2.600) that attempt to excuse them.383 Kirk Summers has allowed 
us to see just how topical and how Roman is Lucretius' description of the annual 
382 Aurigemma (1909) 31-65, Colin (1954) 346-55, Spaeth (1996) 92-97, Beard (1998) 
80-83, 96-98, 164-6. 
383 Summers (1996) 339-40, and see Gale (1994) 85-98. 
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procession in which these rites were made public.384 With this description, Lucretius 
was not just attacking a myth but a Roman religious institution. 
The other religious instantiation of the idea of a provident earth was the cult of 
Ceres who, alongside Proserpina/Kore, was celebrated and worshipped in her role as 
goddess of grain and presider over agriculture. 385 Ceres' cult was established in 493 BC, 
and by the time of the Late Republic was already well integrated with the Greek goddess 
Demeter and the Eleusinian mysteries. 386 The goddess Ceres was no less present at 
Rome than was the Magna Mater and held equal , if not greater, sway over the public 
consciousness.387 We have already examined Lucretius' concession to the name Ceres 
as a term for grain (2.655-660),:1gx but we have not yet paused to consider just how 
prevalent and significant this metonymic expression was for his Roman audience. 
Ceres' temple was likely the sight of a grain depository and/or the headquarters of the 
administration of the official grain supply, the annona, and the goddess herself was 
384 Summers (1996), addressing previous claims of the foreignness of Lucretius' account 
of the cultic rites of the Magna Mater, shows conclusively that Lucretius was 
describing the Roman instantiation of this cult with which his Roman readers would 
have been familiar: "Lucretius was addressing his audience within the context of their 
own personal experiences, speaking as one Roman to another about contemporary 
issues" (338). 
385 On Ceres' close association with the Roman earth-goddess Tellus see Horace Carm. 
Saec. 29-30, Ovid Fasti 1.671-684; cf. Spaeth (1996) 34-7. 
386 Spaeth (1996) 18. The Eleusinian mysteries counted among its initiates such 
notables as Cicero and Atticus (Cic. Leg. 2.35) and Sulla (Vit. Sulla 26); see Spaeth 
(1996) 18, 60. On the distinction between the initiation rites of Ceres and those ofthe 
Eleusinian mysteries, see Spaeth (1996) 59 and 103-23. 
387 On the presence of these cults in the late republic, see Spaeth (1996) 16-20: "By the 
time of the Late Republic [ ... ] all the various associations of Ceres are in place: her 
connection with fertility, both agricultural and human, liminality, the plebs, and 
women" (16). 
388 Above. ch. 4, pp. 114-15. 
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thought to preside over its distribution. 389 The administrators of this grain supply, an 
office created by Julius Caesar, held the title aediles Ceriales. 39° Ceres' name and her 
image were synonymous with grain.391 It was of necessity that Lucretius conceded to 
this socially embedded mythological expression, but the depth of its roots made it all the 
more important for him to bring out the distinction between the word and the goddess 
and all the associations that her supposed divinity brought to bear. 
The latent myth gives him an opportunity to address this version of the earth-
goddess by implicitly reducing her divine status to the natural and the animal. This 
implicit naturalization also saves him from having to address both instantiations of the 
earth-goddess figure explicitly, a prospect that might have involved undue repetition or 
other logistical complications. It is difficult to reconstruct his reasons for addressing the 
Magna Mater explicitly and Ceres through the latent myth, but some intriguing 
possibilities present themselves. There was a conspicuous class distinction between 
these two cults. The Magna Mater, whose temple resided on the Palatine,392 was 
associated with the patrician class, and the cult of Ceres, whose temple was located on 
the Aventine,393 was strongly associated with the plebs.394 The similarities between the 
389 Spaeth (1996) 38-41, 84-5. 
390 Dio Cass. 43.51.3; see Spaeth (1996) 17. 
391 Numerous literary references attest to the fact, Cicero Verr. 2.4.108, 114; 5.99, 188; 
De Or. 3.167; Nat. D. 2.60, 3.41, 52, 62; Varro Rust. 1.1.5; Ling. 5.64; Catullus 63 .36; 
Varro Sat. Men. 251, as do numerous images of her wearing the symbolic corona 
spicea; see Spaeth 16 and figures 3-8. 
392 Spaeth (1996) 93 and Orlin (2002). 
393 Spaeth (1996) 93 , Richardson (1992) 215-16, and Orlin (2002). 
394 Spaeth (1996) 81-102, esp. 90-97, Beard (1998) 70-72. 
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two cults and their nearly concurrent celebrations,395 brought the political associations of 
each to the fore,396 and there was class antagonism between the two.397 These class 
associations were also used to advantage by politicians who wished to associate 
themselves with Ceres in order to gamer support from the plebs.398 Numerous coins 
bear her image, including one issued by Lucretius' own Memmius in 56 BC, which bore 
the image of Ceres and the words MEMMIUS AED. CERJALIA PREIMUS FECIT on 
the reverse and on the obverse an image of Quirin us and the words QUIRJNUS and C 
MEMMI C F.399 Its not clear precisely why Memmius wished to display his plebeian 
roots on this occasion, but the association with Ceres was the vehicle through which he 
advertised them. 
It ought also to be considered that Lucretius attacked the figure of the Magna 
Mater by criticizing the rites of her cult-rites that were on display annually for every 
Roman to see. This strategy was unavailable to him with regard to the Ceres cult, given 
that her rites were mystery rites and unknown to all but to her devotees. Instead, 
Lucretius addresses Ceres explicitly in terms of the social significance of her name, 
which we can imagine from its official use must have had a great claim on regular 
395 The Ludi Megalenses were held on April 4-10, and the Ludi Ceriales on April 12-19, 
Spaeth (1996) 93. 
396 The Megalensia opened with banquets of patrician families, the Cerialia opened with 
banquets of plebeian families, Spaeth ( 1996) 93. 
397 Graillot (1912), Vermaseren (1977), and Spaeth (1996) 92-97, "the fact of 
assimilation in cult practices reflects the sense of rivalry and opposition that imitation 
may confer" (93). 
398 Spaeth (1996) 97-102. 
399 RRC 427.2; BMCRR Rome 3940. See Spaeth (1996) 97-8 and Le Bonniec (1958) 
320-23. 
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parlance. But he subordinates his treatment of her mythological and cultic status to the 
suppressed voice of the naturalizing allegory that his latent myth suggests. 
Although varied in its approach, Lucretius ' treatment of these two goddesses is 
put to the same purpose and serves the same didactic end. Lucretius injects these 
mythological and religious polemics into his argument about the true nature of the earth, 
whose culmination lies in the total rejection of its divine properties. As a sidelight to his 
main argument on Lucretius' description of the use of animals in war (5 .1297-1349), 
Charles Segal compared Lucretius' description of the cow to his description of the 
Magna Mater procession in an important and telling manner. He lists both passages as 
thematically significant digressions analogous to Platonic myth, which Lucretius hopes 
will bring across an emotional force that furthers the trajectory of his surface 
argurnent.400 These passages exhibit a clear emotional force, but they also have a 
didactic significance, in that they redirect the pathos of these mythical expressions of the 
earth ' s power. The awe that the Magna Mater procession evokes is turned from 
reverence to horror in Lucretius' description, and the sympathy that the reader feels for 
Ceres in her search for her lost offspring is transferred to a more appropriate, natural 
source, which nonetheless carries the same emotional weight as the myth. 
V Lucretius ' cow and Ovid 's Ceres 
400 Segal (1990) 191-2. When commenting further on the passage in book 5, Segal puts 
his finger on a crucial point that relates to our understanding of these passages and the 
significance of their divergence in tone and seeming lack of integration: "The apparent 
interruption to the flow of the argument in 1308-49 enables Lucretius to channel an 
underlying ethical message into a torrential flood of morally significant visual 
imagery" (194). 
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Before bringing this argument to a close, I want to explore another, later version 
of the Ceres myth that owes its imagery to this Lucretian passage. In the Fasti, Ovid 
retells the myth and explicitly compares Ceres to a cow that has lost its calf. The 
reappearance of Lucretius' cow in the Fasti helps to confirm the reading ofthe Lucretian 
passage that I have been suggesting, and the way in which Ovid understood and reacted 
to it also gives us some insight into the acient reception of this example ofthe 
phenomenon of didactic latency. 
The language of Ovid ' s retelling of the Ceres myth is conspicuously imitative of 
the Lucretian passage: 
ut vitulo mugit sua mater ab ubere rapto 
et quaerit fetus per nemus omne suos, 
sic dea nee retinet gemitus et concita cursu 
fertur eta campis incipit, Henna, tuis. 
inde puellaris nacta est vestigia plantae 
et pressam nato pondere vidit humum (Fasti 4.459-464), 
As, when a bull-calf is taken from the udder, its own mother lows and seeks her 
own offspring throughout the whole glen, so the goddess does not hold back her 
bellowing and starting into a run is borne on and sets out from your fields, 
Henna. From there she traced the prints of her girlish foot and scanned the 
ground pressed by her familiar weight. 
Ovid's passage is nearly a quotation of Lucretius. He has his Ceres trace the footprints 
that her daughter left on the ground, puellaris nacta est vestigia plantae et press am [ .. . ] 
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vidit humum, just as Lucretius' cow had done, nanquit~ 111 humi pedibus vestigia press a 
bisulcis (DRN 2.356). The only linguistic alteration that Ovid makes is to change 
Lucretius' pedibus bisulcis to puellaris plantae in order to distinguish the feet ofthe 
young goddess from those of Lucretius' calf. 
But Ovid's homage goes beyond simple linguistic imitation. He also alludes to 
the theme of recognition and ownership that the Lucretian passage is intended to 
illustrate, adapting Lucretius' scientific principle to his version of the myth. Lucretius 
brings his atomic analogy to its conclusion by remarking on the cow' s need for its own 
calf, usque adeo quiddam proprium notumque requirit (2.366). Ovid recognizes the 
pathos that Lucretius imparts to this conclusion and takes full advantage, re-
appropriating it into his version of the myth. The cow is the calfs "own mother," sua 
mater, and Proserpina is Ceres' "own offspring," fetus suos, whom she can recognize as 
her own just by the marks that her "familiar weight," nato pondere , impresses upon the 
ground. And although Ovid's simile initially separates Ceres from the cow with whom 
Lucretius identifies her, his language soon blends the two together again. Ceres lets out 
a "bellow," gemitus, that echoes the cow's low, mugit.402 And she follows her 
daughter's footprints along the ground, vidit humum, as if nosing them like an animal, 
nacta est. By this kind of "transfusion of terms"-itself a very Lucretian poetic 
401 There is some circularity in my argument for this particular word, given that I have 
accepted nanquit here on the basis of Ovid (:,ec ;1hnv'-'- n . .";7:" ), but even if we do not 
chose to accept nanquit at DRN 2.3 56 the imitation is clear. It is the obviousness of the 
imitation, after all, that led Mooney to adopt this word in Lucretius in the first place. 
402 Murgatoyd (2005) 79. 
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mannerism403-0vid makes his Ceres not just cow-like, but nearly the cow herself. He 
seems so captivated by Lucretius' image of Ceres as the cow that his own Ceres, 
although goddess once again, still bears the traces of her former transformation. 
There is little doubt that Ovid was thinking of Lucretius' cow when he composed 
his version of the Ceres myth.404 But the question remains, what exactly did he think of 
the Lucretian passage? There are two alternatives. It is possible that he was thinking of 
the combination of Lucretius' cow and the mythical goddess as his own invention-a 
clever new spin that he was putting on the myth. Or, as seems to me more likely, Ovid 
recognized the latent myth behind Lucretius' depiction of the cow and expected his 
allusion to bring this association to bear. The question does not have an easy answer. 
No Lucretian scholar has brought the latent myth into the scholarly conversation on the 
passage, and so scholarship remarking on Ovid's allusion does not help us to address the 
matter either. 405 If we accept the second of these two alternatives, we find Ovid paying 
homage, not only to Lucretius ' depiction of the cow, but to the latent myth that 
transformed Ceres into the cow, as we have seen Ovid do as well. This reading has 
substantial significance for the Ovid passage, and it also helps to corroborate our 
understanding of the latent myth in Lucretius, because in order for Ovid to color his own 
403 West (1969) coins the term, which he identifies as a style of argument in which 
Lucretius allows the terms of his illustrative analogies to mingle with the terms of his 
literal argument (42, 44). 
404 Leonard and Smith (1942) 345, Bailey (1947) 861, Hinds (1987) 152 n. 26, Fantham 
(1998) 179. 
405 The scholarly debate on this passage has focused on the relationship of Ovid's 
version of the myth in the Fasti to the version he gives at Met. 5.346-661 and the 
relationship that each of these has with the Homeric Hymn; see Fantham ( 1998) 173 
for a brief review. 
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retelling of the myth by referencing Lucretius' subtly naturalized version, he would have 
to expect his readers to have recognized the latent myth in Lucretius and its significance 
there as well. 
The question reduces to whether or not Ovid recognized Lucretius' intention to 
naturalize the myth. But there is an important constant in both of these alternatives. As 
Ovid read Lucretius' passage, he came to envision the cow as Ceres, and in his retelling 
of her myth, he reinvents his Ceres rendering her as part cow. Thus we can see the 
expected function of the latent myth in action. Ovid was inspired to assimilate the Ceres 
myth to Lucretius' natural exemplum and thereby to reduce the goddess allegorically, 
even in his ostensibly reverential retelling of her myth. Questions of intention still 
linger, both Lucretius' and Ovid's, and perhaps they can never be dispensed with 
completely, but Ovid's interaction with the Lucretian passage indicates as firmly as we 
can justly expect that, in this one case, Lucretius inspired participation in an explicitly 
naturalizing allegory of the Ceres myth. 
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